
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Volume 3
Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization
Some National Case Studies
Edited by
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BRILL

EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES AMONG MUSLIMS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

MUSLIM MINORITIES

EDITORS

Jørgen S. Nielsen (University of Birmingham)
Felice Dassetto (University of Louvain-la-Neuve)
Amira Sonbol (Georgetown University, Washington, DC)

VOLUME 3

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Some National Case Studies

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HOLGER DAUN AND GEOFFREY WALFORD

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CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ALESCO	Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
BREDA	Bureau Regional
CR	Czech Republic
EU	European Union
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
ISESCO	Islamic Organization for Education, Science and Culture
LEA	Local Education Authority
MOE	Ministry of Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SPCK	Society for Promotion of Christian Knowledge
TIMSS	Third International Mathematics and Science Study
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

INTRODUCTION

This book is dedicated to the exploration and analysis of educational strategies among Muslims in the "core" area (countries with a long Islamic tradition) and among Muslims living in countries where they are minorities (in Europe and the USA). The book is intended for students and the academic (with emphasis on educationists) interested in educational policies, and convergence and standardization in the context of globalization, on the one hand, and increasing levels of pluralism within the heightened prioritization of multiculturalism, on the other. Islam as a religion and Islamist revivalism as a movement are component parts of globalization, but also a challenging force to that globalization. Trends and patterns of migration, global tourism and transnational mass media have considerably expanded the areas of interaction between Western and other religious and secular systems of thought and education, and the religiously oriented Muslim counterpart system of thought and educational frameworks.

In Muslim and predominantly Muslim countries, educational systems may include and are permeated by religious-moral elements—within different contexts of formal educational institutions and informal frameworks such as supplementary and alternative schools (e.g. religious mosque schools). Among European states with growing Muslim minority populations, it is the case that in spite of the standardization of educational policies, in such countries, they still differ considerably in their approach to religious and minority demands for special educational arrangements. Some countries have a unitary and national system (national curriculum and secular education), while the state in other countries opts neither to control nor support Muslim education as an alternative system of education or a supplementary component of the present system. A third category of countries however opt for a multi-cultural framework in trying to accommodate immigrant and minority cultures, hence opting for a "compromise" to establish supplementary education (based on a national curriculum) and economically subsidizing such arrangements.

Chapter 1 of the book presents elements of Islam as a religion in general (e.g. Shīʿism and Sunnīsm), Islamic conceptualizations of

knowledge and education and this in the context of globalization processes.

Chapter 2 deals with different Islamic orientations and their relationship to educational issues. Using different criteria such as the relationship between (the Islamic) religion and the state, the role of religion in individuals' lives, the role of education, and so on, four principal orientations may be distinguished. These are the secularist orientation, the traditionalist orientation, the modern/liberal orientation and the fundamentalist orientation. Chapters 1 and 2 together demonstrate that Islam as ideology and praxis is far from a homogeneous and unitarian force, although the Islamic educational arrangements are rather similar across Muslim countries.

The remaining chapters may been seen as two sections, the first section (Chapters 3–8) dealing with Muslim case countries, and the second with some Europan countries and their way of handling education for Muslim minorities (Chapters 9–13). The descriptions in each section differs somewhat for a number of reasons. The Muslim countries vary considerably in economic, cultural and political aspects and in their ways of responding to global forces. Also, homogenous and strictly comparative data has not been available on the countries included. For countries such as Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia, it has been difficult to find accurate up to date information. The countries with Muslim minorities in the North differ in their immigration policies and in the importance given to education for minorities as well as in their response to global forces.

Chapter 3 describes educational development in Iran prior to the Iranian Islamic revolution to the present. The state run curriculum in schools is impregnated by Islamic elements that directly reflect the ethos and raison d'etre of the Islamic revolution and the Shīʿite version of revivalist Islam. On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that a few secular schools have most recently been allowed. They do not however serve or are accessible to a wide base, but are more elitist in their outlook as reflected by their high fees.

Shifts in the state and Islam and different types of Western and Islamic education in Afghanistan are described in chapter 4. The description starts back in history and deals with the development up until present time.

Chapter 5 describes the development of the Western type of education and Islamic education in Pakistan. Although the former type of education includes large proportions of Islamic thought and values

also in such "secular" subjects as mathematics and natural sciences, the number of Islamic educational institutions is increasing rapidly. This chapter also gives some examples of how Islamic matters enter into the subject of mathematics.

Chapter 6 accounts for a case study of Ḳur'ānic education conducted in Morocco. A large number of children attend Ḳur'ānic schools although they are students in the state schools that have as a mission and a component of their curricula the instruction in the most important elements of the religion, and more specifically the religious-moral framework of practice.

After the collapse of the state and the public educational system in Somalia, Islamic education has been revived and renewed (again regarded as a collateral effect to the Islamist revivalist movement). Most of the schools have been run since the beginning of the 1990s by NGOs, most of which can be classified as Islamic (and Islamist). This is the theme in chapter 7.

Chapter 8 gives a description of the different types of education that exist in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. Apart from the governmental schools, there are Ḳur'ānic and Arabic schools owned and administered by Muslim communities (and groups). Parents are able to choose between the two types of schools, and in many districts in these three countries, Islamic schools increasingly enroll more children then the government schools do.

Chapter 9 accounts for the education and immigration policies in Sweden reflecting the findings from two case studies, one conducted in two schools supplementing the national schools with religious education. Such schools, often denoted Muslim schools while not strictly reflecting the normal or most recognized model of a 'Muslim School', have to use the national curriculum and are monitored and controlled by the government. Another case study among the Somali immigrants in Stockholm includes parents who send their children to Ḳur'ānic schools in addition to the education their children receive in the government schools.

Educational laws in England are quite similar to those in Sweden, but the latter has been more liberal in its interpretation of such laws. The case has always been for instance, that it is easy to establish Catholic schools or shools serving to Catholic students. External to the anglo-Christian circle, Muslim schools have been apparent on the landscape and approved only during the last three years, culminating in a total of three governmentally recognized schools.

Chapter 10 attempts to analyse the status quo and parameters of Muslim education in England in comparison with other types of religious schooling.

In Germany, there is theoretically a right to establish private schools of different types as long as they follow the democratic framework established by the federal government. It is the case, however, that a growing number of the Muslim community choose to send their children to Ḳur'ānic schools in the evenings or during the weekends in order to educate them in the in moral matters. This is described in chapter 11.

Minorities have always had certain educational rights in the Czech Republic, but this does not seem to apply to the Muslim immigrant minority. Their children have to follow the education given in government run schools. While by contrast the Romani population has the right to be taught in their own language. This is main focus of chapter 12.

At the end of the Greek-Turkish conflict, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) placed the Muslim groups living in North-Eastern Greece under an international system of protection of linguistic and religious minority rights. Since then, those Muslim groups have been granted the right to education in their own language. In recent years immigration, mainly from Albania, has started changing the ethnic and religious composition of society and school classrooms, creating new challenges for the Greek state. This is the theme of chapter 13.

CHAPTER ONE

MUSLIMS AND EDUCATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

Holger Daun, Reza Arjmand and Geoffrey Walford

Introduction

Most Muslims in the world want schools to their children with some moral and values education. For many state-run education systems it has been a challenge to find an optimal balance between the demand for moral and values education and education enhancing cognitive and technical skills. Now globalization processes add to this challenge in that they result in an increasing demand for competitive people, while at the same time legitimizing multi-religious and multi-cultural demands on education, since more and more people adhere to Islam—itself a globalizing force.

Muslims are in a majority or form important minorities of the population in many countries—from Morocco in the west to Philippines in the east and from Bosnia-Herzegovina—Tajikistan in the north to Mozambique in the south. Today conversion to Islam takes place in many places—not only in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also in Europe and America (Coulon, 1993; Haynes, 1996; van Bruissen, 1995)—but often Islam is assimilated into the pre-existing religions (An-Náim, 1998; Eickelmann, 1989; Masquelier, 1999). This means it is articulated in ways different from those found in, for instance, the geographical area of Islam's origin.

Islam and Its Developments

The *Sharíʿa*, which is the core of Islam and the Islamic law in a broad sense, "designates a prophetic religion in its totality" (Calder & Hooker, 2002) and includes the Islamic doctrine and social practice of the law which regulates all aspects of Muslim life, covering rituals as well as political and legal rules. The classical doctrine of *Sharíʿa* is based on four main sources of the Law: (i) the Ḳurʾān, (ii)

Sunna, (iii) consensus (*iḏjmāʾ*) and (iv) analogy, (*ḳīās*), while some other schools add one source more: wisdom (*ʿaḳl*). To study these principles there developed a special knowledge known as *uṣūl al-fiḳh* (literally: principles of jurisprudence), a discipline required for every pupil in Islamic jurisprudence. The Islamic science of ascertaining the precise terms of the *Sẖariʿa*, is known as *fiḳh* (literally understanding, knowledge). By the development of the Islamic jurisprudence as a field of knowledge, a new group of specialists known as jurists (*fuḳahā*), emerged. *Sẖariʿa*, as Islamic law, is different from secular law mainly in that it covers all spheres of the private and social life.

Throughout history, a series of divisions have taken place within Islam and the community of the Muslim world (*Umma*): the division into two branches (Sunnīsm and Shīʿism), the emergence of different legal schools, the appearance of different brotherhoods within the two principal branches and then the different degrees of secularization. The majority of Muslims are Sunnīs, while Shīʿites are in the majority in Iran and Iraq, and form important minorities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon.

With the spread of Islam during the first centuries after Muḥammad's death, a class of learned men—*ʿulamāʾ*—emerged. This class consists of religious experts (*imāms*), experts in jurisprudence (*ḳāḍī*) and teachers (*muftīs*) at different levels in the education system. During the 8th century, four scholars (*ʿulamāʾ*), living in different places, each formed and developed their schools of law. The conclusion of their work was four systemized schools of jurisprudence which in turn formed four main Muslim rites (*maḏẖāhib al-ʿarbʿaa*).[1] The first texts of the law, recorded by the four scholars differed from each other in that the personal speculations of the jurists as well as the social environment played a significant role. As only some 80 verses of Ḳurʾān clearly deal with the legal issues, the doors for personal interpretations, reasoning and ascertains were open to the early scholars. The personal interpretation of the jurist known as "sound opinion" (*raʾy*), became a key doctrine in Islamic Jurisprudence.

[1] These legal schools became known as *Sẖāfiʿī, Mālikī, Hanafi and Ḥanbalī*. The *Hanafi* predomine in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, the *Mālikī* in North Africa and Africa south of Sahara, the *Sẖāfiʿī* in Indonesia and the *Ḥanbalī* in Saudi Arabia. The four schools differ in the interpretation of the Ḳurʾān and *ḥadīṯẖ*. The Mālikīte legal school has two features which distinguishes it from the three others: (a) it is more practical; and (b) reasoning in legal and other matters is an important method for gaining knowledge (Dodge, 1962; Trimingham, 1968, 1970).

The term *fiḳh* is used in opposition to knowledge (*ʿilm*) and is applied to the "independent exercise of the intelligence, the decision of legal points by one's own judgment in the absence or ignorance of a traditional ruling bearing on the case in question" (Goldziher and Schacht, 2002, p. 232). Ibn Khaldūn (Ibn Khaldūn, 1980: III, 233) defines *fiḳh* as "the knowledge of the classification of the laws of God, which concern the actions of all responsible Muslims, as obligatory (*wāḏjib*), forbidden (*maḥḏhūr*), recommendable (*manḏhūb*), disliked (*makrūh*), or permissible (*mubāh*). These (laws) are derived from the Ḳurʾān and the *Sunna* (traditions), and from the evidence the Lawgiver (Muḥammad) has established for knowledge of (the laws)."

Who is a Muslim then? There is no unanimous answer to this question. Some argue that those who follow the five pillars of Islam, should be considered Muslims, namely: (i) *Shihada* (bear witness that "there is no God but God, and Muḥammad is his Prophet"); (ii) *Ṣalat* (five daily prayers); (iii) *zakāt* (religious income tax given to the poor); (iv) *Ṣawm* (fast during the month of Ramadan); and (v) *Ḥaḏjḏj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) (Gregorian, 2001). Others argue that the principal pillars are "not the lowest common denominator but an outline" (Eickelman, 1989, p. 263). That is, people may be defined as Muslims even if they do not fulfill the five requirements.

Colonialism, Islam and Education

Although the Ottoman empire and various sultanates and other political units existed for centuries, most of them did not have the administrative and decision-making structures of a modern state, although they fulfilled some of the functions of a state. Many of the Muslim countries were colonized and had secular laws and modern Western-type education introduced by the colonial state.

In most cases, education was secularist or Christian in the colonies and did not include Islamic matters. Although never colonized, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey also introduced modern Western-type education. Generally, two different colonial strategies were used: direct and assimilationist (by the French, Italians and Portuguese) and indirect and integrationist (by the British) (Holmes & McLean, 1989; Mallison, 1980). However, all colonial powers implemented state apparatuses and education systems of the type existing in the home countries, while religious issues and family laws

were left to the local populations (Warnoch Fernea, 1995). The formation of the state implied differentiation of society and individualization—features that were alien to the *Sharī'a* and the *Umma*. Modern education systems were introduced by the colonialists into the occupied territories, but countries which were not colonized also established this type of education.

Modernization accompanied colonialism and was accepted to the extent that it resulted in economic growth and a better material standard of living. However, the price for material progress tended to be increased economic and political differentiation, stratification, individualization and secularization (Kramer, 1997; Tibi, 1995). Modernization was therefore interpreted by many Muslims to mean modern education, technology, and industry, but also the Western style of life. In other words, modernization was Westernization and, therefore, "modernity" came to be rejected by sections of the Muslim populations (Ayubi, 1991).

Generally, we can distinguish two principal waves of Islamic revival. The first occurred during the early colonial period more or less as a response to the early Western influence, colonialism and modernization. It included a struggle against Western hegemony and the growth of secularism in the Middle East and other countries and a reinforcement of religion, either through a return to the sources (fundamentalism) or a change of way of life back to what is perceived to have been the way of life in previous periods (traditionalism) (see Chapter Two). However, Islamic revival has developed in rather different ways in different countries. Iran and Turkey secularized their states and education systems but later, the Iranian revolution abruptly reinstalled the Islamic influence in education, while a gradual restoration of Islam in education has taken place in Turkey after Atatürk's efforts in the 1920s to modernize the country. The second wave of revival emerged in the 1970s in relation to globalization and unfulfilled promises of modernization.

Independence, State and Education

After the Second World War, the Muslim countries found themselves on very different baselines, economically, culturally and politically. Islam's position vis-à-vis the state (and consequently, the place of Islamic education in society) came to differ due to a number of

factors, such as: (i) the power relations between different religious (or other) groups in society; (ii) the degree of economic development and modernization of the society in question; and (iii) the development strategy defined after independence (or the period of intensive nation construction in non-colonized countries).

The historical relationship between rulers and Islam as well as the power relations between different religious (or other) groups in society vary from one country to another. Practically complete Islamization took place in the Middle East, North Africa and some countries in Asia, while it was partial in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the latter area, the proportion of Muslims varies from less than one per cent in the southern part of Africa to 80–90 percent in Mali and Senegal and from a low percentage in the Philippines to 100 Afghanistan. In a third category of countries, such as Indonesia and Lebanon, Islam and the state had to adapt to the fact that Christian minorities were rather influential.

As far as economic development and modernization are concerned, several of the oil producing countries have had a rapid economic growth but no corresponding modernization of society (e.g. Saudi Arabia), while other countries have experienced modernization more than economic growth (e.g. Algeria). A third category of countries have had gradual, comprehensive change (Morroco).

Modernization implies separation between the state and *Sharīʿa*, and between state-run education and *Sharīʿa*. At independence, Muslim countries had one strategy in common: they made attempts to keep these two "entities" separate in that secular laws were maintained and continued to be a matter for the state and its jurisdiction but in practice, family issues and interpretation and application of civil laws to a large extent were left to the civil sphere and local communities. For many of these countries, the image of Japan functioned as a model to follow, that is, modernization without Westernization (Gregorian, 2001).

Apart from the strategy mentioned, states differed in the way they dealt with Islamic interests (the *'ulamā'*). Some states avoided an alliance with these interests, while others made Islam a state religion (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, Yemen, Morocco, Egypt and Kuwait), which means that the state follows secular laws but protects and supports Islam. A third category of countries have at some periods had an Islamic state, following *Sharīʿa* law (Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Haussa state in Nigeria and Afghanistan under the Talibans, Iraq,

Pakistan and Sudan).[2] Some countries applied a Socialist development approach and had the ambition to erase Islamic influence but they were not able or willing to replace *Sharī'a* in all sections and at all levels of society (Badie, 1986; Haynes, 1999; Kramer, 1997; Nyang, 1993).

Education continued to be an issue for the state; thus, education systems were "nationalized" in that (a) the state determined the curriculum and the structure of the system, (b) the national language was introduced if it had not been the language of instruction in the colonial schools, and (c) Islamic matters were included in the curriculum of the state-run education. This strategy was used in most of the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan. In some countries, the state maintained the parallel system that had emerged during the colonial period when the secular school network expanded along with the Islamic schools (e.g. Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan). In countries with a less influential Muslim tradition (e.g. countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and some Asian countries), the secular education system was maintained. In all of such countries, Islamic educational arrangements have been established outside of the state sphere.

Most of the Muslim countries started to experience pressures from the accelerating processes of globalization when they were still in an intensive period of nation-state construction (Badie, 1986).

World System and Accelerating Globalization

The world constitutes a system in which interdependencies between units situated in different geographical areas around the globe are being extended and intensified (Sklair, 1995). Such processes (globalization) are historical but went into a new phase of acceleration in the 1970s due to the economic liberalizations initiated in this decade, cheaper transport and the growth of ICT (information and communication technology).

Globalization may be seen from different perspectives: economically, politically and culturally, although it is principally seen through economic and cultural processes which occur rather independently

[2] A phenomenon such as an Islamic state is, according to An-Náim, 1998, p. 117) an invention from the second half of the 20th century.

from single country actions and frontiers. The new media techniques and means of communication allow rapid and direct contact between individuals all over the world. Various flows have become more complex, extended and intensive and new flows have emerged: flows of goods and services; flows of financial and other capital; flows of people and flows of information and messages (Appadurai, 1991; Waters, 1995). Some countries are highly involved in global processes while others are not, and some aspects in one and the same country are highly globalized, while others are not (Hirst & Thompson, 1996; McGrew, 1992).

Economically, there is a growing interdependency between nations, companies, organizations, and individuals around the world. Economic actions and processes are the leading globalizing forces and they consist of more than international exchange of goods and services and interaction of separate domestic economies. The world system is predominantly capitalist, which means that people are encouraged or compelled to enter into commodified, monetized and priced exchanges as producers and consumers. The strongest globalizing forces include the market idea as well as the idea that modernization is to make individuals' behaviour "consistent with liberal norms of modernity" (Duffield, 2002, p. 91).[3] High technology activities, growth and richness are concentrated in a geographical zone including East and Southeast Asia, Western Europe and the USA. There is increasing economic competition as well economic marginalization. Some of the Muslim countries are highly involved in globalization processes, while others have become more or less marginalized (Beeley, 1992).

States have to handle some principal forces deriving from global processes: (i) world models, (ii) governance through market forces and mechanisms, and (iii) secularization as well as desecularization. As to the first force, Meyer et al. (1997) aruge that a world polity and something like world models have emerged (Meyer et al., 1997), not as physical bodies or institutions but as a complex of cultural expectations and "tacit understandings", and explicit recommendations, deriving from and "stored" in international organizations (such as the World Bank, OECD, UNESCO, etc.). World models are "cognitive

[3] The debate concerning the compatibility between *Sharʿa*, on the one hand, and economic growth and modernization, on the other hand, will not be referred to here.

and ontological models of reality that specify the nature, purposes, technology, sovereignty, control, and resources of nation-states and other actors (Meyer et al., 1997: 144). They define and prescribe what educational policies are opportune, desirable and appropriate, and take for granted the existence of modern states that implement modern institutions and cultures (Meyer et al., 1997). The modern culture is oriented towards individualism, purposive rationality, and competition.

During the first phase of accelerating globalization, the models that appeared the state was seen as the principal actor and motor of development of national societies. These first models included prescriptions concerning institution-building (a national state apparatus or polity, a national education system and mass education, and so on) (Boli & Ramirez, 1992). World models that emerged later (from the 1980s), prescribed societal and educational restructuring (decentralization, privatization and application of market forces) and Human Rights, Children Rights, Neoliberal views (the self-interested and utility maximizing man), consumerist ideals, and so on. All world models, thus, embody the Western world view (Robertson, 1991; Wilson, 1997). Furthermore, international pressure is growing on nation-states to change their legal system to correspond to the requirements of the global market. This affects many laws (and even constitutions) and not only those applying to the economic domain and the liberal form of democracy.

As far as governance is concerned, the world economy is governed by market forces (Griffin, 2003) and this type of governance is country-wise mediated by history, politics, contingency and complexity resulting in different impacts (Duffield, 2002). It has been difficult for states everywhere to convert cultural and value-oriented demands into regulation of behaviour (Held, 1995; Offe, 1984). Globalization processes have made this task more problematic than ever before, and the market does not have drives and is not organized in such a way that it make it culturally sensitive. Globalization of market forces implies that complex and sometimes contradictory processes occur. In the capitalist system, economic imperatives tend to dominate over all others, individuals act in self-interest and their actions are guided by purposive (instrumental) rationality. There is a universal commodification of life and political and social relationships (Giddens, 1994) as well as extension of pricing to more and more services and activities (Saul, 1997). In addition to the spread

of the market model and monetized exchange of goods, services and ideas, a standardized consumer culture is spreading (Ahmed, 1992; Lash, 1990). Rationalization (the spread of purposive rationality) is accompanied by secularization and declining importance of moral values, at least in Europe. The "universalized" aspects of cultures challenge and question local cultures and taken-for-granted aspects, and traditions are being problematized (Giddens, 1994). Individuals can less than before trust the immediate and experienced past and present (Robertson, 1992; Waters, 1995). All this results in increasing risk and uncertainty (Reich, 1997). Islam, along with other religions, appeals to groups experiencing these features.

Another factor in the cultural/ideological domain is the increasing dissemination of discourses, made possible through mass media and the growth of literacy in the world. Two predominating discourses have been globalized since the beginning of the 1980s, and they may be termed *the market-oriented* and *the modern communitarian-oriented.* In the market discourse, education is seen as a good or commodity, and moral issues and moral training are neglected. The communitarian discourse attempts to restore community or at least the spirit of community and education is a holistic matter (Etzioni, 1995). The common denominator of these two predominating discourses includes many features that do not fit certain categories of Muslims: Individualism; freedom of choice; education as a private and individual good, purposive (technical) rationality; decentralization; participation; individual autonomy; etc. (Ahmed, 1992; Meyer et al., 1997).

With increasing flows of capital, messages and people across countries, Islam is spreading but is also challenged by the Western world view and life style (liberal, pluralist and market oriented) (Ahmed, 1992; Massialas & Jarrar, 1991; Wilson, 1997). ICT and the mass media are "exposing the everyday world of Islam to the competition of pluralistic consumption and the pluralization of life worlds . . ." (Ahmed, 1992, p. 177), and "Nothing in history has threatened Muslims like the Western media; neither gunpowder in the Middle Ages . . . nor trains and the telephone, which helped colonize them . . . The Western mass media are ever present and ubiquitous; never resting and never allowing respite" (p. 223). The relativization implicit in or resulting from globalization threatens the Muslim way of life and makes it necessary for Muslims to defend their values and belief systems and for new groups to seek meaning in Islam (Berger, 1998).

Globalization implies spread of modernization, and the latter has

for a long time been assumed to carry secularization. This assumption is now questioned by some researchers (see, for instance, Berger, 1998; Davie, 1998). Several areas in the world have been able to combine modernization and a high priority of religious beliefs and values among the populations. Europe is seen as the only exception. The fact that Islam and the *Umma* are spreading geographically maintenance of religious beliefs and values may be mentioned in this context (Beeley, 1992; Haynes, 1999; Turner, 1991). Since the Second World war several international organizations have been established for the spread of Islam. For instance, during the 1970s, the Islamic Organization for Education, Science and Culture was founded with the aim to establish arabo-islamic culture as a uniting worldwide force (ISESCO, 1985) and to create a front against what was perceived as Western cultural imperialism (Brenner, 1993). This organization supports educational projects not only in Africa, Asia and Latin America but also in the industrialized countries, including adult education, teacher training in the Arabic language, support to Arabic schools, and similar activities. The first World Conference on Muslim education was held in Mecca in 1977. African and Asian Ministers of Education have increasingly participated in the meetings organized by the ISESCO.

The de-secularization, particularlization and revival of (what is believed to be) traditional values, implies an articulation of a perspective or discourse that may be called traditional communitarian. Reinforcement of local groups or cells of Muslims or the imaginary *Umma* exemplify this discourse.[4]

The revivalist wave, starting in the 1970s, may be seen as a response to the secularizing aspects of globalization, and it has to some extent accepted the existence of modernity including a modern state and a secular education system (although the role of the state and its relation to religion may vary) and it is as much a reaction to global secular forces as to "national" forces (An-Náim, 1998). Some groups are in favor of modern political systems as long as they do not undermine a deep commitment to Islamic ideas and teachings, a fact seen by Turner (1991) as a defense of modernism against postmodernism and by Ahmed (1992) as an articulation of the frustration from the deprived access to the benefits of modernization. Other categories

[4] Robertson (1992) sees many of the communitarian actions as an attempt to establish mechanical solidarity (*Gemeinschaft*) at the global level.

of Muslims reject the modern as well as the post-modern life style. In many places, Muslims have resisted the extreme forms of capitalism and consumerism (Coulon, 1993; Lubeck, 1985). For them, *Sharia* precedes the state and, consequently, the state should be an element of the religion or at least serve religious interests (Ahmed, 1992; Ayubi, 1991, 1999).

Islamic movements have extended to new areas, while Christian movements and churches have lost members in the "core" countries but gained new ones in other areas. Islamic messages reach large parts of the globe via mass media and IT and through migration. In relative terms, the proportion of migrants is not bigger than before, but in absolute terms, the number of migrants has grown rapidly. In addition to this, more people than ever before are traveling, even across continents. All these phenomena imply a multiplication of cultural encounters. More than ever before, the world religions compete and challenge one another; each of them claims to possess "exclusive and largely absolute truths or values" (Turner, 1991, p. 173). For instance, in many areas of former Soviet Union, Christian, Islamic and secular "Western" NGOs compete to install their ideologies (Niyozov, 2003). Consequently, globalization results in intensive encounters between Islam, Christianity, Buddism and Hinduism.

Robertson (1995) employes the concept of "glocalization" and Nederveen Pieterse (1995) the concept of "hybridization". Both concepts deal with the encounter between global, standardized cultural aspects and local and/or value-oriented cultural aspects. In the first case, universal features are transformed and translated into local cultures and in the second cases the universal and the local more or less merge. This means, that the outcomes of the encounters between Islam and other globalized beliefs and values differ in different geographical and cultural areas. A large number of Muslims have lived for generations in the North and, according to Eickelman, 1989, "Muslims in Europe are becoming increasingly central, in terms of the role they play not only in the Muslim world, but in the European states were they reside" (p. 261).

There are, thus, different views on how to deal with Western knowledge and education, for instance. One group advocate complete decoupling and the creation of an alternative system of education, while another group argue for a partial decoupling (Hassan, 1999; Tibi, 1995). For the former, modern education is not appropriate for the formation of believing Muslims and Islamic experts and for

the reproduction of *ʿulamāʾ*. For the majority of Muslims, learning Islamic moral training is important, whether it takes place in the formal education system or in non-formal or informal socialization arrangements, and if they feel that Islam does not have a proper place in the state-run schools, they enroll their children in non-formal and civil sphere Islamic arrangements for moral training.

Two Types of Education

Wherever Muslims form substantial minorities, there are Islamic educational arrangements. This means that there are two principal types of education: a) Modern Western type education, and b) Islamic education. The latter may be divided into traditional and modern, and both of them have different levels. The relative importance of these two types may be assumed to vary with (i) degree of modernization (and secularization); (ii) the relative power of Muslim and other interests; and (iii) the degree of involvement in global processes.

According to Ayubi (1991), the role the *ʿulamāʾ* have in educational matters in North Africa and Middle East is related to the rate of modernization of each country; the more rapid the process of modernization, the more it has provoked revivalism and resulted in a stronger position for the *ʿulamāʾ*. However, an analysis of economic and educational data for the Middle East, North Africa and Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan (1960–1998) indicates that there is no clear relationship between, on the one hand, degree and rate of modernization, and, on the other hand, the way education systems are built and how they deal with Islamic matters (UNDP, 1990, 1995, 2001; World Bank, 1979, 1991, 1995, 1999). Instead, the two other factors (the relative power of Muslim and other interests and the degree of involvement in global processes) seem to determine the nature of the educational arrangements. For instance, in predominantly Muslim countries with important minorities of Christians, access to the state and influence on education have been matters of dispute and negotiation.

As a result of globalization processes, schools are now concerned not only with preparing children for adult roles, but education increasingly has to respond to national and local economic and moral requirements as well as the requirements deriving from the globalized world models. Education increasingly has to handle a series of

contradictory needs, demands and requirements such as: religious vs. secular; local vs. national; national vs. international; formation of human capital and merits vs. broad personality and moral development; competition vs. solidarity; focus on tests and performance vs. more holistic considerations; mother tongue vs. international language/s (Benhabib, 1998; Chabbot & Ramirez, 2000; McGinn, 1997). Neither the Western nor Islamic type of education alone seems to be able to handle all this variety.

Islamic Education

In the Islamic conceptualization of knowledge, a distinction is made between acquired knowledge and revealed (intrinsic) knowledge. Education is the acquisition of external knowledge (that improves faith) and the internal realization of intrinsic meaning. The former type of knowledge is either transmitted traditions or rational knowledge, achieved through reason (*ʿaḳl*) (Talbani, 1996). Intrinsic knowledge is sacred and it is believed that the that only a few adherents have the ability to experience it (Ali, 1987; Ashraf, 1987). According to (Warnock Fernea, 1995, p. 8), "Traditionally, the child is without *ʿaḳl*, or reason, and the goal of childhood was to instill and develop the reason" which is necessary in adult life.

Islamic education consists of three levels: elementary education (Ḳurʾānic school, *kuttāb*, mosque school, dāra), complementary or secondary education (post-Ḳurʾānic school, *madrasa*, Arabic school) and higher education (Islamic universities). Table 1.1 provides an overview of different patterns of Islamic educational arrangements.

Combination (1) seems to have been the traditional prototype; children entered some type of Ḳurʾānic school when they were four to seven years old, and then continued in the traditional madrasa (intermediate and higher levels) (Dodge, 1962). This combination still exists in several places but also modernized madrasa have emerged. In combination (2) Ḳurʾānic education has become a matter for "preschool" children, who then continue in one or the other type of madras (or the Western type of primary school). In other places, Ḳurʾānic education may be seen is an education attended by "preschool" and "school age" children who then have the opportunity to enroll in a traditional or modern madrasa for deeper studies in the matters taught at lower stages (combination 3).

Table 1.1 The Structure and Role of Different Types of Islamic Education

	"Pre-school" level	Elementary level	Intermediate level
1	—	Ḳur'ānic school (Mosque school, *dāra, kuttāb, maktab*, and so on)	Traditional or modern *madrasa* (école arabe, Arabic school)
2	Ḳur'ānic school (mosque school, dāra, *kuttāb, maktab* and so on)	Traditional or modern *madrasa* (école arabe, Arabic school)	—
3	Ḳur'ānic (mosque school, *dāra, kuttāb, maktab, madrasa* and so on)		—

Elementary level: The goal of elementary (and higher levels of) Islamic education is to equip the pupils with knowledge about this world and for this world and the next and to lead "each individual and society as a whole, to the Ultimate Truth" (Ali, 1987, p. 36). In the orthodox view, the Ḳur'ān contains the core content of basic Islamic education; textbooks are seen as deviation from the correct way (Hurst, 1985; Talbani, 1996). According to the Ḳur'ān, men and women have the same obligation for and the same right to education, and both are obliged to learn about Islam.

Ḳur'ānic schools do not depend on the state or any other formal specific administration for their operation but are often organized by teachers, the local community or members of the local *'ulamā'*. Teachers are supported by the local community or parents in different ways: pupils work for the teachers (in trade or farming) or parents pay in cash or produce (Keynan, 1993; Nicolas, 1981). There are no formal grades, forms or stages in these schools. Anyone is free to start and to finish whenever he or she wants. The pupil is expected to learn the Ḳur'ān by heart, and he or she learns at his or her own rate. Questioning of, or critical reasoning in relation to Islamic principles is allowed only at the more advanced levels of education (Talbani, 1996). Ideally, a pupil should learn all the 114 *sūra* (verses) of the Ḳur'ān and the three Rs (in Arabic) but also the basics of Islam (*Sharī'a* and the five pillars). In reality most of the pupils memorize Ḳur'ānic verses by heart but initially without knowing the

meaning of the content, and only a minority of Ḳur'ānic pupils ever learn the whole Ḳur'ān.

Intermediate level: The goals of post-elementary education (Madrasa) are to create "experts" in, first and foremost, Muslim law, the Islamic religion and the Arabic language. These experts are supposed to have perfect knowledge in the domain of their specialization. The intermediate level includes the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, *Sharīʿa*, mastery in intellectual reasoning, mastery of jurisprudence. Finally, the advanced course should include mastery of jurisprudence, interpretation of Ḳur'ān, tradition and the ability to reach a proper conclusion in required cases and in relation to the issue a religious verdict (See Appendix 1). The ultimate goal is to reach scholarly argumentation and interpretation of *Sharīʿa* and related sciences (*idjtihād*). To gain this quality, the pupil can approach the religious authority and prove his ability to reason in different Islamic matters.[5] In the traditional madrasa, as in Ḳur'ānic schools, there are no formal grades, forms or statges. Anyone is free to start and to finish whenever he or she wants. However, *idjāza* (lit: permission) is considred as the only traditional form of evaluation of the students educational achievements whereby the professor gives the graduated pupil the authorization to transmit the part of knowledge received. *Idjāza* is issued in a specific branch of knowledge by the professor specialist in that knowledge who in turn had received authorization through his master.

As the accuracy of religious narrations is of vital importance, the chain of transmission is followed throughout the different generations of authorized narrators. The phenomenon is known as *tawātur* (lit. frequency) is considered as one of the deciding factors in the accuracy of transmitted knowledge, including *hadīth* (Prophet's sayings) and *tafsīr* (exegecies). *Idjāza* also was a certificate for teaching certain subjects or to issue new religious verdicts.

The modern madrasa have established curricula, syllabuses, time tables and classes in the same way as modern Western schools. This means that they teach secular subjects as well as a large proportion of Islamic matters. In at least some countries in the Middle East,

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[5] There are also extra-curricular studies in which a pupil can participate in courses such as Islamic Philosophy, Arabic Literature, Biography, Scholastic Theology, peripatetic thinking and agnosticism.

North Africa and Asia, post-Ḳur'ānic education is taught in theological seminaries following a curriculum designed for the formation of religious experts. The pupil must pass through various stages in order to attain the rank of an expert. The curriculum for the primary level includes courses on Arabic grammar, syntax and composition, logic, rhetoric and ability to understand and explain the Ḳur'ān and Arabic texts. Apart from the educational institutions, a system of seeking teachers developed, at least in Sub-Saharan Africa and Africa's Horn. This means that single pupils looked for different Islamic specialists as tutors for their studies. Those who want to continue their Islamic education, when they have completed the elementary level, have either to enroll in an Islamic institution of higher education in North Africa or Middle East, or to seek teachers specialized in different areas of Islam. There is generally a high degree of specialization; pupils opt for some subjects after their Ḳur'ānic studies and pursue more profound studies of these subjects (Nicolas, 1981; Santerre, 1974).

In Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan, elementary and intermediate levels of Islamic education are given in schools that are under the "state umbrella" in that they are subsidized and are allowed to certify their pupils. In North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic educational arrangements are not an issue for the state. Most villages in Central and West Africa and Africa's Horn have at least one Ḳur'ānic school. Only The Gambia has Islamic matters in the curriculum of the state-run schools, and in Mali, Niger and Senegal, for example, a few schools of a mixed type (Franco-Arabic schools) are subsidized by the state (Daun, 2002; UNESCO, 1993). In Sub-Saharan Africa modernized madrasa started to expand with the support from Middle East countries in the 1970s (Coloquio Internacional, 1993; UNESCO, 1993). Religious schools that prepare the pupil for higher levels of education in the religious sciences and Islamic guidance exist in Middle East, North Africa and some Asian countries.

According to some authors, Islamic education is mostly seen as appropriate for religious and teaching professions (Eickelman, 1989), but findings from case studies indicate that such an education is not only for religious purpose and for insulated niches but is also an important instrument for jobs in the informal sector which has expanded rapidly in many low income countries (Daun, 2002; Oni, 1988; William & Amer, 1988).

Western Type of Education

The independent states continued the path established by the colonial or western states. They maintained the structures of the inherited education system and change the content somewhat but it continued to be non-religious. The countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have maintained the secular public education systems inherited from the colonial powers. However, in practically all Muslim countries Islamic elements were introduced into the curriculum. In the Middle East, North Africa and some Asian countries, the state-run schools devote more hours to religious subjects than other countries in the world.

According to an agreement (The Charter of the Arab Cultural Unit established in Baghdad in 1964) and the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALESCO), all the Arab countries should have the same educational goals and objectives (Zouain, 1998). For this reason, among others, the aims of modern education in Middle Eastern and some Asian countries, are, with a few exceptions, based on Islam. These countries differ educationally from other countries in the world in at least three ways: (a) Modern education expanded comparatively late, at least in the Gulf states; (b) the school curricula contain a larger proportion of religious subjects than in other parts of the world; and (c) they have comparatively centralized education systems (Ben Jaballah, 1994; Hussein, 1994; Morsi, 1991).

The first modern school was established in Saudi Arabia in 1926 and in Oman in 1940 (Al-Baadi, 1994; Bird, 1995). Still in 1969/70, only 90 pupils were enrolled in primary education in Oman (Morsi, 1990). In Saudi Arabia, the rate of literacy was 15 per cent for men and two per cent for women in 1970. Twenty years later, the numbers were 73 and 48 percent respectively (Bird, 1995). As to the curricula, in Saudi Arabia, for example, 50 percent of the teaching time is spent on religious matters in Grade 1, and in Grades 6–9, it is over 20 percent (Bird, 1995, p. 287). Nearly one third of school time is spent on the Ḳurʾān and Islamic studies in Yemen (Daun and Arjmand, 2002). Despite this large proportion of Islamic matters in primary school, there are in most Muslim countries Ḳurʾānic schools that function as a complement to modern primary schools. In North Africa, for instance, modern schooling has expanded rapidly since the 1950s and as the system includes some Islamic matters, Ḳurʾānic schools have been relegated to the role of pre-school institutions or institutions solely for initiation into Islam.

Oman and Saudi Arabia have gender divided schools, and in the latter country, there are two different education systems, one for boys and one for girls and the education of girls is not placed under the Ministry of Education, but is in the hands of a council of *'ulamā'*. The first public school for girls opened in 1981.

In the drive for "Education for All", Islamic education has received unanticipated attention and support from UN bodies. Unesco organized a seminar in 1993 with leading representatives of Islamic education in Africa in order to discuss how to use such institutions in the struggle for education for all (UNESCO, 1993). Moreover, UNICEF organized a number of seminars in Africa in order to find out what Islamic educational arrangements could be used in the struggle for increased school enrollment and, consequently, started to support Islamic schools economically (Coloquio Internacional, 1993).

In countries with a large percentage of Muslims we find different combinations of Islamic and Western type of schools: (a) the state-run modern schools have Islamic matters in their curriculum. Apart from this, there are other schools under the state; they are privately owned and governed but receive subsidizes from the state, are monitored/regulated by the state, and provide certificates that are valid for continued education in the state system or for the labour market. Small percentages of pupils attend such schools in Afghanistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Some countries have two or more of the combinations shown in Table 1.2. Afghanistan can be used as an example. State-run schools teach Islamic matters and there are some modernized madrasa which are "under state protection" (combination a). In addition to this, a large number of mosque schools and other types of Ḳur'ānic schools do not have any links at all with the state (combination d).

(b) is similar to (a) except one thing: schools are neither regulated nor monitored by the state. In both Egypt and Pakistan a small percentage of children attend Ḳur'ānic schools or madrasa of this type.

(c) Apart from the state-run schools teaching Islamic matters there are schools not belonging to the state system and they have conditions similar to those in (b) except the fact that they do not belong to the state system.

(d) State run schools teach Islamic matters, while these are private Islamic schools that do not have any links to the state.

(e) State schools do not include Islamic matters but there is a sector of private schools run in parallel to the state schools. These

Table 1.2 Principal Educational Arrangements in Countries with Large Proportions of Muslims[6]

	State run schools include Islamic matters	Private Islamic schools are				Examples:
		under state "umbrella"	subsidized by the state	monitored/ regulated by the state	give valid certificates	
(a)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia
(b)	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Egypt, Pakistan
(c)	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	The Gambia
(d)	Yes					Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Gambia, Iran; Kuwait; Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey
(e)		Yes	Yes		Yes	Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia
(f)			Yes	Yes	Yes	Senegal
(g)						Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa incl. Guinea-Bissau: Senegal and The Gambia

NB: It should also be mentioned that some Muslim countries have a national curriculum while others do not.

[6] Sources: Al-Baadi, 1998; Aziz-Zadek, 1998; Daun & Arjmand, 2002; Djeflat, 1998; Ghafoor & Farooq, 1998; Hussein, 1994; Mahrouse, 1998; Massialas & Jarrar, 1991; Moegiadi & Jiyouo, 1998; Morsi, 1991; Unesco, 1993; Zouani, 1998.

private schools are Islamic, are subsidized by the state and give valid certificates.

(f) The state sector schools do not include Islamic matters, but some private Islamic schools are subsidized and monitored by the state and give valid certificates.

Finally, (g) is a combination in which state schools do not include Islamic matters but there are a large number of Ḳur'ānic schools and madrasa which are run by civil forces.

In all, Islamic non-formal educational arrangements in the civil sphere seem to be comparatively frequent, where the state is secular and state-run schools do not teach Islamic matters. On the other hand, in highly Islamized but comparatively modernized countries, where state schools teach Islamic matters, Islamic educational institutions have become few, weak or both.

Muslims, Education and Choice in the North

The permanent presence of Islam in Europe, North America and Australia has become a reality today. The difference between the Islamic values and identity, on the one hand, and the predominant cultures and value systems of the host societies, on the other hand, has made educational policies problematic in that states in the North have made attempts handle the tensions between integration and the preservation of minority culture. The general processes of both religious revival and secularization take place also among Muslims in the North, and the four orientations presented in chapter two are present practically everywhere albeit in different proportions. Youths and second generation immigrants tend to adhere to more secularized life styles and beliefs and to attend schools not teaching Islamic matters.

As far as Europe, North America and Oceania are concerned, the education systems vary in the opportunities they make available for Muslims to have a modern *and* Islamic moral education. On the one hand, the European Union finds that, despite processes of convergence, education still differs a great deal from one country to another in regard to, for example, the duration of compulsory schooling, the structure of the system and the existence of mother-tongue teaching for immigrant or other minority children (European Commission, 1994, 1997; Muñoz-Repiso, 1997). On the other hand, at a deeper level of analysis, Sultana (1995) argues that strong forces are work-

ing in a convergent direction: (a) an increased technocratic understanding of education (principally as formation of human capital and the view of pupils as human resource to be developed; and (b) the overriding aim of making education contribute to Europe's competitiveness. His arguments are highly relevant in a discussion of the cultural, religious and linguistic diversity of Europe. Collot et al. (1993a) argue in a similar manner when they state that the European countries, in the domain of education for immigrants (and other minorities) tend to see educational matters from a narrow technocratic and secular point of view. These features might be contradictory to the demands from many Muslims for training in morals and values.

Despite EU efforts to harmonize laws and regulations related to immigration, the practice still differs between the countries, due partly to cultural-historical differences and partly to inertia. Traditionally, the European countries have different "social paradigms" (Mauriel, 1993): an Anglo-Saxian model and a French model. The former emphasizes plurality and favours diversity, while the latter is "assimilationist" (Collot et al., 1993b). These models may be seen as extreme poles, and most countries are situated somewhere between these poles. The model predominating in a country determines the strategies available to Muslim immigrants—socially as well as educationally.

Relevant within the educational domain itself are (i) the general features of the education systems, (ii) linguistic policy in the educational domain and, finally, (iii) educational alternatives resulting from these policies. Some countries have the ambition to create equal conditions for all pupils and give more resources to schools with a comparatively large proportion of disadvantaged children (children with learning disabilities, immigrant children, and so on). For instance, in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, supplementary resources are allocated to areas or schools that have a certain proportion of immigrant children (Fase, 1993; Skolverket, 2000; Verflot, 1993). In Germany, on the other hand, such policies have not been implemented in all *Länder* (states) (Boos-Nünning, 1993; see also chapter ten). It is evident that some immigrant children (especially those from the South) have a significantly lower level of achievement on knowledge and skills tests in the OECD countries, due, among other things, to the fact that education in the "host" country is performed in the country's own predominating language(s) and few (if any) efforts are made to base teaching in and on cultural and/or socioeconomic conditions (OECD, 2001).

As far as linguistic policy in education is concerned, the European Council and the European Commission have established that minority children have the right to be taught in their mother-tongue (where it is reasonable to do so), but the degree of implementation of such policies varies from one country to another and within one and the same country. This means that children of Muslim parents do not always have the opportunity to be taught in their language. In France and Germany, for example, the policy mentioned has been far from implemented. On the other hand, a large proportion of the Muslim immigrants in France, were fluent in French before they immigrated and Muslim immigrants in Australia, Canada, England and the USA were fluent in English before they immigrated.

In regard to choice opportunities, the countries in the North have different rules and regulations and different levels of subsidies to private Muslim schools. Examples of some different educational policies in this regard will be mentioned. Private confessional schools without subsidies is a legitimate and recognized alternative in England and the USA. Such schools—but with large subsidies—exist in Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands, while confessional schools are integrated into the public sector in England, Germany, New Zealand and Sweden in that they are private only when it comes to ownership and governance but follow a curriculum established by the state (OECD, 1994). In Sweden, schooling is compulsory, and only schools that follow the national curriculum and the official requirements of teacher competence are allowed to exist. If the private schools accept all the requirements, they are approved by the state and highly subsidized but also controlled through monitoring and inspection. According to the national curriculum, pupils are taught *about* different (world) religions, but teaching *in* a particular religion is not allowed. Religious teaching has to take place as an extra-curricular activity in the state subsidized schools after the ordinary school day or in Ḳur'ānic schools organized by Muslim associations outside of the school. All parts of the curriculum are, in principle, compulsory, which means that Muslim pupils have to participate in sex education and different subjects related to art, for example. Certain groups of Muslims have been critical of this policy (Euro-Islam, 1995).

In France, schools can choose between four different "contracts" with the state. In the simplest version, private schools are neither subsidized nor regulated by the state, while in the most complex arrangements, private schools are in all aspects (except ownership)

run in the same way as public schools (they follow the national curriculum, have the same requirements of teacher competence, and are subsidized and controlled by the state). All Catholic schools have one of these types of contract but the state has not approved any such contracts with Muslim or Islamic schools, meaning there are no recognized schools with the latter profile.

In England there are many private Muslim schools, and four of them are now within the state-maintained sector. These four have to follow the national curriculum, have only trained teachers and are subject to regular inspection. In return, their current expenditure is fully covered by the state and the bulk of their capital costs are also met. In the state-subsidized Muslim schools, Muslim pupils do not have to take part in all education (sex education and certain types of art teaching, for instance). The Dutch case is even more generous. That politically and religiously divided nation has long accepted that all religious groups have a right to start their own schools and to have all the costs fully covered by the state. In this case, where minority religious groups meet the criteria (which are mainly in terms of the number of pupils expected to attend), the municipalities have to provide buildings and full costs. In return, these schools are expected to cover the national curriculum, only employ trained teachers and be subject to inspection. There are now nearly 40 Muslim schools in the Netherlands and they are better funded than the average Dutch school as the funding formula gives more to children from ethnic minorities and from homes where the parents have low levels of education. It is worth noting that, even in the favourable situations in England and the Netherlands, most Muslim parents do not want their children to attend separate Muslim schools, and part of the reason for these schools starting is general dissatisfaction with the academic quality of alternative schools and perceptions about the degree of racism to be found in them. Most Muslim parents would prefer their children to attend good, ethnically-mixed state schools which take account of some of the special religious needs of their children. There is a similar situation among Muslim parents enrolling their children in state-subsidized Muslim schools in Sweden.

In the United States, on the other hand, there is no national curriculum and, according to the constitution, confessional schools cannot receive state subsidies. Private Muslim schools are neither controlled nor subsidized by the state. Also, such schools do not lead to diplomas

or certificates that are valid for further education or for employment in the formal sector of the economy. Pupils from religious schools have to take tests before they are admitted to further education or have to prove their knowledge when they seek employment in the formal sector of the labour market.

Muslims have historically been present in Albania, northern Greece and parts of Yugoslavia. In Greece, for instance, the Muslim minority has for a long time had two options: either to enroll their children in ordinary state schools (teaching, among other things, Christian matters and in Greek) or to enroll their children in minority schools (teaching Islamic matters apart from other subjects and in Turkish)—see chapter 13.

Eastern Europe has no long tradition of Muslims, since these countries were rather closed before the Soviet collapse. Countries aspiring for entrance into the European Union have made attempts to adopt recommendations and requirements established by the Union and the European Council in relation to immigration, minorities and education. The Czech Republic (CR) is one such example (see chapter 12). This country has a long tradition of Polish, German and Romany minorities. The former two groups have special rights and are allowed to organize education in their own languages. Although the Romany population has not received such rights, it has more options than the Muslims, who do not have the right to establish schools recognized by the state. Their children have to attend secular state schools and organize Ḳur'ānic teaching as an out-of-school activity.

All this means that the parameters according to which Muslim parents can make the choice of school for their children differ considerably between the countries in the North. For instance, the possibility of establishing private schools in general and confessional schools in particular differs considerably. Some combinations are shown in Table 1.3.

Combinations 1 and 2 are rare among the OECD countries and have, in this study, been found only in the Muslim parts of northern Greece, in Australia and the Netherlands. In combination 3, Muslim schools have to follow the national curriculum, and in France and Sweden, there are no exceptions, while in England, Islamic matters may be taught. Combination 4 applies to state-maintained Muslim schools in England. Combination 5 is the option if Muslims in

Table 1.3 Principal Combinations of Educational Policies in Relation to the Demand for Private Religious Schools in the OECD countries (primary and lower secondary levels)

Combination	Pupils acquire formal diploma or certificates	Schools are subsidized by the state	National curriculum compulsory	Schools are monitored by the state	Islamic elements in curriculum	Examples
1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Private Muslim schools in the northern part of Greece. Muslim schools in the Netherlands.
2)	Yes*	Yes			Yes	Private Muslim schools in some states in Australia.
3)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Private schools (among them Muslim schools) in Sweden and France.
4)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	State-maintained Muslim schools in England.
5)	Yes	Yes		Yes		Public schools in Germany and the USA.
6)	Yes*				Yes	Private Muslim schools in the USA.
7)					Yes	Ḳur'ānic and Madrasa schools in many countries.

* In the USA, the pupils have to take tests or examinations before they are admitted to further education in the public system or before they are regarded by employers as "employable", at least in some branches of the formal sector.

Germany and the USA choose public schools. (This is, of course, a combination similar to the one applying to public schools in some other countries—but then there is a national curriculum). Combination 6 means that Muslims are allowed to run their own schools without involving the state, but pupils with certificates from such schools often have to prove their knowledge on tests or in some other way,

when they apply for continued education or formal sector employment. Combination 7, finally, is the case of non-formal Islamic educational arrangements organized by associations or private persons—often as an after (primary or secondary) school activity.

Conclusions

Islam is affected by international and global events and processes. At the same time, this religion is itself a globalization force in that Muslims have migrated to most parts of the world and the Islamic message is conveyed by the help of IT and mass media, and several Muslim countries in the South resisted the world models.

Muslim immigrants in the North adhere to a variety of orientations of Islam and they have experienced different types of education in their countries of origin. Once migrated to the North, they encounter various policies, both socially and educationally. Muslim parents make different demands and have different requirements in relation to education, but most of them prefer at least some Islamic moral training for their children. Their opportunities to choose school and obtain financial support from the state for separate Muslim schools vary from one country to another. Despite the spread of the world models, several countries in the North have not implemented all the elements of these models, mainly those referring to minority rights. Chapter 2 describes different orientations of Islam, and Chapters 3–8 describe Islamic educational arrangements in different countries in the South, while Chapters 9–13 make an account for the conditions for and existence of Islamic educational arrangements in the North.

Appendix 1.1 Themes and Subjects in Islamic Education

	The Subjects in Islamic Education by Level
Level	Contents, Subjects, Disciplines
Elementary (Ḳur'ānic)	Arabic letters, the Arabic alphabet, Ḳur'ānic verses and *sūras*, the five pillars of Islam, skills in reading and writing, manual work, civics.
Post-Elementary	*Luġha* (the Arabic language) *Fiḳh* (legal theory of Islam; is the Islamic law in its theoretical form. It is studied with the help of the Ḳur'ān and other writings which the teachers have memorized and then present orally to their pupils.) *hadīth* (is, after the Ḳur'ān, the most important source concerning the *Sharī'a*. *Ḥadīth* contains the traditions, that is, the sayings of the Prophet himself about problems and events in everyday life.) *Tawḥīd* (unity of God; is the theology at its most abstract level. It deals with the unity of God, unity between God and man and unity between men. In ordinary post-Ḳur'ānic education these aspects are seldom treated. Instead, the pupils are taught the doctrine of unity without making any interpretation of the "inner core" of the subject.) *Tafsīr* (Ḳur'ānic exegesis; the content of the Ḳur'ān is explained and commented upon by the teacher.) *Sīra* (the biography of Muḥammad, it was developed very early, i.e. before the traditions were standardized and written.) *Riyadiyat* (arithmetic and the subjects below are not taught in all post-Ḳur'ānic education.) *Naḥw* (Arabic grammar) Arabic poetry *Madḥ*, praises addressed to the Prophet Muḥammad. Natural sciences
Higher (Islamic university)	Deeper studies of the above.

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CHAPTER TWO

ISLAMIC ORIENTATIONS AND EDUCATION

Sherin Sadaalah

Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the principal religious and ideological differentiations and orientations within Islam. In trying to grasp the essence of Islam as a religion, interpretative endeavor and way of life (i.e. practice), it is important to delineate the most important orientations within the religion. In spite of the claims to the existence of different 'Islams' practiced locally within a variety of countries, a *basic universal* categorization is evident throughout scholarly endeavors across different times in history, both in the East and the West. Hence, and according to Dessouki (1982).

> Islam is better understood from this perspective as designating an 'ideal type', which should be analyzed in relation to special social structures. The basic assumptions here are that unity and universality of the ideal type are reflected in a multiplicity of actual historical experiences in specific social contexts (p. 7).

The content and emphasis of this chapter however is limited to a delineation of an analytical approach to contemporary Islam (as religion, interpretation and practice). The features Islam holds in its orientations towards education will be traced. This mapping may be illustrative of the position and locus of different case studies contained in this volume.

Huntington (1993) described Islam as a militant religion blurring the dividing lines between the religious and the secular, furthermore maintaining that its "theocratic proclivity makes it extraordinarily difficult for Islamic societies to accommodate non-Muslims. It makes it very difficult for Muslims to easily fit into societies where the majority is non-Muslim" (p. 19). This statement disregards the interpretative diversity of Islam, the different historical schools[1] (Kepel,

[1] Also known as *madhāhib*. These are the four historical legal schools mentioned in chapter 1.

1985, p. 79) and "different modern tendencies in religion and politics" (Ibid., p. 15) and reflects a clear orientalist stance. One of Huntington's principal arguments is that Islam is a monolithic unit of reference. This is further complemented by the conception of Islam as a unitary civilization (Huntington, 1993, 1996). This conceptualization takes as given the premise that the "concept 'Islam' (is) something distinct, definable, essentially homogeneous", a notion strictly contradicted by reality (Hjärpe, 1996, p. 74). Islam, however, is not a monolithic religion and cannot, therefore, be treated as a single or unitary phenomenon (Hjärpe, 1991). In addition to cultural variations springing from the spatial context where the religion is practiced, and the major division between the Sunnī and Shī'a sects, other more important ideological variations have come to manifest themselves within the body and structure of modern Islamic thought. As Hjärpe (1991, p. 30) furthermore confirms "there is an entire scale of interpretations of the essence of Islam and its societal functions".[2] A predominant proportion of this body of thought is modern Islamic political thought. It is also important to recognize that Islam as a religion and socio-political system has undergone a process of resurgence during the latter half of the twentieth century. This process became more visible and prominent during the end of 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Dessouki (1982) described this 'Islamic resurgence' as an illustration of the "increasing political activism in the name of Islam by governments and opposition groups alike. It designates a politicized, activist form of Islam and the growing use of Islamic symbolism and legitimation at the level of political action" (p. 4). This resurgence has contributed to a large extent to consolidation of the fine lines between different Islamic/Islamist orientations and ideological frameworks.

To fulfill the task of describing different orientations, this research has borrowed as a basic framework, the classification introduced by Hjärpe (1991, pp. 31–34); he distinguishes between four different Islamic orientations: secularism, traditionalism, modernism and fundamentalism. This classification will, however, be supplemented by theoretical approaches maintained by other scholars and contributors

[2] Please note that all translation is carried out by the author of the research unless otherwise specified.

to the subject of Islam orientations. Most space will be given to the analysis of the fundamentalist trend. One of the reasons for this is the overwhelming scholarly theoretical work dedicated to this phenomenon. Another reason is the preliminary assumption made by the author of the importance of fundamentalism as a recent, dynamic, and evolving trend manifesting both the highest levels of politics and as a concrete activist agenda, that entails a distinctive identity formation. This decision has also been necessitated by the diversity within fundamentalism. A further reason for such a focus is the clear illustration it provides of what Rudolph and Piscatori (1997) term the 'transnational civic society' and transnational religions, whereby a level of transnational identity is maintained, superceding at times the national, context-specific one.

Orientations and Education

An overview of the orientations is made in Table 2.1. Then each of the orientations will be described more in detail.

Table 2.1 Different Religious Orientations within Islam and Predominant Characteristics

Religious Orientation	Sphere for Religion	Concept of Law	Interpretation (*iǧtihād*)	Sovereignty and Political System	Identity and Supreme Loyalty	Activism/ Islamic Political Implications	Education
1. Secularism	Private	Man made	Freedom of interpretation/extended to Laymen	Democratic/ pluralist	National identity and loyalty as important as the religious	—	Secular and modern
2. Traditionalism	Public	God's Law/ *Sẖariʿa*	Interpretation restricted to madẖāhib and *'ulamā'*	Not necessarily Islamic	Religious Identity	—	Specialized *'ulamā'* education
3. Modernism/Liberalism	Public	Law man-made guided by Islamic principles	Freedom of interpretation/ extended to laymen	Not necessarily Islamic/ guided by Islamic principles	No conflict between national and religious identity	Islam as politically neutral	Modern integrating a religious curriculum

Table 2.1 (*cont.*)

Religious Orientation	Sphere for religion	Concept of Law	Interpretation (*iǧtihād*)	Sovereignty and Political System	Identity and Supreme Loyalty	Activism/ Islamic Political Implications	Education
4. Fundamentalism/ Islamism	Public	God's Law/ *Sharīʿa*	Freedom of interpretation/ Supremacy of *ʿulamāʾ*	Islamic state/ politics	Supreme loyalty to Umma/ religious Identity	Islam as a source for political activism	Hybrid between modern and religious

The Secularist Orientation

Secularism in Islam is an orientation that advocates the relegation of religion to the private sphere, within an individualistic space and context and the maintenance of a strict separation between the religious and the political. Secularism furthermore advocates the ordering of society, and the formulation of legal foundation on the basis of a value system that includes both believers and non-believers. This implies a separation of the religious from the profane. Muslim secularists support their orientation by the Ḳurʾānic premise negating compulsion in religion (*sūra* 2, 256), whereas the implication of religion in the ordering of society (and state) will result in some form of compulsion (Hjärpe, 1991, p. 31). In addition to the narrow role given to religious ideology in the conduct of life, society, and government, secularists do not leave the interpretation of texts *iǧtihād* to *ʿulamāʾ* but allow for freedom of interpretation. Parallel to this, is the strongly held notion that law is or can be man-made, and derivative from sources other than the *Sharīʿa*.

It is remarkable that the amount of literature and analyses of the secularist trend within Islam has been minimal when compared with other trends, especially the fundamentalist. In spite of the obvious difficulties, this has made it necessary to use rhetorical text by fundamentalist scholars dealing with the issue of Islamic secularism to further describe its characteristics. Hence, according to Muḥammad Qutb (1994),[3] a fundamentalist theoretician, the secularists embody

[3] Muḥammad Qutb is brother and disciple of Sayyid Qutb who is classified as a major exponent of Islamic fundamentalism and especially the revolutionary streak. Qutb who had been a member of the Muslim Brethren (Egypt), has initiated the

a trend that rejects the intermixing between Islam (religion) and state (politics) and, accordingly, oppose calls by the fundamentalists for the need to apply the *Sharīʿa* (Ibid., pp. 5–6). Parallel to this, secularists strongly advocate democracy and democratic rule, and key words within their agenda are pluralism, political freedom, and alternation of government according to the principles of democracy (Ibid., pp. 5–6). Calls against the application of the *Sharīʿa*, and the merging of state and religion derive from a belief that under such a system, political freedom according to the democratic model is unrealizable. In addition no space would be allowed for political opposition or the 'other' (meaning competing political entity(ies)) to manifest and exercise its political rights. This agenda and call emanates from the reaction to the absolutism that characterizes fundamentalism.

Piscatori (1983), however, has identified two main types of secularists: The Marxist variant (Marxian dialectics of historical materialism) which "views religion per se in public life as debilitating" and prescribes a future scenario where "'materialism and nationalism' will replace that of 'idealism and metaphysics'" (p. 5). It is important to note here that this specific group focuses on the incompatibility between religion and politics, and within the public sphere. A second variant of secularism delimits the incompatibility to the "peculiarly unhelpful qualities of Islam itself", emphasizing in their logic the "desirability" and "prudence" of the separation mentioned. Both variants "do not think of Islam as a civilization or an ideology" (Ibid., p. 5).

With respect to education, the secularist recognizes the importance of modern schooling and secular education. Notwithstanding Dessouki's assumption (1982) that "no contradiction is perceived between being engaged in advanced science education or highly technical education while upholding traditional beliefs on the family, the status of women, or relation between the sexes" (p. 24). Today, this point is debatable, however, due to a emergence of a strong secular elite, whereby total divergence from a religious raison d'etre is becoming more of

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revolutionary, activist stance after his incarceration by Nasser between 1955 and 1964, and later in 1965 until his death in 1966. Two major works by Qutb deviating from the moderate stance of the Brethren, and symbolising a reconstruction of Islamist thought along more radical lines are *Milestones* and *Under the Aegis of the Ḳur'an*. For a more detailed discussion of Sayyid Qutb's work and role refer to Kepel (1985), chapter 2.

a cause than an effect. This has led in many instances to the development of alternative world-views within the same society, a point well illustrated within our model for different Islamic orientations.

Historically, exchanges during the 19th century between the Muslim Middle East and Europe led to Muslim students bringing back ideas about education after being educated in Western countries[4] (Tibi, 1988). In the absence of any type of schooling except traditional religious-based systems, this came as an innovation in Muslim societies and into the domain of modern knowledge (or industrial 'higher culture') (Ibid., p. 98). Furthermore, western schooling became also an extension and instrument of colonialism (Ibid., 1988).[5] In addition to this, missionary schools (developing during the latter part of the 19th century and early 20th century) have, according to Tibi (1991), acted as a central locus around which the roots of modern educational systems and secularism in the Middle East, and specifically the Arab World, were built. The period, which witnessed this transition from traditional Islamic education to modern education, was also a period known as '*al nahda*' (renaissance). Thereby, an 'intellectual awakening' was perceived as taking place "legitimizing the innovations which came in the train of military, scientific, technical and educational imports from the West" (Livingston, 1996, p. 543).

The heritage remaining of modern, secular schooling in Muslim societies is still considerable today, but is gradually being replaced by alternative views on the role and value of education within an emergent religious framework and identity illustrated by an all-encompassing Islamic resurgence. Furthermore, identification of secular education with the elite (Tibi, 1988) has developed across socio-economic lines and resulted in new sites for resistance and reactive

[4] Although many scholars prefer to use 'modern' and 'Western' as synonymous, I shall abstain from making such a generalization and categorize modernity as a phase of development rather than a socio-ideological worldview expounded by a specific region or political entity i.e. the West. This is also integral with the thesis that what is modern is not by necessity Western, although it may be a state of development reached and surpassed by the West. This is important especially in discussions that follow on the fundamentalist trend, and calls for authenticity that in many ways reflect a resistance to colonialism rather than a complete disengagement with modernity or what the traditionalist and the fundamentalists falsely understand as modernization i.e. westernization.

[5] The ideological, indoctrinating features of western schooling, however, have been weakened in the post colonial era to give way to modern schooling as such in spite of its classification by some as a reflection of neo-imperialistic designs.

response. This resistance is manifested at the popular level in a post-elite society,[6] where non-class actors and activists (predominantly religious) have a bigger role to play.

In spite of the delineation of variants, secularists converge across the following lines:

- The separation of religion (Islam) from the political process, realm and/or state.
- Religion (Islam) delimited and relegated to the private sphere, and predominant within the domain of individual practice of Faith (*īmān*).
- The acceptance of man-made laws that are not (by necessity) derivative from the *Sharīʿa*, due to the important prerequisite of ensuring equality under the law for both Muslims and non-Muslims.
- The importance and supremacy of pluralism and democracy with active opposition to absolutism or absolutist agendas that will not accept the manifestation of a political 'other' (a direct criticism of the fundamentalist debate).
- Islam is not an ideology, and especially it is not a political ideology.
- Education as secular and modern.

This, therefore, allows us to place, as Hjärpe does, secularism in direct polarity with fundamentalism. This polarity, however, it not of equal magnitude due to the broader scope of the fundamentalist orientation. And the common misconception held by some Western scholars, and supporters of the "Islam against the West" thesis such as Hungtington's, accepting as ipso facto 'the extreme Islamists' claim of representing 'true Islam' and all Muslim (Hjärpe, 1996, p. 76).

The Traditionalist Orientation

Traditionalism in Islam denotes the adherence to the traditional Islamic heritage, be it traditional legal schools of thought (*madhāhib*),

[6] Post-elite society is the term hereby introduced to denote the development of new fine lines redefining social actors, which transgress class lines in Muslim societies. Social transformations, and several other factors including globalisation have led to the development of non-class actors, that accentuate the transcendence of elitist value in lieu of a more popular, traditionalist world view and value system, impregnated by religious symbolism and ideological facets.

or traditional way of life. The sources of order in society stem from the *Ḳur'ān*, the *Sunna*,[7] and the *Sharī'a* as maintained by early interpretation (*idjtihād*) by the four *madhāhib*. Islam is, therefore, not only a religion but also a way of life (*dīn wa dunyā*).[8] The traditionalists do not accept any changes, new or foreign ideas to Islam. For them, true Islam is the one built through historical precedents, as maintained in the Islamic tradition represented by the different *madhāhib*; any innovation is by necessity a departure from the essence of the religion (Hjärpe, 1991, p. 34).

Hjärpe presents a useful characterization of the traditional worldview. This world view is "established in its main lines by about the year AD 950 and certainly by 1200" (Ibid., p. 3). In addition, Watt (1988) claims synonymity between, what he calls, the "traditionalists/conservatives" and the "fundamentalists". Like Arkoun (1984) he maintains the traditionalists respresent the categories of the "unthinkable and the unthought", where ideological control confirms the category of 'unthinkable' to be held true for everything related to Islam (Watt, 1988, p. 1).

Kepel (1985, p. 79) also maintains that "according to orthodox Islam, the four historical legal schools of medieval theologians and annotators established the limits of legitimate interpretation of the verses of the Ḳur'ān. After them the doors of interpretation (*idjtihād*) were closed". "Orthodox" can be taken as synonymous with traditionalist. The view taken here is that the distinction between fundamentalism and traditionalism stems from the view of the former as an innovative, modernizing force, advocating the reopening of the door to the interpretative endeavor (*idjtihād*) directly from Text (Ḳur'ān and *Sunna*), and departing from the adherence to tradition. This important distinction shall be made clearer in the section dealing with fundamentalism.

The traditionalists, therefore, have stopped in time at the era of the four major schools of interpretation. Society should, therefore, be arranged according to this world view, and innovation is totally rejected. Strict limits to the interpretative exercise are not only set in the time frame mentioned above, but interpretation is reserved

[7] Sunnah is basically the process of taking the life of the prophet as example and his sayings *ḥadīths* as discourse, for more details refer to Hjärpe, 1991, p. 33.
[8] Translated as religion and way of life.

for to the *ʿulamāʾ*. Law, accordingly, is God's Law or the *Sharīʿa* (Hjärpe, 1991, p. 42).

It is important to mention here that the roots of the traditional education emanate from the status quo ante of education systems that existed during the Ottoman Empire. Hence, as Tibi (1988) maintains, during that period

> The educational system was monopolized by the Islamic clergy, the *ʿulamāʾ*. This monopoly in instruction and all other intellectual activities led to a situation in which the four pillars of religious education—Ḳurʾān, *ḥadīth*, *Sharīʿa*, and Arabic grammar—became the only sources of pedagogy. The central feature of this Islamic education was the memorization of the sources of Islamic source. But problem-oriented thinking cannot be learned through raw memorization. This view of education corresponded to the absence of participation in a traditional society whose hierarchy consisted of the *ʿulamāʾ*, the military, and the political authorities (pp. 95–96).

Within contemporary societies, traditionalists argue for the separation between religious and modern systems of education. For them religious education is basically there to prepare and produce a body of *ʿulamāʾ* (clergy) who shall furnish the society with guidance and *fatwās* (religious opinion). In this respect, education becomes more specialized and more developed concentrating specifically on Islam as a religion and its different interpretative and historical/methodological premises. Schools such as the religious schools in Saudi Arabia or the Azharite schools in Egypt prepare the students for higher levels of education in the religious subjects—*fiḳh*—and Islamic guidance (*irshād*). Students graduate from such specialized traditional schools to continue their education in a religious university such as Al-Azhar University in Egypt, which produces a large number of Islamic preachers for the greater part of the Muslim World.

Traditionalism, however, recognizes and does not directly compete with modern schooling and scientific knowledge, but as stated above, de-links the two world views. Furthermore, the premises of the traditional education has been relegated after the advent of modern schooling into the role of preparation of the rank and file of the *ʿulamāʾ*. Traditional Ḳurʾānic schools such as the *kuttāb* in Egypt and the madrasas in northern Africa are a legacy of traditional education that has been weakened considerably not only by the forces of the modern school system and education, but also by the pressure of emergent and alternative forms of religious education. Ḳurʾānic

schools persist predominantly in rural contexts, where important factors such as underdevelopment, economic incapability, and geographic isolation from a modern school enhance their survival (Houtsonen, 1994). Houtsonen (1994) further confirms that "we can better understand the continuity of traditional Islamic education if we see it as being closely bound to the popular understanding of Islam" (p. 489).

Traditionalism represents the following stand:

- Adherence to precedence of Islamic history and interpretative schools.
- Interpretation (*iǧtihād*) is delimited in space and time to the four main historical *maḏāhib*.—Innovation or new interpretation is not permitted.
- Islam is a religion and way of life (*dīn wa dunyā*).
- The process of modernity, modern society and development are external to the religious traditional worldview.
- The authority for interpretation (*iǧtihād*) lies with the *ʿulamāʾ*, while law is God's Law or the *Sharīʿa*.
- Traditional Islamic education is a system of religious education inherited from the Ottoman period, but relegated by the advent of modern schooling to becoming a specialized type of education strictly dedicated to the development of the *ʿulamāʾ* (establishment[9] clergy).

Other forms of traditional Islamic schooling such as Ḳurʾānic schools persist by force of popular understanding of the religion. And factors intrinsic with underdevelopment and economic and geographic access to modern schools.

The Modernist/Liberal Orientation[10]

Modernism, as labeled by Hjärpe, entails advocating innovation and new interpretation (*iǧtihād*) in Islam, and is in direct opposition to

[9] Where 'establishment' denotes institutional Islam as distinctive from Organized Islam or Fundamentalism.

[10] It is very important to distinguish here between Western liberalism, and "patterns of liberal responses to Islamic fundamentalism, for example, emanating from

traditionalism. It is a trend that recognizes the all-encompassing realm of the religion hence it advocates Islam as a religion and way of life (*dīn wa dunyā*). Interpretation, however, according to this orientation, is not the sole right or authority of the *'ulamā'*. This is a quality, in addition to the acceptance of man-made law, that the modernists share with the secularists. Law has, according to the modernists, to be inspired by the principles of Islam. An example of the modernist trend presented by Hjärpe (1991, p. 36) was the Egyptian Constitution that declared Islam as the religion of the state and the source of guidance when making laws. This, however, does not entail the subordination of the state to Islam because that law and the interpretation of Islam and its principles are a man-made exercise, delimiting the scope of religion as it is understood by the fundamentalists. The law, therefore, is not the Islamic Law (except in the case of personal law for Muslims), but is a more mundane attempt at interpretation by laymen, with Islamic principles as guidelines.

The above mentioned trend is also represented in Islam in general and termed liberal by Watt (1988), who argues that Muslims who appreciated much of the Western outlook and felt that the explicit or implicit criticism of Islam were partly justified, but who at the same time thought of themselves as Muslims and wanted to live their lives as Muslims . . . the liberals began to look for a new identity which in some respects at least, would be more in accord with Western values (p. 62).

While in agreement with the emphasis placed by Watt on Western values as a yardstick for the liberal innovators, values reflected by modernity are also central within this orientation. Salvatore, on the other hand, stresses the liberal hybrid, which he terms neutralist, emanating from an Islamic public arena as a reaction to fundamentalism, and viewing Islam as politically neutral (Salvatore, 1998). Central within the fundamentalist call in its multiple variants, is the strict connection between Islam as a religion and politics or the state—*dīn wa dawla* (religion and state) (p. 77). This reflects what Salvatore assigns the label of conflationist interpretative scheme which tends to "conflate two poles that can be called Islam and politics, or Islam and the state, or Islam as *din* and Islam as *Dawla* (*Islam*

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within the Islamic public arena" as maintained in Salvatore, 1998, p. 75, and Binder, 1988.

Din Wa Dawla)". The neutralists, on the other hand, "see Islam as limited to *din* (religion) or as also encompassing the *dunyā* or the 'world' (according to the formula *Islam dunyā wa dīn*)".[11]

Salvatore (1998), while recognizing the Islamic particularity of the liberalism represented by neutralism, does not however negate that it takes on "an added transcultural dimension for being assessed in the West as the area for the 'Islamic liberals', those who translate Western values into an Islamic framework" (p. 72). But he strongly refutes the assimilation of the neutralists to "liberalism in the Western sense", due to one element of their thought claiming "that even without any reference to an actual form of state and government the Ḳur'ān necessarily provides the basis for an 'order' or 'system' (*nizam*)" (p. 97). This tenet echoes a characteristic cited by Hjärpe (1991, 1992), namely the role of Islam and its principles as a guide in the conduct of life, and exercise of processes such as the formulation of laws. Neutralists, in spite of manifesting the political neutrality of Islam, differ, however, from the latter along the more comprehensive aspect held by the neutralists: Islam as *dīn wa dunyā*. By such an understanding Islam is placed within the public sphere, while it is taken seriously enough "as a socio-cultural regulatory force or 'normative system'" (Salvatore, 1998, p. 92).

The Islamic liberals strongly advocate a modern educational system, which is inclusive of a clearly defined religious curriculum that enhances the child's development as a Muslim and intellectual being. Their approach to religious education as a foundation of an Islamic moral code, conduct and way of life is essential within their understanding of a comprehensive body of education.

The main tenets of modernism/liberalism as an Islamic religious orientation include:

- The acceptance of Western values and values of modernity translating them into an Islamic framework.
- Islam as politically neutral, delimited to the realm of *dīn wa dunyā* (religion and way of life). The understanding of *dīn wa dunyā*, however, takes on a more expansive conceptualization where Islam becomes a blueprint for life conduct (Salvatore, 1998, p. 95).

[11] This is synonymous with Islam *dīn wa dunyā* introduced earlier but with a different order of identical words.

- *Dīn wa dunyā* in this expansive definition also entails Islamic principles acting as guiding principles in the formulation of man-made Laws, and the evaluation of systems (*nuzum*).
- Freedom of interpretation extended to laymen, and the advocacy of man-made law.
- The belief that claims for an Islamic reawakening or solution (to the modern crises of Muslims) is a fundamentalist attribute that departs from the essence of the religion confined to the realm of Faith (*īmān*) (Ibid., pp. 93–94).
- Education is basically of modern type, integrating a well-defined religious curriculum.

The Fundamentalist Orientation

The term "Islamic fundamentalism" has been used by many writers interchangeably with Islamism and political Islam. And as Moussalli explains

> some scholars prefer to use the term 'political Islam' instead of Islamism or fundamentalism. . . . where the whole issue of preferring one description to another relates not only to the phenomenon itself, but to the perspective of the analyst as well as his/her discipline of knowledge and method of inquiry. To a religious scholar, it is probably fundamentalism, to a political scientist it is most likely Islamism or political Islam (Moussalli, 1998, p. 3).

Hence, and as Moussalli concludes, the terms may be used interchangeably. Islamic fundamentalism should however be distinguished from any connotations that may derive similarities to other forms of religious fundamentalism, especially Christian fundamentalist movements. As Ciment (1997) confirms, "Fundamentalism is a problematic concept when applied to Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology" (p. 62). Fundamentalism as a form of Islamism, "while seemingly a return to Islamic roots, is, in fact, inherently modern in its outlook . . . It tries to modernize authentic Islamic sources" (Ciment, 1997, p. 79). Furthermore, the word fundamentalism in this sense strictly denotes 'those who regress to the fundamentals, which distinguishes it from the negative implications that this term may carry as a result of media coverage and sensationalism.

Islamic fundamentalism, furthermore, has an inherent activist agenda. To understand the nature of this activism, the relationship

between Islamic fundamentalism and politics should be taken as a given, reinforced by its being a body of thought that "changes Islam into political ideology or an 'ism'" (Moussalli, 1998, p. 3). Hjärpe (1991), who maintains that "Islam has always been a phenomenon with political consequences" (p. 30), has also explained the relationship between Islam and politics within a historical framework.

Fundamentalism in Islam, however is not uniform; it includes various trends and variants that reflect different interpretative discourses and ideologies. While the unitary factor between the different categories of Islamic fundamentalism is their 'explicit affirmation' of the scriptural foundations[12] of Islam, the diversity emanates from the implicit counterpart of what this affirmation is used for, or is intended to reject or deny (Arjomand, 1995, p. 182).

Variation may be the result of variables such as the ideological and institutional context where the fundamentalist movement (and or identity) emerges or develops, thus influencing its political role and reaction (Arjomand, 1995, p. 183).[13] In addition to this, the variation in the climate of the international political culture is cited as another eminent reasons for variance (Ibid., pp. 192–193). The main types that will be identified here are mainstream fundamentalism (also known as reformist), and radical fundamentalism. The choice of these two typologies, in spite of an existence of a variety of others, and a set of evolving hybrids, has been made here.

But before identifying the predominant characteristics of each, a delineation of the basic tenets of fundamentalism *per se* is necessary. Fundamentalists share the following basic tenets:

- Islam (as derived from the scriptural foundations of Ḳur'ān and *Sunna*) is a source for a comprehensive social system and way of life (*dīn wa dunyā*) and for politics and government (*dīn wa dawla*).
- The return to the scriptural foundations of Islam within a process of reform (*iṣlāh*) and revival (*ʿahwa*).

[12] Basically the Ḳur'ān and the *Sunnah* which includes the tradition of the Prophet or *ḥadīth.s* (sayings).

[13] It is important to clarify here however that Islamist (i.e. fundamentalist) theorists strongly oppose the notion of "'political Islam' as based on the formula of a 'politicization of religion'" an argument presented in Salvatore, Discursive contentions, p. 88. For a more detailed dicussion refer to Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Al-sahwa Al Islamiyya Bayn al-juhud Wa al-tataruff*. Qatar: Marba'at al-Dawha al-Haditha, 1982.

- Law is God's Law (*Sharīʿa*), and God is Sovereign.
- *Sharīʿa* is both a system of law, and a source of guiding principles. Its application is inherent within fundamentalist designs to establish the Islamic state, the ultimate state for believing Muslims.
- Opening the door of interpretation (*iǰtihād*), which is in direct contrast with the traditionalists (Salvatore, 1998; Hjärpe, 1991; Arjomand, 1995).
- Supreme loyalty to the *Umma* (community of believers).
- Education combining both modern and religious education. Religious education, however, is given a role as an instrument, central in enhancing the expansion of the fundamentalist movement.

Within the renewal of interpretation, Hjärpe (1991, pp. 39–42) delimits this right in fundamentalism to the *ʿulamāʾ*, taking the example of Iran and the post-revolutionary Iranian Constitution. This point however is refutable since within the development of fundamentalist ideology and more specifically the radical variant, interpretation emanated from intellectuals and members of the intelligentsia who regarded their religious knowledge as sufficient for interpretation (*iǰtihād*) and theorization. Hence Arjomand confirms that "the oppositional lay intelligentsia played the leading role in the intermediate stages of the Islamic movements from the 1930's to the 1970's and was largely responsible for the creation of the new Islamic fundamentalist ideologies" (Arjomand, 1995, p. 187).

However, currently the Islamist ideological scene is witnessing an attempt by its theoreticians and especially the advocates of the *al-sahwa* (Islamic awakening) stance (representing the mainstream), to restore the centrality of the *ʿulamāʾ*. Their definition of *ʿulamāʾ* is, however, more expansive in that it includes the category of "'Islamic propagandists and intellectuals' (*al-duʾat wa al-mufakkirun al-Islamiyyun*) only through stressing their belonging to *ahl al-ʿilm*, scholars of Islamic science" (Salvatore, 1998, p. 85).[14] Thus they are seen as a sub-category to the *ʿulamāʾ* preoccupied more directly with the social sphere, while the *ʿulamāʾ* are to be recognized as the primary interpreters of the Islamic *Sahwa* (awakening) within its theological connotations

[14] As represented within an analysis of an argument presented in al-Qaradawi, al-Itar al-ʿamm li al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya al-muʾasira, in Saʾid al-Din Ibrahim (ed.) *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya wa humum al-Watan al-Arabi.* Amman: Muntada al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1988.

(Salvatori, 1998, p. 85). This has been deemed as an intellectual necessity in the light of the development of radical fundamentalist thought and conscious attempts by the mainstream at hampering its momentum.

With these general features as a background, we proceed with the delineation of the selected variants of Islamic fundamentalism.

Mainstream fundamentalism

As a starting point, it is important to stress the evolutionary characteristic of Islamic political thought. Ciment (1997, p. 78) maintained that the origins of "modern political Islam . . . traces its origins to the Muslim Brotherhoods of Egypt and Pakistan of the 1920s".[15] Fundamentalism as a movement and trend of thought was preceded by another type of revivalist Islam, namely the reformist trend. Intellectuals and thinkers such as Al-Afghani, Muḥammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida championed this reformist trend, also known as Pan-Islamism (Huband, 1999, pp. 76–81). It was however a body of thought that was reactive to foreign, European colonialism, calling for the reassertion and revival of a true Islamic 'civilization'. The terms Islamic state and polity did not appear within their discourse but focused more on the internal cohesion of the *Umma* and Islamic civilization; the renewal of *iǧtihād*; and the need for a "unified system of Islamic Law" inspired by the *Sharīʿa* (pp. 76–81). After the liquidation of the caliphate by Gamal Ataturk in 1924, the development of modern Islamic thought took on a new level. The Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), and its ideology came to the fore and represented a continuation of the legacy of Al-Afghani, Abdu, and Rida "in the field of active politics. . . . whose ideology marks the break of fundamentalism with the notion of the parallel existence of religion and politics and insists on the subordination of the former to the latter" (Enayat, 1982, p. 83).

The Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 originally as a society and was turned into a political organization by its founder

[15] Arjomand (1995, p. 183) confirmed this point by stressing that "two intellectual watersheds mark the ideological conditioning of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism", citing Abu Al-Alaa al-Mawdudi (Pakistan), and Sayyid Qutb (Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood movement). Both Mawdudi and Qutb however, represent a more radical view of Islamic fundamentalism. This radicalism had its foundations in the movements they derived from, and in the case of mainstream fundamentalism the Egyptian Brotherhood is of particular importance.

Ḥasan Al-Banna in 1939. In spite of this, the main ideological focus was on establishing an "islamic order" in contrast to an Islamic state, and the strengthening of Islam within society. Three main principles were the basis of ideological direction and activism, mainly:

- Islam is a comprehensive, self-evolving system; it is the ultimate path of life in all its spheres.
- Islam emanates from and is based on two fundamental sources: the Ḳur'ān and the *Sunna*.
- Islam is applicable to all times and places (Hassan Al-Banna, 1939, p. 85).

Thus the societal features of the fundamentalist call were more prominent during the founding and early years of the brotherhood.This, however, changed gradually with the developments that led to the appearance of the radical trend. As a result the implementation of the *Sẖari'a*, as a symbol proceeding the establishment of an Islamic system of government/state came to predominate. This is a factor that both mainstream fundamentalism and the radical fundamentalism share. The dividing lines have grown to be clearer during the last four decades along the logic adopted for the achievement of this goal of establishing the Islamic state. The mainstream opted for a gradualist endeavor within a pluralist political system, while the radicals adopted a revolutionary stance supported by a more complex system of ideas (Karlsson, 1994, pp. 56–57).

Religious education plays a central role and has an intrinsic value in reform (*iṣlāh*) of society. This does not negate the importance of modern schooling (to prepare the Muslim subjects intellectually), as long as it is combined with a more extensive and specific religious education based on fundamentalist principles. Ideologically, however, it is important to note that mainstream fundamentalists are in many ways conducting an Islamist movement (*ḥaraka Islāmīyya*) that moves to deeper levels of intellect. In essence they have championed their movement through promulgating an intellectual discourse with their opponents, predominantly the secularist. This discourse is in essence supportive of Islam as being the basis of a new renaissance, whereby the Fundamentalist/Islamist[16] is defined by Emara (1995, p. 17) as

[16] The term Fundamentalist and Islamist are used interchangeably pending the term used by the ideologue in question. Fundamentalist is referred to in Arabic as

"a Muslim implementing a project aiming at change, renewal and renaissance". This is one facet of change in the realm of knowledge and its production. In correspondence to this, Emara (1995) strongly voices the position of his camp with regards to perceived threats of Western infiltration and especially intellectual infiltration—*Al Ghazou Al ʿaḳlī or Al Ghazou Al Fikri.* Hence, modern education and instruction is to take place within the cognitive framework of the Fundamentalist/ Islamist movement and its confines.

One of the most illustrative representatives of the mainstream fundamentalists is the solutionists (Salvatore, 1998, p. 83)[17] who advocate the following:

- The politics of *Sahwa* (revival), instigating a comprehensive Islamization of discourse, the public sphere, and the political arena.
- The importance of the application of the *Sẖarīʿa*, which gains a symbolic significance in the establishment of an Islamic government/ state.
- The necessity that the establishment of the Islamic State is based upon ideological and logical premises.
- Evolution is stressed within their discourse due to their emphasis on gradualism, and the centrality of the idea of the reform (*iṣlāh*) of society.
- Gradualism is also stressed in political activism where a call for participation and the use of a pluralist political system is eminent.
- A renewed focus on the centrality of the *ʿulamāʾ*, in spite of its expansive definition, where the term *ʿulamāʾ*, in addition to the category of Muslim scholars, may also include a sub category of 'the people of Knowledge' (*ahl al-ʿilm*) represented by propagandists and intellectuals.

Usuli Pl. Usuliyuun, while Islamists are referred to in Arabic as Al-Islamiyyuun and the Islamist Movement as *Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya.* The dilemma of which term to use is reflected here, and problems of definition and content of meaning do evolve when trying to delimit the use to one term or another. It is however evident that the term Islamism/Islamist is more used today by representatives of the mainstream trend and in pertinent evolving ideological discourse(s). The concept and what it denotes however has in itself presently developed to entail a more comprehensive categorization, as reflected within contemporary discourses.

[17] The name is derived from their call "that Islam can provide political solutions" (Salvatore, 1998).

– The refutation and clear rejection of the radical, revolutionary stance within fundamentalism especially the most extreme (Ibid., 1988, pp. 83–92; Arjomand, 1995, p. 193).

Religious education on the practical level serves as an instrument of indoctrination, and recruitment into the Islamist movement. Religious study circles (*ḥalaḳat al-dars al-dīnī*) conducted within mosques and in the privacy of the homes of movement members are one of the major alternative forms of non-formal religious education taking precedence over curricular religious education. Such study circles figure as the site for expanding the movement and consolidating its recruited members. They serve also as a locus for the Islamization of society[18] (independent from recruitment) to enhance its compatibility with the Islamist message and 'higher cause'.

Radical Fundamentalism

Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb have been claimed to be the benchmark of modern militant Islamist thought. For Mawdudi, Islamic government was an uncontested reality that had to be realized. Sovereignty was God's sovereignty (*al-ḥākimīyya li'l-Allah*), while the Worship of God in His unity (*Al Ubudiyyat li-llah*) was a complementary principle to be realized (Kepel, 1985). These two principles were also adapted and extended by Qutb. The means to achieve the delineated two pillars of the Islamic state was to be a *revolutionary* break with the status quo. One major difference diverted the two thinkers, mainly in the typology and activist agenda parallel to the concept of revolution. As Arjomand (1995) confirms "although Mawdudi's ideological elaboration included the appropriation of the modern political myth of revolution, this appropriation remained more semantic than substantive" (p. 184). However, the revolutionary path must be led by a vanguard, who for Mawdudi was represented by "the pious vanguard", while for Qutb the vanguard's duty was made achievable, by means of the activist implications of a movement (*ḥaraka*) that would first remove any obstacles to him (Kepel, 1985, p. 55).

[18] For a discussion on Islamism in society and its effects on raising level of Islamization of social, cultural and political life in Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East, see refer to Pipes and Nafisi, 1999.

Mawdudi in many ways furnished Qutb with the background on which to build his own ideological militancy base and transition to higher levels of militancy. The supremacy of Qutbian thought within the sphere of radicalism has come to be recognized; whereby his works "Signposts" and "Under the Aegis of the Ḳur'ān" are considered the counterpart of Lenin's "What is to be done?" to this strand of fundamentalism (Ciment, 1997, p. 74). But what are the main tenets of Qutbian/radical thought? A complex system of ideas is hereby presented as simply as possible:

- *Djāhiliyya*: "There are only two types of societies: Muslim and *djāhiliyya*. The latter is identified as a society where Islam is not applied" according to the parameters of *ḥākimīyya* and *'Ubuddiyya* (Kepel, 1985, pp. 50–51). Thus, most societies live in a state of *djāhiliyya* (a state of ignorance, anarchy, and idolatry analogous to the one that was present in pre-Islamic times). The role of the vanguard is to redeem Muslims from this *djāhiliyya* by showing the Right Path and effectuating the major principles of *ḥākimīyya* and *'Ubuddiyya*.
- Many types of societies were explained and deemed as *djāhiliyya* societies, including Western democratic systems and societies where "modern forms of idolatry" exist, allowing "the belief in the ultimate sovereignty of the people" (Ciment, 1997, p. 78).
- To establish and proceed towards an Islamic state guided by the rule and sovereignty of God and His Law, the rightly guided Muslim had to fulfill different types of action. First among these was the execution of *'uzla* (separation). By this is meant, according to Qutb, the "spontaneous mental withdrawal of the pious and practicing Muslim from those who do not feel bound by Islam's obligations" (Kepel, 1985, p. 64).
- Thus believers in this credo formulate what is called the Islamic society. If three believers professing this credo exist, then they may be considered an Islamic society which "exists in deed". The new founded society of three shall expand to include other members who after secession from the surrounding *djāhiliyya* society, engage in a constant struggle with it. This struggle and the credo that moves it become a movement (*ḥaraka*), which is propelled by a "sacred combat" or struggle (*Jihad*) (Kepel, 1985, p. 54).[19] Thus

[19] With reference to Sayyid Qutb. Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq (Signposts). Beirut-Cairo:

for Qutb the world must be cleansed and purified by means of this struggle or Jihad, even if Islam is not threatened; while existing conditions in a specific country or another should have no impact on the nature and practice of Jihad (Huband, 1999, p. 89).[20]

– The *Umma* (community of believers) is idealized, and in its conceptualization it has no national boundaries or internal divisions (Ciment, 1997, p. 71).

Thus for the radical fundamentalist, all societies that do not follow the discourse and principles necessary to implement a more authentic form of Islam, (including *ʿUbuddiyya* and *ḥākimīyya* are declared as *ǰāhiliyya*). Hence, the fundamentalist with this belief practices two important duties: *ʿuzla* (isolation) in the form of spiritual withdrawal, and *Jihad*, struggle to purify the *ǰāhiliyya* society and initiate a movement that will eventually overcome obstacles and lead to the establishment of an Islamic state. According to this ideological discourse all Western societies and practicing democracies are considered *ǰāhiliyya* societies. Radical fundamentalism is an ideology with a revolutionary stance and an explicit form of activism. Later radical and extremist movements and theoreticians, however, interpreted the dynamics of revolution verbally, where *Jihad* and revolution were combined, and translated into armed struggle. This however is an ultra radical trend, which transgresses into militancy. (This chapter will not attempt to venture into this.)

Sayyid Qutb (1980) in deliberating about education and its value and role clearly distinguished between types of modern education on the basis of the following assumptions:

> A Muslim cannot go to any source other than God for guidance in matters of faith, in the concept of life, acts of worship and human affairs, values and standards, principles of economics and political affairs, values and standards, principles of economics and political affairs and interpretation of historical processes. It is therefore his duty that he should learn all these from a Muslim whose piety and character, belief and action, are beyond reproach.

Dar El Shorouk, 1980 and edition of the World Islamic Union of Students, no location, n.d. (Kuwait).

[20] As Kepel and Huband affirm, for Qutb Jihad was mainly a process of purification to redeem the status of the Muslim religion *din*, not necessarily an endeavor that precludes forms of aggression. This, however has been a point on which interpretation by later radical, more extremist movements varied, where Jihad in some instances was synonymous with "holy war".

> However a Muslim can go to a Muslim or a non-Muslim to learn abstract sciences such as chemistry, physics, biology, astronomy, medicine, industry, agriculture, administration (limited to its technical aspects), technology, military arts and similar sciences and arts; although the fundamental principle is that when the Muslim community comes into existence it should provide experts in all these fields in abundance (Qutb, 1980, pp. 108–109).

He further added:

> However, a Muslim can study all the opinions and thoughts of *ǰāhilī*[21] writers, not from the point of view of constructing his own beliefs and concepts, but for the purpose of knowing the deviation adopted by the *ǰāhiliyya*, so that he may know how to correct these man-made deviations, in the light of true Islamic belief and rebut them according to the sound principles of Islamic teachings (Qutb, 1980, p. 110).

Sayyid Qutb, in writing his treatise was focusing on the Islamic State Project, and the parameters for its establishment. Hence an apologetic stance is taken up in his writing towards what he denotes as 'the practical sciences' enhancing development of the human condition. The Muslim community according to him has to equip itself with all the necessary tools for its progress, including scientists who can realize this goal.

For the contemporary radical, however, the value and role of education has become modified to fit the level of *Jihad*, and constant struggle, with an eminent threat from the West and modernity. Muḥammad Qutb, brother and disciple of Sayyid Qutb, took the interpretation of the latter's works a step further towards the extremist spectrum. In doing so a total disengagement with Western and modern education was evident. In addition to this, the de-linking of Muslims with this type of education was considered as a duty in trying to face up to the claimed threat and conspiracy aimed at Islam by the Western Christian/Judaic civilization (Qutb, 1994). The materialization of anti-western discourse is eminent within contemporary radicalism. One major locus for these forces of power and claimed intellectual competitiveness was education. Modern education, hence, is considered as an instrument of intellectual infiltration that did away with the essence of Islam (pp. 77–89). It is viewed as a sophisticated form of neo-imperialism. This view has been more prominent under the aegis of globalization.

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[21] Those belonging to *ǰāhiliyya* society(ies).

In spite of this, it is evident within the radical trend that the use of IT and technological advances will help in promulgating the movement and fulfilling its agenda. Thus certain areas of modern science are still considered important. This selective use of modern education especially in science and technology lies within the confines of the exercise by radical organizations (a phenomenon here denoted as 'selective modernization'), whereby aspects of modernity are serving the Islamist movement (such as technological know-how, and use of information technology) and are considered as essential.

On the practical level, the radical fundamentalists also concentrate on non-formal forms of education such as religious study circles (similar to the mainstream fundamentalist but different in content and facets of indoctrination) to recruit and expand the Islamist movement. Such activities and circles are usually carried out underground, or in specific and renown mosques identified as under the hegemony of a specific radically inclined group or cell. Islamist schools for younger students and children are expanding as a form of early socialization and indoctrination. It is also a ramification of the exercise of *'uzla*—i.e. separation (on the mental level). Such schools are present in both Muslim societies and among Muslim minorities in predominantly non-Muslim countries.

Table 2.2 Fundamentalism Deconstructed: major categorical tenets and differences

Type	Means towards Islamic State	Form of Political Activism	Political System	Prerequisites	Role of *Sharī'a*	Interpretation	Education
Mainstream	Gradualist	Political Participation	Democratic/ Pluralist	Societal Reform—*iṣlāḥ*	Symbolic	Formalized	Hybrid between modern and non-formal religious education
Radical	Revolutionary	Jihad/ struggle with *ḏjāhiliyya* society	Absolutist	A society of Muslims/ a movement	Fundamental/ Law of God	Freedom of interpretation	Non formal/ tool for indoctrination and recruitment

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to present a general outline of different orientations within Islam. The predominant ideological framework for each orientation with its implications for education illustrate the variance that exists within Islam. It is hence important to recognize such variance in trying to approach a deeper understanding of the connotations that the term 'Islam' can manifest both on the epistemological and cognitive level. It is also illustrative of the ramifications of competing ideologies that predominate in a religion that surpasses in many ways the theological sphere to becoming a potential for a way of life and system of rule. As M. Najjar (2000) affirms,

> Tension between Islamic fundamentalists and liberal Muslim intellectuals is as old as the beginning of modernization in the Muslim world. Western institutions, ideas and values have swept over the Arab-Muslim world, breeding suspicion and resentment among Muslim conservatives. Most feared and resented are Western secular laws and education, which have gradually supplanted Islamic laws and religiously controlled educational systems. This onslaught of Western culture presents Muslims with a serious dilemma: how to become modern, and remain Muslim. While liberal intellectuals seek a modernized Islam, fundamentalists seek to Islamize the modern age, calling for a return to pristine Islam (p. 177).

Najjar's account reflects the war of ideas, alternative worldviews, and cognitive realities existent within Islam.

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CHAPTER THREE

EDUCATION AND EMPOWERMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS ELITE IN IRAN

Reza Arjmand

Introduction

The Iranian Islamic revolution, the most vivid illustration of resurgent Islam in recent decades, is regarded as one of the latest endeavours to interpret and implement a religious discourse in a modern social and political setting leading to the establishment of a theocratic system. Education is, among religious authorities in Iran, considered as the foremost means for the reproduction and expansion of Islamic culture and the shaping the Muslim believer: a potential member of the Global Muslim Community (*Umma*).

This chapter examines Iranian post-revolutionary education in order to trace the implication of religious discourse for the desecularization of the educational content through curriculum changes, the hidden curriculum and social control and domination of the society. Particular reference is made to the intellectual leadership of *'ulamā'* in Shī'a. Focus is limited to the first years after the Islamic revolution in 1979, in which the main objective of education was to produce the religiously committed Muslim (*musalmān-i muta'hid-i maktabī*): the incarnation of Islamic ideology. The ideological hegemony over and through education in post-revolutionary Iran has resulted in the empowerment of the religious elite in Iran.

Background[1]

Iran, one of the largest oil rich countries in the world with a population of approximately 66 millions (July 2001), is the land bridge

[1] All the statistics of this part are from: (SCI, 2002) otherwise specified.

between the Middle East and Asia. Though the Iranian constitution does not recognize ethnic and language minorities as opposed to religious minorities, the country is a composition of different ethnic and language group. The largest ethnic groups are: Persian (51 percent), Azeri (24 percent), Gilaki and Mazandarani (eight percent), Kurd (seven percent) and Arab (three percent). The majority of Iranians (89 percent) are Shīʿa Muslim while ten percent are followers of Sunnī Islam and some one percent practice Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, or Bahāʾīsm.

One third of the population is under 15 years old. The rate of literacy in the country is 79.5 percent and of the total literate population, 54 percent are male and 46 percent are female. The school age population and gross enrollment rates in years 1990 and 1996 are presented in Table 1.

The number of students in higher education institutions in the year 2001 were 1,573,322 of which 744,918 (ca. 47 percent) were female. In the same year 1,443,860 were undergraduate, 66,492 students of Master's Degree and 62,970 Ph.D. The gross ratio of enrollment in tertiary education institutions in years 1990 and 1996 is presented in the Table 2.

The Ministry of Education is the main institution responsible for providing primary and secondary education in Iran. Education is highly centralized and ethnic minorities are not entitled to receive education in their own languages. Religious education for certain religious minorities such as Bahāʾīs is also excluded from the curriculum. The 5+3+4 system was introduced in the 1970s and lasted up to the late 1990s when the upper secondary level was reformed through the introduction of a pre-college period as a pre-requisite for admittance in academic tertiary education.

Table 3.1 School age children and rate of enrollment (1990 and 1996) in Iran

Educational level	School-age population		Gross enrollment rate (percentage)					
			Total		Male		Female	
	1990	1996	1990	1996	1990	1996	1990	1996
Primary	8,351	9,385	112	98	118	102	106	95
Secondary	9,132	11,446	55	77	64	81	46	73

Source: (USAID, 2000).

Table 3.2 Rate of enrollment in tertiary education (1990 and 1996) in Iran

Number of students per 100,000 inhabitants		Gross enrollment rates (percentage)					
		Total		Male		Female	
1990	1996	1990	1996	1990	1996	1990	1996
936	1,763	10.0	17.6	13.7	21.9	6.2	13.1

Educational Development

The absence of a certain scholarly agreement on the religion of Achamenid (525–404 BC) has spread a shadow of uncertainty over the educational tradition of the era. While many believe that Achamenid were Zoroastrians, some other believe that the ancient pre-Zoroastrian Iranian religion, Mithraism practiced along with one version of Zoroastrianism.[2] Although there is not enough evidence to argue that there was formal education in Iran in the Achamenid era, there is extensive evidence that the Egyptians and Babylonians under the Persian Empire continued to follow their traditional education with scribal schools (Oppenheim, 1977). The curriculum was composed of reading, writing, grammar, mathematics and astronomy intended solely for boys. In the strictly hierarchical administrative system during the Sassanid dynasty (224–651 AD), however, education was a privilege only for the elite (nobility, clergy and secretaries). Urban merchants were familiar with writing and numeracy, while peasants in rural areas were mostly illiterate. Children of the nobility started school at the age of five to seven years. General education was composed of reading, writing, religious instruction, physical education and courtly arts and would last to the age of fifteen. The training included not only hunting and the arts of war but also social manners and etiquette. The teaching methods relied heavily

[2] As Ahura Mazda ("The Wise Lord", supreme God of Zoroastrians) was regarded as God, and the one who bestowed kingdom to the Achamenid kings and Hoama cult (a ritual using an intoxicant plant (Hoama) with medicinal and spiritual properties) was practiced in Persepolis with fire as the sacred element, some scholars consider Achamenids as Zoroastrians. Some archeological findings show, however, that Mithraist traditions such as worship to Anahita (Iranian goddess of royalty, war, and fertility) practiced in the court and there is no clear evidence to prove that sacrifice (blamed among Zoroastrians) obliterated from the Achamenid court.

on memorization of the sacred texts and following the instructors (*farhangbud*) in their practices. The ultimate aim of education was to contribute to good conduct which was one of the principles of Zoroastrianism, the predominate religion.

With the arrival of Islam in the 7th century, Iranian boys came to attend elementary schools (*maktab*), known as *kuttāb* in Arabic countries, which in its early stages focused on the memorization of the Ḳur'ān and traditions (*ḥadīth*). Girls, on the other hand, participated in home schooling. The sessions for boys took place at the neighbood mosque and on some occasions in the homes of the teachers. Students paid tuition fee for the education they received. Lecomte (1954: 324, quoted in Landau, 1999) argues that "There is some evidence that the structure and teaching methods of the *kuttāb* were modeled on the Byzantinie primary school", while the curriculum was modified to suit the Islamic context and to fulfill the local demands. "The early *kuttāb* was an important agent for socializing different ethnic groups into the Islamic faith and its way of life" (Landau, 2002).

Kuttāb and *maktabs* were private institutions which sometimes were organized in the homes of wealthy people, partly to make the attendance of girls possible. There was neither any age restriction nor any grading system to assess the progress or evaluate the educational outcome of the *maktabs*. In Iran, *maktabs* and their traditional approach in education survived to 1920s when they were replaced by modern elementary schools. *Maktabs*, however, survived as an extra-curricular institution long after their removal from the formal educational scene in Iran and played a vital role in the absence of a formal preschool system. They were the main centers of religious teachings and for learning to recite and memorize the Ḳur'ān.

The history of higher education in Iran could be traced back to the time of the King Shāpūr I (241–272), of Sassanid dynasty who established the first medical academy in the world, known as Academy of Jundi-Shapur, a leading research institution and scholarly sanctuary of the time. With the Islamization of the country the extensive establishment of mosques and *khāns* (guest house) created an academic campus. Development of such institutions, especially in big cities and cultural centers, facilitated the mobility of students in the quest for knowledge that was an essential requirement for the scholars of traditions (*ahl al-ḥadīth*). This in turn, necessitated the establishment of *madrasas*, which appeared as independent entities in early

10th century and grew rapidly all over the Islamic world. The establishment of *Niẓāmiyya*, by Niẓām al-Mulk in Baghdād and Nayshābūr, starting in 11th century were among the first endeavors to unify the curriculum, though the impetus of the founder was to spread the *Shāfiʿī* school of thought—one of four legal schools of Sunnīs, derived from teachings of Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Shāfiʿī (767–820). *Niẓāmiyyas*, as a network of Islamic higher education institutions were spread all over the Islamic world which became the research centers attracting scholars and scientists of the time. Madrasas contributed extensively to the advancement of sciences especially narrative sciences (*ʿulūm-i naḳlī*).

Education and empowerment of ʿulamāʾ

The history of Shīʿism[3] and the development of various sub-sects within it, cannot be presented in this short chapter. However, it is worth looking at one of the theoretical debates which led to practical consequences in later periods. The doctrine of *imāmat* (religious leadership) suggests that the *Imām* is the source of true knowledge. In the absence of the infallible *Imām* and in the era of occultation (*ghayba*), the Muslim society should turn to the Ḳurʾān, *Sunna* (traditions transmitted through a chain of credible successors—*tawātur*) and consensus (*idjmāʾ*). This idea was supported by a group of *Imāmī* (Twelver) scholars known as the *Akhbārīs* who were criticized by rationalists who argued for the role of rational knowledge (*ʿaḳl*) as the main distinguishing feature between a religious expert (*faḳīh*) and a layman.

This theoretical shift in the early eighteen century in the Shīʿite thought resulted in more assertive empowerment of the religious elite in modern Iran. The *Uṣūlī* thought, which was adopted by the Shīʿite religious leaders and accordingly the believers thereafter, bestowed more authority to *ʿulamāʾ* through the doctrine of emulation (*taḳlīd*). *Uṣūlī* scholars believe in the involvement of reason (*ʿaḳl*) as an essential and prominent qualification of the religious expert which enables him to develop and adjust the Shīʿite jurisprudence appropriately to

[3] The term *Shīʿa* is meant the Twelver Shīʿia (*Ithnā ʾAsharīyya*) which is the subject of discussion here, unless otherwise specified.

the requirements of a modern society. According to the tenet of emulation, the religious leader is the source to be emulated (*marḏjaʿ al-taḳlid*) and demands obedience from the followers (*muḳallidīn*).

This theoretical evolution was perfectly suited to a methodological approach to the education of religious students proposed and practiced by the prominent Shīʿite scholar Shaikh Mortiḍā Ansārī in the textbooks *Kitāb al-Rasāil* and *Kitāb al-Makāsib*. The approach known as rational jurisprudence (*fiḳh-i istidlāī*) was an educational innovation using a methodology known as *masʾala sāzī*, which may be translated somewhat awkwardly as 'argumentation through hypothetical construction'. As a result of this innovation in methodology, Shīʿa religious students have acquired a dazzling brilliance in the art of abstract discursive argumentation in the dialectical manner (Akhavi, 1980: 121).

This, in turn, contributed to the dynamic of *fiḳh*—to hypothesize and theorize the individual and social realms of Muslim life and to insert *Sharīʿa* in a modern society. Scholarly interpretation of dogma (*iḏjtihād*), which the Shīʿite argue to be open to examination by religious experts (*muḏjtahidīn*), resulted in new interpretations of the primary texts: Ḳurʾān and *Sunna*. Control over the interpretation of such texts is of a vital importance since, "political power lies in the control over religious interpretation and the discourse that the religious group uses to exert such a control" (Talbani, 1996: 68).

The unity of *ʿulamāʾ*, Bazaar (the commercial sector of the economy) and the state—particularly from Ṣafavid era (1499–1736) onwards—paved the way for attainment of the power of *ʿulamāʾ*, who in turn propagated and legitimized the state ideology through religious interpretation. The collaboration of *ʿulamāʾ* in the courts of the kings was justified as for the best of Muslim community. This collaboration turned to be the field of scholarly debates through which several theories were introduced. Shīʿite scholars endeavored to explain the division of power and legitimacy of non-faḳīh political leader over the Muslim community in the absence of the infallible *Imām*, which led to different theories. One can recall certain theories by Allāmeh Ḥillī, al-Karakī, Muḥammad Baḳir Maḏjlisī, Muḳaddas Ardabīlī and Shaikh Yusuf al-Baḥrānī, which each became a source of inspiration and were subject to development by scholars thereafter. The legitimacy of the *ʿulamāʾ*'s involvement in the state is questioned by some of Iranian Muslim thinkers. Ali Shariʾati, a west-educated Muslim

sociologist, criticizes it by discussing the "triangle of sword, gold and rosary" as one of the main factors to encourage and sustain orthodoxy among Shīʿa (Shariʾati, 1971: 241).

The Iranian constitutional revolution of 1906 is considered as the first demonstration of the power of the religious leaders (*ʿulamāʾ*) in modern Iran. This revolution resulted in the creation of a constitutional monarchy. After the Ḳādjār dynasty (1795–1925) who maintained a cooperative relationship with *ʿulamāʾ*, the Pahlavi Dynasty came into power in 1925 and ruled the country until 1979. The Pahlavi dynasty copied the Western state model and pushed for rapid modernization. Such processes threatened the religious elite who had dominated Iranian education for more than one millennium.

The Revolution of 1979 overthrew the last Shah of Iran, closed the chapter of two and a half millennia of Persian monarchy and established an Islamic republic. This revolution led to the empowerment of the religious elite (*ʿulamāʾ*) in Iran. These two revolutions were similar in the sense that they continued and articulated the traditional claims on legitimacy of the ruling authority by the state and the religious elite (*ʿulamāʾ*). The *ʿulamāʾ* reinforced the religious leadership, which paved the way for their political authority in the society, initially in the nation-state and later extended to the macro community of *Umma.* One of the means to achieve this was through the interpretation of the Ḳurʾānic texts as mentioned, for instance, in IV: 59, to "Obey Allah, obey the Apostle and those in authority from among you". In the eyes of the Shīʿite leaders, "those in authority" are religious leaders (*ʿulamāʾ*) who are considered as the true and righteous inheritors of the Prophet. Arjomand (1976: 12) argues that Allah does not use political authority; rather, lordship over the universe. He is "not directly involved in mundane political events nor in the explicit source of political authority."

However, the doctrine, of acquisition (*iktisāb*) suggests that the notion of sovereignty as exercised by human beings is acquired and contingent upon the sovereignty of Allah. In practice, this idea led to the formulation of the *Wilāyat-i faḳih* (authority of the jurisconsult). This doctrine flourished and was practiced by Ayatollah Khomaini and crystallized in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This view is not limited to any specific nation-state but aims at unifying the Muslims worldwide in order "to create a government of universal justice in the world" (Khomaini, 1979: 66). For Khomaini, the Global Muslim

community of *Umma* "is a real community in this world" (Akhavi, 1980: 166), composed of the essential unity of Muslims in diversified cultural settings.

In the Islamic political system practiced in Iran, the highest authority is a qualified pious jurist known as *faḳīh* who, according the Shīʿite doctrine of leadership, gains power from the divine source and extends the domination to all three state powers—legislative, juridical and executive. Emulation and obedience are the main expectations from a Muslim person as the necessary principle of the religion.

The theocratic outcome of the Iranian revolution, in spite of the contribution of the secular and leftist factions, is explained by the resources at the disposal of the religious elite, namely, the mosques and religious students. The estimated number of mosques was 75,000 in 1982; the estimated number of religious students in 1980 was 1,500 only for Ḳum—a city known as the main centre for Islamic education (the Islamic World Review 1982, quoted by Goldstone et al.).

The revolution was financed by the Iranian economic sector (*bazaar*), as a reaction to the economic policies implemented by the Shah to open the domestic market to international enterprises and allow dependence on the United States and Europe. These measures led to a weakening of the *bazaar* which traditionally had acted as one of the wings of power in Iran.

The massive rural-to-urban migration, an outcome of the Shah's economic policies, changed the structure of the cities in 1960s and early 1970s. In the cities the traditionally minded immigrants felt far stronger support and influence from restive *ʿulamāʾ* than from the Shah's government and the migrant peasants who became mobilized by the religious establishment generally suffered from bad conditions in the shantytowns (Goldstone et al., 1991).

The migration trend accelerated the emergence of new lower-middle classes, for instance, craftsmen and petit merchants. The new Iranian identity was the embodiment of the values and attitudes of such classes. This group assisted the Iranian revolution and maintained the newly established Islamic government. It is from these classes that the government received its strongest support.

Health services and more mosques were the two most frequently cited demands of the urban poor (Kazemi, 1980: 78), and the fact that there were "1843 mosques only in Tehran as early as 1975" (Akhavi, 1980: 208) indicates that there were plenty of centres where these groups could be mobilized. The ideology of Shīʿite Islam,

appealed strongly to lower and lower middle class migrants, and the masses, and lower-level leaders, were absorbed into the religious organizations such as Mosques and received financial support from bazaar merchants. This grouping provided the religious opposition with more troops than the secular forces could possibly hope for. The religious leaders of the opposition groups, enjoyed the organizing efforts of a vast network of mosques, religious schools, and shrines which ultimately led to empowerment of the religious elite in Iran (Goldstone et al., 1991).

Post-Revolutionary Education

The Iranian Islamic constitution stipulates that it is the responsibility of the government to provide free education for all up to secondary school and for the expansion of free higher education to attain the self-sufficiency of the country (Article 30, cf. Art. 3 and Art. 43). The revolution was followed by a cultural revolution which in turn resulted to the establishment of The Higher Council of Cultural Revolution in 1980, aiming to modify Iranian education. The cultural revolution necessitated the reestablishment of the philosophy, objectives, policies and assessments of education in both basic and higher levels in accordance with Islamic principles. The four ideological doctrines of Iranian Islamic Republic namely (a) inseparability of religion and politics, (b) Islamic revival, (c) Islamization of the society and (d) the creation of the committed Muslim, are considered among the primary objectives of the post-revolutionary education. The goals set for basic education are the emphasis of ideological principles along with acceptance of the absolute authority of the jurisconsult (*wilāyat-i muṭlaḳa-yi faḳīh*), fortify and support of the political, economic and cultural unity of Muslim community (*Umma*) and oppressed people (*mostaḍ*ʿ*afīn*); rejection of any form of oppression, suffering, and domination; and strengthening of the country through military training in the values of independence and territorial integrity (MoE, 1983). The objectives above manifest the politicized ideological tenets set for integration in a global society beyond what was perceived as arbitrary divisions according to racial, geographical and ethnic boundaries. To fulfill the promise, education is expected to be developed to increase productivity, achieve social and national integration, and cultivate social, moral, and spiritual values, to strengthen the faith of Islam and to expand them to the global society of *Umma*. The first fundamental

educational reform introduced by the revolutionary government aimed at the transformation of the curriculum, initially through revision of textbooks, especially those in social studies, humanities, and religion. The objective claimed to be: "demonarchize" the curriculum and to replace "colonial and tyrannical" topics with Islamic and revolutionary subjects (Sazman-e Tahqiqat, 1980: 8, quoted in Mehran, 1989: 221). In fact, this was the first step of a series of endavours to dominate education so as to control the channels of reproduction. As Apple (1995) argues the "critical element in enhancing the ideological dominance of certain classes is the control of knowledge preserving and producing institutions of a particular society".

The reform started with the content of the curriculum and continued with the replacing the old textbooks, increasing the hours devoted to religious issues and the introduction of the Arabic language as the basis for Islamic principles. In the process of the transformation of education, schools were expected to inculcate values and beliefs appropriate to the Islamic community (*Umma*). The "specific changes in the nature of the state, the position of the elites, and the conditions of popular groups combined to create the revolution" (Goldstone et al., 1991) and while in the process of the revolution, the non-religious (nationalist and leftist) groups were among the main contributors, new the education system lacked any set of values other than Islamic ones. The nationalist forces were seen as the supporters of the secularism, which, it was said, the previous regime had "fostered in order to achieve the dual goals of increasing government control and of destroying the power base of the religious establishment (Ibid., p. 123).

A body (The Organization of Textbook Research) was created in the Ministry of Education and it was composed of members of the religious authorities *'ulamā'*. Its role was to regulate and control the ideological content of the textbooks as well as the trend of Islamization. In the new textbooks secular figures like scientists, writers, poets, and political personalities are never presented as role models, whereas Persian religious figures; prophets and the Shī'ite Imāms have been elevated into figures for emulation (Mehran, 1990 quoted by Ferdows, 1995: 334). Nafisi (1992, quoted in Higgins and Shar Ghaffari, 1992: 341), in his comparative analysis of pre- and post-revolutionary Iranian education, finds out that "the Pahlavis emphasized the pre Islamic Persian heritage to legitimise their rule, similarly, Islamic Republican

textbooks concur with other ideological statements in emphasizing the Islamic era of Iranian history, the pulpit, and the faith itself as sources of legitimacy."

The revolutionary government revised the textbooks to focus only on the Islamic history of the country as a way to reinforce the Islamic ideology. It was argued that the textbooks should strengthen an Islamic world view according to which "one single focus: the development of a thoroughly committed individual to one God" (Shurish, 1988: 62) was emphasized. School children are presented with a sharply defined image of the world, divided into pious, brave, uncompromising, honorable, morally superior Muslims and secular, unjust, greedy, inhuman, oppressive 'Westerns' and 'Westoxicated' intellectuals (Mehran, 1989: 289).

Pupils were exposed to a comprehensive Islamic environment and were expected to establish a relation with this environment. In order for the students to habitualize appropriate actions, they were provided by both "patterns of conduct" and "social control".

The Islamic government continued the habitualization through the process of purification in which, the textbooks in use before the revolution have been "purified" and cleared of "the misguidance and decadence of the despotic former regime," as well as foreign "cultural influences" "700 topics from 636 primary and secondary-school textbooks had been changed, especially in social sciences, humanities, and religious studies" (Mehran, 1990, quoted by Higgins and Shoar Ghaffari, 1995: 339). All the teachers in Iran had to pass the process of purgation in which approximately 8,000 professors, about half the total university faculty members were dismissed from their jobs. The study of religion was emphasized from primary grades through college, and teachers were forced to ensure that only those who understood the "true meaning of Islam" could complete their education or continue after the elementary stage of education. Regulations for behavior and dress, conforming to Islamic tenets, were established and the pupils were compelled to follow them in the schools.

The Iranian Islamic regime emphasized the role of the intellectuals and underlined religious commitment as the necessary requirement for their admittance to the elite of Islamic society. The new so-called "committed intellectual" was shaped as an alternative to what perceived as "Westoxicated intellectuals" to create a hegemonic situation in which the new ruling group is supported and their legitimacy

justified through new intellectuals.[4] The new faction of intellectuals after the revolution, known as "Religiously committed Intellectual" (*Roshanfekr-e Mota'hed Mazhabi*), was an effort to hinder the impact of secular intellectuals, and to maintain the power of the ruling elite (*'ulamā'*) in Iran. The emergence of the new faction entitled "religious intellectuals" in Iran, was a by-product of the rapid economic growth during the Pahlavi era, by which a large group of rural inhabitants moved to cities. The migration of many traditionally-minded peasants, marginalized in big cities, played a significant role in supporting the revolution and revival of religious values, in spite of fifty years efforts of Pahlavis to secularize the country.

Schools were considered as the main platform for the Iranian Islamic system to establish and internalize the desired qualities in children through both textbooks and the activities of Muslim teachers. The school, teachers and students were regarded as the human and cultural capital of both the country and the Islamic *Umma*, through which it would be possible to "recreate forms of consciousness that enable social control to be maintained without the necessity of dominant groups having to resort to overt mechanisms of domination" (Lzere, 1977: 755). The extent of the attempt to attain the new consciousness and "ideological conformity is evident from the government's attempts to encourage students to spy on their own parents" (Spencer, 1988, quoted in Goldstone et al., 1991: 131). Islamic education has to some extent succeeded in transforming the new generation of Iranians. Those who were born in the early 1970s have not experienced adult exposure to the "imperial" system. The change in the educational system has been so successful that now "kids teach parents revolutionary values" (Ibid.).

The content of the textbooks, the moral codes presented by committed teachers and the hidden curriculum in the official schooling assisted the Iranian Islamic regime to create and maintain a new religious consciousness as an inseparable part of the transmission of knowledge. Iranian "textbook-based instruction" inherited from the traditional Islamic education practiced in *maktabs*, Ḳur'ānic schools

[4] Gramsci introduces the concept of pseudo-hegemony in which the system "in order to gain a functional equivalent of hegemony, pretends to exercise its power in the name of a class which in reality it does not represent" (Gramsci, 1972).

and elementary levels of *madrasa*s and seminaries are used to memorize the sacred texts especially the Ḳur'ān. Along with the strict examination system, the use of these textbooks has been the predominant approach in Iranian education, supporting the internalization of the new values and forming the Islamic consciousness. The teachers act in the school to manage and track the development of the internalisation process as well as a part of the intellectual faction of the society who are formed "in connection with the dominant social group . . . to assimilate ideologically" (Gramsci, 1972: 10). School acted as the instrument through which the "intellectuals of various levels are elaborated" (Ibid.).

The reconceptualization of intellectualism based on religious values and the creation of new intellectuals based on Islamic and revolutionary principles are instances through which one could trace the role of intellectuals in forming the new set of values in post-revolutionary Iran. "It is not an exaggeration to suggest that never before in Iran has the teacher been as important a role model for students as in the Islamic Republic today" (Ferdows, 1995: 327).

School children, especially those from the lower middle class families—the main group supporting the revolution—are exposed to a dominant official ideology in school to which they could find the live representations through their family life and social relations. This synchronization saturates the pupils through a process of habitualization and hegemony: they read the books, observe the behavioral codes and practices and internalize the values that the authorities in the society, teachers in schools and parents in the families are their real models.

It would be appropriate to study the achievement of Iranian students in an international and comparative perspective. This may give a better understanding of the impact of the social milieu on scientific advancements of the students. The study known as TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and Sciences Study) was conducted by the IEA in some 45 countries from 1992 to 1997. Three target groups were nine years old (fourth and fifth grades in primary school) and thirteen years old (second or third grades in junior high school). The study tested the performance of the students in mathematics and sciences. The result showed that the average performance of Iranian fourth grade primary school children in the respective tested groups were at least 18 percent and at most 22 percent lower than

the average performance of students in 24 other countries and that their overall performance is lower than that of all participating countries. The average performance of children in fifth grade was 17–25 percent lower than students in 26 out of 28 participating countries. In the second group, also, the average performance was eight percent lower than 39 and 41 other countries (Harmon et al., 1998). The study showed that not only the learning level of the Iranian students in such activities as data collection, demonstration and interpretation of data, design of experiment, problem solving, employment of necessary means to solve problems and the use of common sophisticated guidelines is low but also Iranian students are weak in answering the questions which require ability to write and describe processes. Although the average performance of female and male students in both categories showed no difference, in the field of measurement the average overall performance of female students in both categories was 90 percent lower than that of male students.

The poor results of Iranian students is partly explained through other parts of the study: the educational level of teachers in Iran is lower than that of other countries. The number of students per teacher is high. The educational period in an academic year is shorter. The number of books and other cultural means available for families are few; and education is lecture based which heavily relies on textbooks as the only educational source (Martin, Mullis, Gonzalez, Smith, & Kelly, 1999). As the ideological criterion for admission of teachers has emphasized by the authorities, the scientific merits became of secondary importance and the number of unqualified teachers increased. Extra-curricular activities devoted mostly to religious events, in some occasions extended even to the hours intended for science. The amount of expenditure on education decreased despite the rapid population growth at the same period (Table 3).

Table 3 Current public expenditure on primary education as a percentage of GNP

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Percentage	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.3	2.6	2.5

Source: (MoE, 2000)

The number of hours devoted to the religious studies boomed from 9.3 percent for primary and 5.9 percent for lower secondary level in pre-revolutionary period (Ashraf, 1989: 194) to 20 percent in post-revolutionary era, while new subjects such as the testament of the supreme leader Khomaini and military training were introduced to the curricula.

The traditional Islamic elementary education which gradually disappeared from the educational scene of the country due to the Pahlavis nationalized primary education, never could return to its former status. The post revolutionary government retained the structure suggested by the Pahlivis and did not re-establish the traditional primary schools. Thus, in the elementary level, parents have no alternative other than formal schooling which claims to be Islamic in content and modern in structure. However, the religious higher education practiced in traditional seminaries (*ḥawza*) and *madrasa*s at both undergraduate (*saṭh*) and post-graduate (*kh̲āriǰ*) levels is recognized as the higher education degree by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education to be continued in universities. Islamic education institutions grew in certain fields such as theology and law in the advanced levels, partially due since "the revolution gave clerics the opportunity to assume the central roles that they had played in the courts and legal education prior to secularization reforms of 1920s" (Mayer, 2000: 343). Iranian post-revolutionary education is perceived as an example of an education in an Islamic state and has been one of the area which observed by other Muslim countries. The post revolutionary changes in the education system in Iran are considered by many Muslims as Islamization of education and "Islamists from Morocco to Indonesia are demanding educational changes similar to Iran's" (Reid, 1995).

While the process of Islamization favored religious forces and the supporters of the revolution, it has demonstrated the regime's intolerance to any criticism. All criticisms considered as heresy and questioning the principles of Islam and are treated by the Islamic law *Sh̲ariʿa*. More than two million Iranians, mostly intellectuals and well educated opponents of the government fled to Western countries. Some 1800 Iranian professors are teaching in universities in United States, while the estimated number of professors in Iran hardly reaches 1000. Among 61 developing countries, Iran is ranked as the first in terms of brain drain and exodus its of highly educated elite (Kadivar, 2003). Beyond any doubt, the processes of migration as well as the

restriction of domestic counter-hegemony forces through elimination of infrastructures, banning newspapers, and to arrest and imprisonment of intellectuals have had devastating consequences on the economic development of Iran.

Globally the Iranian revolution contributed to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the world and a substantive number of Islamic movements appeared thereafter. But the Iranian model has not been emulated by other countries. In the eyes of many fundamentalists, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a failure as an Islamic polity, because it has a specific Iranian character . . . [they believe that] in Islam the only legitimate political entity is *Umma*, and the nation-state and nationalism are inherently un-Islamic (Mayer, 2000: 348). On the other hand, the national character of the Iranian revolution stimulated a sort of Islamic nationalism and demonstrated "the capacity of Islam to symbolize social identity has been merged into national feeling" (Juergensmeyer, 1993: 47). In last two decades, Islam has been the driving force behind many national and ethnic movements in the world. In short, "Islamic nationalism in one country can encourage the growth of Islamic nationalism in other countries (Ibid.) and the Iranian revolution contributed to such a growth in the global arena more than any other phenomenon in recent years.

Conclusion

The correspondence between the dominant ideology and culture, on one hand, and indigenous religion and culture (Shīʿite Islam), on the other, facilitates the creation and maintenance of the hegemonic force. The education system through the content of the textbooks and moral codes, as a part of the hidden curriculum, penetrates the minds of new generation whose values and cultural norms are shaped throughout by the revolution. The amplification of the Islamic era of the Iranian history and the ignoring of pre-Islamic cultural heritages also contributes to an effective hegemonic process in which the new generation has been saturated by the Islamic codes.

Finally, it should be added that the formal education in Iran leaves no room for parental choice. Islamic education at the elementary level—once fruitful—is no longer an alternative to formal education, but has become a marginalized extracurricular activity for families with stronger religious ties.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ISLAMIC AND WESTERN-STYLE EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN—CONFLICTUAL OR COMPLEMENTARY?

Pia Karlsson and Amir Mansory

Introduction

Afghanistan is among the countries with the lowest rates of enrollment in modern education and of adult literacy. At the same time, the country has a long tradition of Islamic education. This chapter describes the development of Islamic and modern education and the conflicts and tensions over the content of modern education, frictions that are evident not least in the current post-conflict state of the country.

The Country

Afghanistan, located in the heart of Central Asia is one of the poorest countries in the world. GNP per capita was estimated to 164 US$ in 1998 and the country's human development index ranked 169 (out of 174 countries). Life expectancy at birth is around 45 years; under five mortality rate is 257 per 1000. The population is estimated to be 25 million inhabitants, of which some 2–3 million still live in exile. The main ethnic groups are Pashtuns (45–50 percent), Tadjiks (30–35 percent), Hazaras (5–10 percent) and Uzbeks (5 percent). 99 percent are Muslims, 85–90 percent are Sunnī and 10–15 percent are Shīʿa Muslims. The country has two official languages, Pashtu and Dari (UNDP, 2000; UNICEF, 2001; CIA, 2000).

Many countries have experienced wars for long periods but few, if any, have suffered so immensely as Afghanistan. The destruction of the country was tremendous, leaving practically nothing untouched. Nearly two million people died, four million were disabled and one third of the population, around six million, fled the country for a refugee life, mostly to the neighbouring countries. In addition, several

natural disasters have devastated the country. An almost total, next to inconceivable, destruction of the country is the result.

Afghanistan has not seen any positive development for decades. The industrial sector is asunder, exploitation of natural resources has collapsed, agricultural production has declined, the physical and administrative infrastructure has broken down, and the social sector has almost totally collapsed. The literacy rate—for men is 45 percent and for women 11 percent, among the lowest in the world—was low also before the wars but there were more schools and more students in schools in the 1970s than in 2001. Although the Taliban fall in end of 2001 is bringing a change, at least in the cities, it is doubtful whether there is any other country with such a low rate of female literacy as Afghanistan. Moreover, the 'illiterate environment' in Afghanistan is conspicuous: there are hardly any newspapers, magazines, bookshops, or libraries and very few written messages such as posters, advertisements, and signboards. This situation is rapidly changing from 2002.

However, the country has a rich history of highly developed civilisations where art, literature and sciences have flourished. Written languages have existed for thousands of years. The upper classes of the population have been literate and have practised their literacy for centuries. Moreover, Islam has been dominating most parts of the country for 1,200 years or more, which implied that Islamic education has reached large parts of the population, including rural people living in remote areas. The Ḳur'ānic education did not only teach the Ḳur'ān but also reading, writing and counting were learnt by a number of rural villagers (boys and men). Islam also includes the *Sharī'a* laws, which implies that legal regulations and legal documents have been spread and used even among illiterate people for a long time. These contradictory facts, the dominating 'illiterate environment' in combination with the 'literate history' and the long existence of Islamic education, make the educational situation in Afghanistan unique.

The history of Afghanistan goes back thousands of years. The country is connected with the old Persian and Turkish empires, with Alexander the Great, the Ghaznavid dynasty, Genghis Khan and others. Afghanistan was never colonised despite three British attempts to conquer the country. At the end of the nineteenth century the state had been consolidated and strengthened, Islam was defined as a state religion and the country isolated itself from the West. In the

early twentieth century the rulers tried to modernise the country, influenced by developments in Turkey. The first constitution was adopted and education opportunities were established for both boys and girls. During the reign of Afghanistan's last king, Zahir Shah (1933–1973) governmental power was reinforced, and a new constitution was adopted.[1] By the end of the 1970s, the modern sector had grown considerably. An Islamist movement was crushed in 1975 and its leaders fled to Pakistan. In April 1978, Marxist sympathisers in the army, trained in the Soviet Union, murdered the Prime Minister and seized power through a military coup. Widespread rural revolts followed. Soviet troops invaded the country in December 1979 and installed a puppet regime.

In 1989 the Soviet troops had to withdraw only to be followed by a long and violent power struggle involving hundreds of local "commanders" (warlords). Anarchy and chaos dominated the entire country. This situation remained up to the end of 1994, when the Taliban (students of Islam) entered the arena and installed law and order—at the cost of human rights abuses. In particular women and girls in the cities were denied work and educational opportunities. Foreign extremist Islamists infiltrated the Taliban movement and after the US bombings at the end of 2001, the Taliban lost power and were replaced by an interim administration. In June 2002 a new Islamic transitional government was appointed, which, according to plans, will lead the country up to 2004 when free elections will be held.

Islam in Afghanistan

In the development of Afghanistan from a tribal confederation to today's state, religion and politics have been intimately connected. Islam has been the means for unifying the country and for sanctioning both the absolute monarchy in the beginning of the last century and for the "re-sacralization" of the state by the Islamist movement (Olesen, 1995). Islam reached Afghanistan during the seventh century and gradually replaced the existing religions—Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Hinduism. Islam spread rapidly all over the country

[1] Zahir Shah returned to Afghanistan in 2002 and was appointed Father of the Nation.

with the exception of the eastern part, Nuristan, where the inhabitants converted only in the end of the 19th century. Today, 99 percent of Afghans are Muslims. Islam is the basic cultural identity and defines the frame of reference for social morals, rights and obligations for all Afghans, regardless of ethnic origin. The religion influences all parts of life; in politics, in education, in science, in daily life at home, in the mosque, at the office or in the field—references to the Ḳur'ān and to the *ḥadīth*s justify and motivate actions and opinions. "[F]ew Muslim peoples in the world observe the rituals and the piety of Islam with such regularity and emotion as the Afghan" (Rashid, 2000, p. 82).

The first constitution (1964) confirms that "Islam is the sacred religion of Afghanistan" (cited in Samuelson, 1981). The *Sharī'a*, dominated the 1964 constitution but included also secular law (Ibid.). Other religious beliefs were not allowed to be propagated but non-Muslims were allowed to practise their religion. The Communist regime in the 1980s had to retreat on the question of Islam and wrote in its constitution: "The Holy and Faithful religion of Islam will be respected, complied and protected in the People's Republic of Afghanistan; all Muslims are granted freedom to perform all the religious rites of Islam"[2] (Utas, in Davidsson et al., 1990).

The tribal and popular uprisings that have occurred throughout history have all been waged in the name of Islam. Rural *mullas* have been at the core of these upheavals (Roy, in Maley, 1999). Islamism in Afghanistan, on the other hand, recruited followers among the intelligentsia and modern urban people, also among educated women; it was rather a political ideology addressing politics, economics, culture and law than a purely religious revivalist movement (Ibid.). It emerged in the mid sixties among the students of Kabul University who launched a failed uprising in 1975 and were at the core of the different *Mujaheddin* groups during the war against the Soviet Union (Ibid.). After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 their influence decreased and after 1992 Islamist ideology played just a small role in politics.[3] The Taliban movement was one of few radical Islamist movements rooted in a rural society.[4] The Taliban government (1996–2001)

[2] Translation/Pia Karlsson.

[3] The Soviet troops were defeated and left the country in 1989 but the Communist puppet regime held its power over Kabul and some other cities until 1992.

[4] The rural origin is of importance when understanding the Taliban movement and its conduct in the capital of Kabul.

enforced Islam as a state religion by proclaiming Afghanistan as an Islamic Emirate and imposed an extremely strict interpretation of the *Sharīʿa* law. The role of Islam and *Sharīʿa* was hotly debated at the *Loya Jirga* in June 2002; several ministers assured that *Sharīʿa* would still be the main legal system in the country.

The strict gender segregation has been strengthened in the last decades. With references to Islam, the gender issue has been an issue in all insurrections and battles in Afghanistan. Most often when women's role in education has been improved, this has provoked counter-actions.

Educational Development

From an educational perspective, three issues have been important in many upheavals and rebellions in Afghanistan throughout modern history: i) the role of Islam in education, ii) education for girls and iii) governmental (state) control of Islamic education.

During the reform program of the 1920s launched by King Amanullah many new reforms were tolerated at first but, when the government also sought to control all kinds of Islamic education, the cup was full to the brim. Second level *madrasas* were introduced, governmentally financed and in many aspects organised as secondary schools with timetables and curriculum, examination system and grades. Two such schools were first established in Kabul. The reform programme also included a certification system i.e. government authorities should approve all *madrasas* and their *mulla*-teachers before any teaching was allowed. With graduates from governmental *madrasas* the king intended to set up a proficiency system for *imāms, mullas* and *maulawis*. On this and other points he met strong resistance from particularly rural conservative *mullas* and he had finally to resign and go into exile. Another, maybe an equally important reason for the King's resignation was the introduction of girls' education (the girls were dressed in European school uniforms, blue skirts and white blouses). After the King's resignation, girl schools closed down but the governmental *madrasas* remained and, later on, several governmentally financed *madrasas* started—but no more than nine such schools ever existed.

During the period from mid 1930s up to mid-seventies the Islamic and Western-style educational systems lived on side-by-side, seemingly

in peace. Local communities continued to run elementary Islamic education in the mosques and in *madrasas* and the government slowly expanded a Western-style education system. From the fifties there was education for girls, mainly in the cities. Islamic subjects were included also in Western-style education.

By the end of the sixties Western-style education had increasingly produced "revolutionaries", particularly in the (few) big cities. These rebel students were of two kinds, one group influenced by the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China and another affected by Islamist movements in the surrounding and Arabic countries. With the Soviet invasion, the Communist faction gained power and ruled from 1978 to 1992. The Communist government introduced a modern education almost free from Islam but wisely left the traditional *madrasas* to the local communities. The *madrasas* survived but kept a low profile during this period. The teachers were officially accused of backwardness and the students at higher levels were called 'black reactionaries' (because of their black beards). However, the governmental *madrasas* remained; there was still a need for Islamic judges as the *Sharīʿa* system partially remained. The regime was careful not to allow these institutions to develop into resistance centres; heavy investments in Communist propaganda and the employment of only Communist teachers were among the means employed. Also during this period girls' education was at stake. Pictures of girls dressed in short skirts with red neck-scarves and clenched fists were hardly cherished by the Afghan people, particularly in rural areas. Girl schools again closed down, this time due to lack of students.

The leadership of the *mujaheddin* in the resistance struggle (1979–1992) often had its origin among students and teachers in the Islamist movement. Western-style schools sprang up everywhere in liberated areas, including schools for girls. Mujaheddin soldiers acted as teachers or teacher trainers in low intensity fighting periods. Financial support was obtained from international NGOs. The Ḳur'ān and Islamic subjects again played an important role in these schools and, when the Communist government was replaced in 1992, the new curriculum dedicated around 30 percent of the timetable to the Ḳur'ān and Islamic subjects. The government plans for some 30 government *madrasas*, one in each province, were never realized.

That the Taliban, who emerged in 1994 after some chaotic civil war years, focussed on Islam in education and on girls' education

in their policy is not surprising considering their extreme interpretation of Islam. Originally themselves students of Islam, it was only natural that their education aimed at making the young generation true followers of the right Islamic path—as interpreted by the Taliban themselves. With the very limited resources they possessed for anything else but fighting their educational ideas only had any impact the last years. People did not initially oppose them either; they brought the long desired peace, law and order and their Islamic ideas were by no means alien to the ordinary (male and rural) Afghan. Their ban on girls' education was not adhered to in rural areas and it was only when they grossly exaggerated their Islamic revivalist ideas and actions (e.g. extreme public punishments and the destruction of Buddha statutes) that not only educated but also ordinary people turned against them.

Table 4.1 Changes in Governments and Weekly Time Tables in Afghanistan

	Daud Govt: 1960–78		Communist Govt: 1978–90		NGOs (SCA 1984–2001 a)		Taliban Govt: 1996–2001 b		Interim Govt: 2002 c	
Grades Subject	1–3	4–6	1–3	4–6	1–3	4–6	1–3	4–6	1–3	4–6
Ḳur'ān and religion	4	5	1	2	12	10	11	16	3	4
Math:s	4	5	6	6	6	6	6	4	5	4
Language	12	9	12	6	9	7	6	8	10	11
History and Nat. Sc:s	0	6	0	6	0	6	0	2	0	6
Other	8	5	6	6	3	3	0	0	6	5
Total	28	30	25	26	30	32	23	30	24	30

a) Curriculum introduced by the Mujaheddin Government in 1989; b) Curriculum introduced in 1999, but very seldom applied in NGO supported schools, c) Curriculum introduced by the Interim Administration in 2002 and taken over by the Transitional Government the same year

Sources: Teaching program for primary schools issued by Temporary Mujaheeden government 1989, Ministry of Education 2001 (Taliban), 2002 (Interim Administration)

With the interim administration installed in December 2001, the girls have returned to their schools in the cities but also rural schools have seen a slight increase of girl students. After only a few months in power, the curriculum was again changed so that the Ḳur'ān and Islamic subjects corresponded to twelve percent of the timetable, four hours out of 30. This is a measure that may please the international aid community but—considering the historical backlashes—this may affect the Afghan parents negatively. Islam cannot by definition be separated from the daily activities of human life, of which education is a part. All parties have advocated a single Afghanistan and an Islamic Afghanistan.

Education in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan as in other Muslim countries education has a long history. Within the frame of Islam, education has existed for many centuries. Today, education includes three different categories: (i) traditional or indigenous, (ii) Islamic education, and (iii) Western-style education.

Indigenous Education

When Louis Dupree (1973) travelled in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s, he found Islam mixed with pre-Islamic customs; some were contradictory to the Ḳur'ān, e.g. revenge and blood vengeance, even on fellow Muslims. Black magic, witches, *jinns* and *malangs*[5] existed parallel to Islamic practice. As an effect of the modernisation process (from the 1960s) popular beliefs contradictory to Islam started to disappear, a process that continued and was reinforced by the mobility and refugee experiences due to the wars.

Education as the transmission of skills needed for survival in a subsistence agricultural or nomadic setting has of course occurred and been common in Afghanistan long before any formal education system was introduced. Teaching of skills, traditions and beliefs,

[5] A *malang* is a holy man who wanders around the country and is thought to have been touched by the hand of Allah.

values and culture is a kind of indigenous education transferred from generation to generation, often through oral transmission of poetry and stories. The stories usually have a moral message: they advice and counsel. Children (as well as other listeners) are expected to learn what is required by the individual with regards to responsibility and behaviour toward human beings and society. The overt or covert moralities include virtues such as honesty and kindness, respect and empathy. Children are taught the importance of unity, obedience and helpfulness, the obligation to share gained knowledge, to fight against oppression in all its forms and to struggle for equality.

The traditional, indigenous education also includes teaching about Islam. The non-formal Islamic education that is transmitted by the adults and adolescents around the child consists of Islamic references on everyday issues and moral values. Also popular beliefs, some of which are alien to Islam, may be communicated as Islamic, even by some *mullas*. Virtues such as generosity, courage, kindness and hospitality are regarded as essential to becoming a good Muslim and constitute a considerable part of this indigenous education. The history of Islam and the life story of the Prophet are also included. The illiterate Afghan society has a living tradition of oral storytelling and poetry; many poems with origins in the classical literature are known by heart in many layers of the population. For example, the short poem of *landay* is a Pashtu popular poem, often anonymous and often aphoristic, which when recited by women is often used as a satire against the power and superiority of men (Forsberg et al., 1995). Moreover, there are some 30–40 similar poems transmitted orally during hundreds of years from generation to generation. These stories are mostly told to small gatherings in private houses during the long winter nights by a good storyteller, often an older man in the family. In the end of the 19th century many of these stories were compiled in a book called *Mili Hendara*, National Mirror. This book was available in almost every village (in Pashtu areas) and was read by a literate person while others were listening. In Dari-speaking areas they read ancient books in Persian, written hundreds of years ago. These include Islamic moral issues and Islamic knowledge. Two of these books are also used in the mosque schools for children.

The indigenous education also strongly transmits gender roles. Afghanistan is characterised by strict gender segregation and the girl is taught to prepare herself for marriage and learn useful domestic

skills and the boy to be a protector of his family and family honour. The woman should be a good caretaker and maintain the family's well-being while the man is the breadwinner and the provider for his family. The goal in life is a large family, preferably with many sons. These gender roles are often thought of as induced by Islam.

Islamic education

There are four types of Islamic schools in Afghanistan: Mosque schools and traditional *madrasa* (first level); traditional *madrasa* (second level) and modern *madrasa*. The formal Islamic education differs from the informal and non-formal Islamic instruction in at least three aspects: 1) It takes place in a specific setting, usually in the mosque. Most mosques, even the very simple ones, have a special "classroom" for teaching and learning. 2) Not everyone is allowed to teach; a special teacher is appointed—namely the *mulla* of the mosque. 3) Written texts are used, always the Ḳur'ān and the *ḥadīths* but sometimes also other kind of written literature.

Islamic education has a long tradition in Afghanistan. It began with the arrival of Islam. Various men considered to possess religious knowledge and experience have been teaching in the mosques for hundreds of years. Such Islamic schools have been prevalent all over the country (Amaj, 1991, Kamgar, 1998, Rafi, 1998). To learn the Holy Ḳur'ān is the first objective. People, young and old, are taught to memorise parts of the Ḳur'ān. A person who can memorise the entire Ḳur'ān is still highly respected in Afghanistan and is called *Kari*.[6] In the ancient Islamic schools reading, writing and arithmetic were also often included (Kamgar, 1998, Rafi, 1998). Moral education, such as the individual's duties and obligations towards him/herself, the family and the society was also an important part; sometimes also vocational training such as calligraphy, and accounting was included (Mansory, 2000).

Today, some children attend *madrasas* (only for boys) where they receive religious education and some children attend ordinary primary school, which also has several hours per week of Islamic education.

[6] Originally, the *Karis* were graduates of a *Darulhifaz* (= "home for memorising the Ḳur'ān"), where mostly blind people learned to memorise the Book.

The *Mosque School* provides the elementary level of Islamic education. It provides a basic Islamic learning for all children in its neighbourhood. It is non-formal in character; it is not regularised and has no specific administrative or institutional rules. There are no entrance admission criteria, no fees, no examinations, and no certificates. There are mosque schools in all villages except some extremely poor and isolated villages where the population cannot afford a *mulla*. Practically all children, boys and girls, attend a Mosque school when they are of pre-school age. Besides teaching the Ḳur'ān, these Mosque schools prepare the children for the next educational stage (if there is any) in as much as they acquaint the small children with the type of activities and situations they will encounter. They learn to listen to the teacher, to take turns, to raise hands when asking questions, they become familiar with letters[7] and some learn to read. There are also children who attend Mosque schools in addition to attendance at a primary school in the afternoons or weekends.

Virtually all children from four to five years of age attend the mosque school. The length of attendance is up to their parents but usually children stay there until they commence the primary school or the *madrasa*, the modern or the traditional one. If no school exists in the neighbourhood the boys can continue for many years in the mosque school with irregular attendance, but girls tend to leave when they are around ten to eleven years old. Students pass through individually in their own pace. The classes can be quite big (and noisy!)—up to 100 students.

The *mulla* teaches a couple of hours per day to those who appear in class. He is head of the mosque; informally "employed" by the surrounding community, i.e. by the people who inhabit the area "belonging" to the mosque. Besides teaching the children, the *mulla*'s duties include the guidance of the villagers in Islamic matters—women as well as men (but for the former in reality only to a limited extent), leading the prayers, performing ceremonies at deaths and marriages, and suggesting names for the new-born. In Afghanistan, a man can be a *mulla* and simultaneously have another profession, farmer or businessman or whatever. A *mulla* is simply a learned

[7] There is very little difference between the Arabic letters and the letters used in Dari and Pashtu.

person in the domain of Islam. The Afghan *imām*, like *imām*s in other countries, leads the prayers. Sometimes the *imām* and the *mulla* are the same person, sometimes not. In some villages the mulla is paid through the *zakāt* system, i.e. the Islamic tax collection system, where everyone should contribute ten percent of his income for financing collective needs and for assisting the poorest. If paid, the *mulla*'s salary is more or less equivalent to the salary of a primary school teacher. Usually, however, there is no fixed salary rate—the villagers pay according to *zakāt* in cash or in kind. The poorest have no obligation to pay anything but the *mulla* is still obliged to guide and teach everyone. He has achieved more Islamic knowledge than others and therefore has a duty to share his knowledge.

It is generally agreed that every child should receive some basic Islamic education. Still today that means learning to read the Holy Ḳur'ān, memorising some minor parts, learning the five pillars of Islam, the prayers and the praying rituals as well as certain Islamic morals and values. Before reading the Ḳur'ān, children often use an alphabet book, called *Baghdadi Qaida*, the Baghdad Principle. It is phonetically organised and consists of Arabic phonemes and letters and the children learn all the phonemes one by one. After that starts the reading of the first part of the Ḳur'ān, the first *separa*.[8] If one *separa* is read then all the others can easily be read too. Most children learn to read the Ḳur'ān in two to three years. Often parts of the last *separa* are memorised (i.e. from the 90th to the 114th *sūra*) as these verses are recited when praying. Only occasionally are parts or verses of the Ḳur'ān translated or explained to the children. They learn to read, mostly without really understanding it.

Direct teaching (i.e. the teacher is speaking while the students are listening) is the dominant method and often regarded as an expression of respect for the teacher. Respect for teachers is mandatory and the teacher, i.e. the *mulla*, is usually highly respected for his knowledge (but there are also many good jokes about *mullas*!). The children are also respected; to be kind and decent to children is regarded as an Islamic obligation. When teaching Islamic morals the *mulla* uses a book titled *Panj kitab* (Five books) in Dari and when translated into Pashtu called *Rashid Bayan* (Rashid's exposition). These books are also used for learning how to read. When writing is taught

[8] There are totally 30 *separas* in the Ḳur'ān.

in the Islamic school it is done through copying a book or the teacher's writings. Simple arithmetic is often taught as well. Later on, students may also learn how to set up contracts or papers of agreement, following the commonly agreed rules for such documents. Such contract and agreement letters are compiled in a "book" called *Mulatefa*, which consists of a series of paper sheets clipped to the next one in a progressive degree of difficulty (Rafi, 1998). The student reads, repeats, writes, memorises, copies until he or she masters them, one at a time.

Learning in the Mosque School (as in most educational settings in Afghanistan) is a passive act. One can, however, find *mullas* with inborn pedagogical talents who adapt their teaching to the children's level. Older children often teach the younger ones, while the children take turns at being taught by the *mulla*. The children learn the rituals of praying, the Islamic five pillars, good manners and habits, and some of the ethics that the *mulla* considers to be consistent with Islam. The *mulla* is usually a very respected person but there are examples of *mullas* whose reputation is not so good or whose knowledge is poor. People complain—sometimes loudly—about *mullas* who are not punctual or who are unkind to the children and it sometimes happens that they are dismissed.

Traditional madrasas have a long history. The boy students, the *taliban*,[9] learn a broad spectrum of religious subjects (and only religious subjects), including *fiḳh* (jurisprudence), logics and rhetoric and the Arabic language. The students are usually highly motivated and often dedicate many years to their studies. Traditional *madrasas* exist in most villages but also in the cities. The local community is responsible for running the school. Traditional *madrasas* have always been a community affair and villagers did often not perceive the difference between them and Modern *madrasas*. Students attend on irregular and individual basis; they decide themselves at what pace they might wish to learn and for how long. Some choose to walk long distances to attend a special *madrasa* with a famous teacher. Also in traditional *madrasas* the education is free. They study the *tafsīr* (interpretations of Ḳur'ān) and the curriculum includes study of other interpretations as well. They study the *ḥadīth*s and the *sīra*, and *tawḥīd* (unity of God) and they learn rhetoric and logic (Socrates) as well as Arabic

[9] Taliban is the plural form of talib, which means student of Islam.

and Persian literature (Sharif, 1987, Appendix 1.2). A good student might pass through and complete the entire training in ten years in such a school.

Less ambitious and smaller traditional *madrasa* exist all over the country. They are boarding institutions and students from different villages attend the school and live together. The aim of the traditional *madrasa* is to provide for the specialists that an Islamic society needs or, in other words, to produce masters in Islamic theology and law. A student from the *madrasa*, after completing a certain number of books in the different subjects and through a special ceremony, is acknowledged as *Maulawi* or *ʿAlim*. He is then authorised to work as judge, as well as an *imām* or *mulla*. Anyone, who has studied Islam, can become *imām* or *mulla*, but to become judge or lawyer a particular training is stipulated by the government. Principally, only graduates from the *Sharīʿa* Faculty of the University are allowed to function as judges but graduates from traditional second level *madrasas* have also been approved and permitted to work as judges.

Few students continue to the second level of the traditional *madrasa* and only few such schools exist—some 15 to 20. This is less than one per province. The training aims at producing *imāms* and *mullas*, missionaries and teachers and maintaining the high status of the Islamic learned person. In addition, nine governmentally run second level *madrasas* have existed. The curriculum in those schools was fixed and decided by the government. It consisted of six grades and, when graduating after grade 12, students were allowed to enter into the faculties of *Sharīʿa* and Law of Kabul University. The aim of government *madrasas* and Islamic education at the University was to produce judges, governmental cadre and teachers for Islamic schools.

Girls have always been excluded from formal Islamic education. After the elementary instruction they get in the Mosque schools their opportunity to get Islamic education is only through attending the primary school—if there is any and if it is offered to girl students. Consequently, on strong grounds one can assume that girls and women in Afghanistan have a much more limited Islamic knowledge than boys and men unless their father, husband or brothers have taught them at home, something which actually is quite common. The few women with some type of university training are exceptions. Those at these institutions often attended Islamic classes and constituted a considerable share of the students at the Faculty of

Sharīʿa, following a training that aimed to produce the necessary female teachers in Islamic subjects in primary and secondary schools for girls.

That the female literacy rate in Afghanistan is extremely low (even compared to other Muslim countries) has no support in Islam. According to Islam the man and the woman have the same obligation for and the same right to education and both are obliged to learn about Islam. This is expressed in the Ḳur'ān as well as in the *ḥadīths*. The famous *sūra* 21, verse no 7 in the Ḳur'ān says: "If you don't know, you must ask and find out from *ʿalim*" (the one who knows). One famous *ḥadīth* says: "To seek knowledge is *farz*" (obligatory for men and women). Another saying is from the *figh*: "There is no excuse for those who claim that he/she does not know".[10]

The *Modern Madrasa School* is a boarding school for some 50–100 male students aged ten to fifteen years. Before the wars, i.e. in the 1960s and 1970s there were very few such *madrasas*, but from the 1980s, and even more so in the Taliban period (1994–2001), an expansion took place. The Islamic revival during the *Jihad*, the liberation war against the Soviet occupation 1979–1989, prepared the ground for the rehabilitation of modern *madrasas*. Another reason was the decline of primary schools. Many school buildings were destroyed by the war, but even if the school remained intact the number of students decreased as parents withdrew their children from what they perceived to be the Communist influenced teaching during this period. During the Taliban period modern *madrasas* were the only form of education encouraged by the government.

In the modern *madrasa* several *mullas* teach. The subjects are the Ḳur'ān and other Islamic scripts, Islamic ethics and in addition, subjects of the ordinary primary school (the reason why we label this education modern *madrasa*). The length of the education is six years and the school year includes nine months. More than 50 percent of the time is spent on religious subjects. With the modern *madrasa* the Taliban aimed at educating students with a correct and strict (= Taliban) view of Islam while simultaneously training them in modern subjects and thus making them able to compete with what was called the secular school students. That is why subjects

[10] These quotations are frequently used to convince conservative *mullas* about girls' right to education.

such as English sometimes were also included—if any teacher was available. The *mulla*-teachers are sometimes from the village but as often from other areas and have usually graduated long ago from a higher type of Islamic education. During the last years of the Taliban regime younger teachers (young Afghans trained in Pakistani *madrasas*), were also working in the modern *madrasas*.

During the Taliban period there were special governmental grants for the students in modern *madrasas*. The schools were located in simple buildings constructed by the villagers and financed by wealthy individuals (inside or outside Afghanistan) or by the government. Many students were lodged in homes of the villagers, who also provided food for the students. The fact that food was included was sometimes a reason for poor students to attend the modern *madrasa*.

If there is a primary school in the village, parents usually prefer that kind of education for their children but some still choose the *madrasa*, as it provides a more profound Islamic education. Some parents still regard primary education as godless and as a work of Shaitan, some primary school students also attend the madrasa if they have the opportunity. Children often walk a long distance to their primary school but when it is too far away, they may enrol in a distant *madrasa*; in so doing they will get food and lodging and access to the primary school. With the fall of the Taliban many of these modern madrasas have closed down.

Arabic schools in the Afghan context are (a few) schools supported by Saudi Arabia and by some individual Arabs. They appeared first in the refugee camps in the 1980s, some of which had exclusively Islamic education and others with a curriculum mixture of 'modern' and Islamic subjects. Inside Afghanistan there are also a few Arabic schools for male orphans.

Western-style education

Free and compulsory primary schooling was introduced in Afghanistan as far back as 1935. Primary education in Afghanistan covers grades 1–6, i.e. for children of age seven to eight to thirteen to fourteen years. The first modern school—for boys only—was established in Kabul in 1903. After 1919, schools were also established outside Kabul. The first girl school was instituted in 1921. Some students (male and female) were sent to Turkey, Germany and France for

higher education.[11] German and French support of education was not only financial; the school curriculum and the use of school uniforms of these countries were copied into Afghan education. In 1930, there were, in all, thirteen primary schools with 1,590 students in the country (Mansory, 2000). In the 1950s, the education sector expanded rapidly. In 1956, there were 126,000 students enrolled (Ministry of Education, 1968, cited in Mansory, 2000). The constitution of 1964 guaranteed free education for all but only limited possibilities for implementation were at hand. In 1975, around 900,000 students were enrolled; about 80 percent of these were pupils in primary school (Ghani, 1990, cited in Christensen, 1995). In 1990, the number of primary schools was 1,200—less than in 1978—and during the 1990s the situation continued to deteriorate. By 1983, the war had destroyed 50 percent of the schools (Ibid.).

From the 1950s girls' education expanded rapidly in the cities. In 1955, there were girls' schools in seven provincial capitals (out of 29), while in the rural areas, very few such schools existed. At the end of the 1970s, around one third of all children were enrolled in primary schools—but only seven percent were girls. In Kabul, however, girls constituted 35 percent of all students (Ghani, 1990 and Kraus, 1994 cited in Christensen, 1995). A majority of the children in primary schools dropped out after grade three (Daun, 1990). In rural areas there were still very few—in many areas not any—girls' schools until the *mujaheddin* set up such schools in the 1980s with support of NGOs.

The Taliban ban (1996–2001) on girls' education mainly affected girls' schools in the cities. In rural areas, where 80–90 percent of the Afghan population live, this edict was seldom enforced and a large number of schools for girls appeared—often with financial support from the local community. However, the total enrolment rate for girls decreased during the 1990s as an effect of the closure of city schools for girls, but also due to the low priority given to this type of education and, not least, due to the security situation and parental concern of safety for the girls.

[11] The first graduates of the first girls' school were sent to Turkey to get higher education in nursing, an event that caused a lot of discontent among religious leaders. Education for girls quickly experienced a severe backlash, most girls' schools closed down in the 1930s and did not recover until the beginning of the 1950s.

From the eighties and up to 2002 only few educational services were provided by government authorities. However, in early 2002, education was proclaimed a national priority, and the government is now the main provider of education—but financing is completely dependent on foreign aid. International NGOs still play a significant role in education delivery. The biggest NGO, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) enrolled around 240,000 students in the end of 2003, of which 32 percent were girls. It is estimated that less than 20 percent of all school-aged children had access to school in 2001 (with a primary school age population estimated to more than four million children) but according to official statistics more than 3 million children enrolled in schools in the beginning of 2002. This figure increased to 3.7 million in 2003.

"Chalk and talk" is the dominant teaching method. When Islamic subjects are taught the students are even more passive listeners—the teacher reads and the students memorize. The examination system includes two tests per school year; the tests are produced by the individual teachers and are not standardized. Traditionally, teachers have been highly respected in the Afghan society, something that slowly has changed during the last years. Teachers, as many other educated people, belong today to the poorest layers and as such their status has declined. Teachers employed by the NGOs are usually paid with additional contribution from the communities.

The school year lasts for nine months with six days per week. The textbooks have been a controversial issue. The books printed during *Jihad* included an abundance of fighting and resistance messages, glorifying the soldier and his weapons. After 1994, new books excluded the war and peace messages were introduced. In the late nineties several NGOs agreed on more pedagogically developed textbooks. Islam and Islamic messages have all the time constituted a substantial amount of the text in most subjects. The Taliban regime tried to impose a new curriculum with more religion on the timetable (see Table 4.1) but this was hardly successful. They also rejected the NGO textbooks and tried to introduce the books used in traditional madrasas, written in Arabic. As can be seen in the table above the hours per week dedicated to religious subjects constitute the main difference when comparing the pre-war schools, the Communist timetable, the NGO supported schools, the Taliban education and the recent timetable introduced by the interim government in June 2002.

As can be seen in the Table 4.1, the Interim Administration of 2002 has decreased religious subjects to only four hours per week in Grades 4–6, as compared to ten in NGO supported schools and sixteen in the Taliban schools. Before the wars, in the 1970s, Islamic subjects constituted four to five hours per week. Interestingly, the "Communist" schools also taught a couple of hours of Islam per week. In NGO-supported schools textbooks on Islam (with the exception of the Ḳur'ān) are written in Dari and Pashtu, while all textbooks in Taliban schools were in Arabic. The covered topics are similar to those in madrasas, i.e. reading and memorising the Ḳur'ān, learning about the Islamic five pillars, praying, and not least, Islamic values and morals.

Conclusion

Teaching in educational institutions has been widespread in Afghanistan as in many other Muslim countries for a millennium or more. Islamic education reached wide layers of the population very early, although it struggled and still does with popular beliefs and superstition. Not always known is the fact that the Islamic schools quite often also included what are called 'secular' subjects, such as mathematics, reading and writing, literature and sometimes also vocational training.

Traditionally, local communities have been responsible for providing Islamic education but from the 20th century the governments have in various ways intervened, mostly unsuccessfully. The Taliban government tried to introduce a modern madrasa, by including parts of primary school subjects into traditional Islamic education. In general, however, the modern madrasa was only rarely fully implemented. Lack of textbooks and other school material and *mulla*-teachers with deficient knowledge of secular subjects were, together with a general disinterest among the people, the main causes of difficulty.

Traditional madrasas and possibly also modern *madrasas* will certainly remain in Afghanistan, particularly in areas where it takes a long time to establish primary schools or if the curriculum becomes too secularised. However, the fact that the name of the students in such schools (taliban) has been so soiled has today scared students from admitting their attendance in madrasas or even scared them from attending at all.

Today, in spite of widespread illiteracy nearly all ordinary Afghan men and many Afghan women are able to "read" the Ḳur'ān, memorise some parts and know the basic Islamic rules and values. Islam is the cement that still keeps the Afghans together, in spite of all conflicts during the last decades.

For the Afghan Muslim, Islamic education is a duty as well as a right and few have the opinion that such education should be separated from the Western-style education. To develop the pedagogy for teaching Islam in primary school and promote the *understanding* of Islam by e.g. developing pedagogical materials at children's level and in national languages is likely to be more in line with the views of the Afghan people than reducing the hours for teaching Islam in the timetable of Western-style education.

Outside pressure, aid dependency and internal power struggles may again affect the education system negatively. There is fear for a return to previous situations when Afghan values and culture as well as Islamic morals were neglected. The rebuilding of trust in modern education among rural people in the 1980s and 1990s, which resulted in an expansion of education in rural areas was to a large extent a result of the curriculum that was practiced in the primary schools. Today, girls have returned in big numbers to the schools in the cities. Also rural schools have experienced some increase of girl students.

The present situation can be described as having three actors: On the one side the Afghan parents, particularly the great majority in rural Afghanistan, who demand education for their children, increasingly also for their daughters. They demand an education that respect and promote Afghan culture and with Islamic values permeating the teaching and learning. At the other end, the numerous international education "experts", advisers and consultants, donors and aid agencies who stress the need for modernising—westernising?—the education system in Afghanistan. In between is the government, eager to appear modern having to please the financiers and at the same time all to well aware of the popular pressure. This dilemma remains to be solved.

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CHAPTER FIVE

PAKISTAN: THE CLASH OF GLOBALIZING FORCES

Allan Pitman and Farrukh A. Chishtie

Introduction

Pakistan is faced with the dynamics of two powerful globalizing forces: the continuing rise of orthodox Islam as a political and moral force and the fundamental transformations taking place in international economic and trading relations. These pressures are brought to bear on a country which, in 1998, had an estimated literacy rate of 38 percent (Ministry of Education, 1998) and which, while being the fifth fastest growing economy in the 1980s, ranked 120th on the human development index (Mujahid-Mukhtar, 1999). The thrust of the analysis is that, during the 1990's, Pakistan responded to the religious force at the expense of the economic in curricular reform initiatives.

School systems in nations emerging from a colonial past have a double problem with identity. On the one hand, much of the residual structures and forms of knowledge which have been superimposed on the indigenous cultures represents, objectively, aspects of power both at the local and the international levels. For example, in a number of such countries, the European colonial language—usually French or English—is the one non-regional tongue. Further, with the international discourse in science and in mathematics, certain standard forms of notation have become broadly accepted. On the other hand, there is an imperative to use the schools to help forge a national identity; this is particularly the case in those parts of the world in which vast migrations occurred at the time of the formation of these nations. This is the case in Pakistan, where it is possible to see the interplay of colonial and post-colonial influences with the much older traditions of culture and religion.

Pakistan: The State, Religion and Global Economics

Pakistan is located geographically in that part of the world in which the "Great Powers" of the nineteenth century played out their "great game" of establishing spheres of political and economic influence. From the days of the Raj, Crimea, through the maneuvering following the First World War to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American-led overthrow of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, the region has been in the fulcrum of profound political, economic and ideological pressures.

Building identity: the Nation and the Faith

Pakistan was established as a result of the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two States, one predominantly Hindu, the other Islamic. The present State of Pakistan carries in its formation the history of its colonial past. The partition was achieved only at the cost of massive transmigrations, as members of the two major faiths relocated. The task falls, at least in part, upon the schools to create a national identity based upon the primacy of the Islamic faith. The *National Education Policy* 1998–2010 makes this explicit: "Pakistan is an ideological Muslim State" (p. 9). A clear line is drawn between secular western and Marxist countries and their education systems and that which is appropriate for Pakistan.

> The secular western countries or the Marxist-oriented countries always make sure that their ideology is fully reflected and integrated in the educational system not only in the social sciences but also in other disciplines. Secularism and materialism are the two most sacrosanct principles of their educational approach. It is, however, important to note that western secular education allows a few slots in their scheme of studies that deal with moral or religious education. This, however, does not change the basic secular character of their educational systems (Ministry of Education, 1998, p. 9).

In contrast, the claim is made that it is a constitutional requirement that Pakistani educational policy be developed that ensures the preservation, practice and promotion of Islamic ideology and principles. with this in mind, the policy is expounded that

> Curricula and textbooks of all the subjects shall be revised so as to exclude and expunge any material repugnant to Islamic values, and

> include sufficient material on Ḳur'ān and Islamic teachings, information, history, heroes, moral values etc. relevant to the subject and level of education concerned (p. 13).

Despite its original inception as a secular state (Talbani, 1996), Pakistani education has been infused with the belief that the "system should be inspired by Islamic ideology" (Jalil, 1998, p. 36), a view stated explicitly in the 1998 policy: "Pakistan is an ideological Muslim State" and "Pakistan is not a secular country" (Ministry of Education, 1998, p. 9). A question which is begged in such pronouncements is the one concerning the nature of Islamic thought implied: As with other great religions, Islam is rent with sectarian divisions as well as great diversity with respect to the levels of orthodoxy practised by its adherents. The conflict between the competing pressures can be seen in the fundamentalist view of science (and mathematics): "science is seen as an ideological tool in which Western civilization extends its hegemony over Muslim societies" (Talbani, 1996). Further, "modern science is guided by no moral values but naked materialism and arrogance (Engineer, 1986, quoted in Talbani, 1996). This rejection of what is seen as two key characteristics—political and moral—lie at the heart of Pakistan's dilemma. This paper explores a combination of long held cultural beliefs, governmental decisions concerning Islamization, and their effects upon the structure of courses, texts and in particular external examinations drive mathematics teachers to a mode of teaching reliant on drill, repetition and a close knowledge of the text as authority.

Under successive governments since the partition of India in 1949, and, in most strongly, those of the Zia regime (1977–1988) and later, there has been a conscious effort to insert "Islamic thinking" into modern Pakistani schooling. Within this context, the state of Pakistan's formal school system and the resources available within it make any response to the changing technological realities of communication, trade and commerce doubly problematic.

It is within this context of a deep suspicion of the values underlying the Western scientific program that governmental recognition of the human capital gains of a well educated population is situated. Globally, trade agreements and trading blocs are emerging which, in all countries, bring the relation of the State to the commercial and economic activities within its borders into question. Such dynamics spill over into the educational domain in a number of ways: questions concerning the desired attributes and skills of student products

of schools arise; the economic planning policies and their implications for skills needs become important as nations move to position themselves to survive in the evolving world economic reality. It is in respect to this latter concern that the human capital value of an educated population is set beside the responsibility of the State in an Islamic nation to bring knowledge to its people. What should be the nature of this knowledge? To what degree is the knowledge required to meet the economic world commensurate or antithetical to the religious and moral?

The dilemma is captured succinctly by the second 1997–1999 Sharif government's 1998 *National Education Policy*, in the section dealing with Higher Education.

Education, particularly higher education, cannot be divorced from its milieu and social context. Religious, moral, historical and cultural ethos permeate through the fabric of the education system of a country. The context of higher education in Pakistan, therefore, is to be within the Islamic ideology which is the genesis of Pakistan and its cultural and religious traditions.

Having established that position, the document continues "To realize the vision of a developed nation, we need to enhance the level of skills of its population and to produce highly educated and technically skilled manpower" (p. 75).

Therein lies a profound tension, given the deep suspicion of the ideological nature of foreign (Western and Marxist) education and the rejection by a proportion of Islamic thinkers of the moral dangers inherent in Western approaches to science and mathematics discussed later in the chapter. Further, in a system starved of resources (over 20,000 primary schools lacked even a building in 1998 according to the government's own policy document), the demand for the use of information technology in education must be problematic. As the 1998 *National Education Policy* notes:

> Information technology is developing as a major industry in the world. Several small countries have become major information technology producers or sophisticated users. The potential of information technology as an industry in Pakistan has yet to be capitalized. The government of Pakistan has already shown deep interest in it. However, for such an interest to bear fruit, there is a need for a platform for both the public and private sectors to communicate with each other, The most important question is, as to how best we can benefit from this revolution for the development of our education and give access to our teeming millions who cannot afford books. How best can we

use it for the distance learning process? The country also needs highly trained computer scientists and engineers who would carry out research and development in this field and provide effective teaching and training support to academia and industry as well as the intellectual backing for software industry to be able to compete at the international level (Ministry of Education, 1998, pp. 88–89).

Schooling in Pakistan: Formal and Informal

There is a vast network of official schools, government run, which provides formal schooling for the general population. Parallel to this system is a system of religious schools, or *madrasas*, usually operated in mosques and sponsored by a religious organization.

The formal school system

The DHS[1] comparative study of education (Gardner, 1998) in the developing world provides stark data for Pakistan. The rate of Western schooling has shown progress (see Table 5.1). Whereas among those 18 years or older, 61% received less than one year of schooling and 35% four years or more, 55% of children under 15 were in school in 1996.

Table 5.2 shows two stark contrasts: while considerable strides were made in the period to 1996 in retention of students in school, it was to the advantage of rural men and urban women. Rural women

Table 5.1 Percentages of Individuals with Different Levels of Western Schooling and Enrollment in Western Type Education (15 years or older)

Western Schooling			Enrollment in Western Type Education					
1 year	4 + years	Median	6–14 years old			12–14 years old		
		(in years)	Boys	Girls	All	Boys	Girls	All
61	35	0.8	64.5	44.5	55	67	41	55

[1] The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) is a 13-year project to assist government and private agencies in developing countries to conduct national surveys on population and maternal and child health. It is primarily funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Table 5.2 Educational Attainment (Median Years of Schooling) by Residence, Age 15 and Older

Age	Urban women	Urban men	Rural women	Rural men
35–49	0.5	8.3	0.5	0.8
15–24	5.3	8.5	0.7	5.3

Table 5.3 Children Enrolled and Not Enrolled in Primary and Middle School. Numbers and Percentages of Appropriate Age Cohorts Enrolled

	In school			Not in school
	Boys	Girls	Total, percentage and number (thousands)	Total number (thousands)
Primary (Age 5–9), Grades 1–5, percent	84.6	57.5	71 (13,720)	5,500
Middle (Age 10–12), Grades 6–8, percent	56.0	35.0	46 (4,350)	5,150

born up to 1981 continued to be virtually excluded from a formal education.

Among the children born since then, the situation is considerably better, but one in which universal elementary education is an aspiration rather than a reality (see Table 5.3). With 29 percent never attending primary school and over half not reaching Grade VIII, a drop in participation rates for 1996–97 to only 38 percent at the secondary level and 11 percent at the higher secondary level Government of Pakistan, 1998, p. 43) is not surprising.

In 1996–97, out of a total of 19.2 million primary school age (5–9 years) population, only 13.72 million were in school and 5.5 million were left-out, who were never enrolled. This represented gross enrolment rate (GER) of 71 percent (males 84.6 percent and females 57.5 percent) (Ministry of Education, 1998, p. 26). At the secondary level, the participation rate stood at 32 percent in 1998, with 11 percent at the higher secondary level.

As a guideline for the future, the projected goals from the 1998–2010 education policy (p. 26) state lofty increases in school facilities and teachers. The existing benchmark (based on 1996/1997 statistics) has 145,000 new formal primary schools. The policy targets this to increase to 190,000 by 2010.

The madrasa schools

The *madrasa* schools have long been a part of the Pakistani educational landscape. However, the influx of millions of Afghani refugees during the soviet occupation of that country accelerated the growth of the movement. From a total of 235 *madrasas* in 1947, there were 2,862 by 1987, according to a government survey (Ministry of Education, 1988), with about 100 new *madrasas* opening annually by that time. These schools range from primary grade level to degree granting institutions. The growth since is suggested by Nayyar (1998) as having accelerated, but in the absence of more recent surveys this is unconfirmed. Ideologically, they tend to be most strongly supported by the orthodox groups within the religious community. In discussing the attractions of these alternative schools to the formal governmental system Nayyar makes the following points: They generally provide free accommodation, free books and sometimes clothing; they lay an emphasis upon discipline; they resonate with a religious sentiment of many in the population; and the formal system is often seen as burdensome with a doubtful value in return. The political and religious influence of the rise of the *madrasas* has been profound in ways far beyond the provision of an education to their students. In the wake of the Afghani war, "(s)upported by the USA, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, and aided logistically by the Pakistani military agencies, religious parties with *madrasas* got their cadres trained and battle hardened" (Nayyar, p. 241). The Taliban was very much a product of the *madrasas.*

The *madrasa* holds an ambiguous place in the official educational fabric of the country. It has been variously tolerated, encouraged and held in suspicion over the half century since independence. In the 1998 Policy document, the role of the *madrasas* is recognized, in that a policy provision is enunciated to the effect that steps be taken "to bridge that gap between the formal education and *Deeni Madaris* systems and to eradicate sectarianism, the curricula of *Deeni Madaris* shall be upgraded and improved to enhance the prospects of employment" (p. 12). Further, the government of the day wished to move to the integration of willing *madrasa* schools with the formal system, along with curricular reform and financial support for the payment of teachers' salaries.

Mosque schools

This effort was initiated by the government of Zia-ul-Haq who received the support of 30,000 mosque leaders at the time to increase the numbers and function of these religious schools. The meshing to the traditional primary school curriculum was required in these new variants of *madrasas* or mosque schools, which were to be implemented along with Ḳur'ānic teachings. The official policy called for each school to have a teacher to be paid by the government who would follow the primary curriculum for three years. This was complemented by the Ḳur'ānic teachings and lessons in Islamiyat by the mosque leader, who was to be financially supported in a similar vein. These schools received free textbooks and uniforms and were supervised by provincial officials. One of the motivations for this step was to increase enrollment of students, in particular girls, at a very low cost, especially in the rural areas.

Mosque schools show a mixed record of success. Their greatest achievement was to increase the enrollment of boys and especially girls through low-cost co-educational schools managed by mosques. The government correctly judged that parents would send their daughters to school with boys if those schools were supervised by religious leaders. The greatest potential weakness of mosque schools is in the quality of education they offer. Though no studies have been done on the quality of mosque schools, government officials question the teaching credentials of the religious leaders and the teachers working under them. The three year schools also raise doubts whether graduates who receive no further education have learned to read, write and work with numbers (Warrick & Riemers, 1995, pp. 126–127).

The Sharif government policy saw the mosque schools as an effective way of addressing the low literacy rate, singling out these schools as a major area for governmental support in addressing the problem. The 1996/97 figure for the number of mosque schools was 37,000. This figure is expected to increase two-fold, namely 57,000 in the 1998–2010 policy (p. 26).

Higher education

By the late 1990s there was deep governmental concern about the world standing of the country's universities and the value abroad of

their degrees. Again, the ideological imperative holds equal prominence with the economic in the policy.

The objectives of higher education are multi-dimensional and may be termed as personal, social, economic and cultural. In the context of Pakistan, it has ideological meanings attached to its purposes as well. Pakistan, as an ideological State, cannot ignore its ideological moorings, national unity, individual and economic development and the needs of modern society for building a competitive nation whose individuals are scientifically trained persons and make their contribution to the socio-economic development of the country (Ministry of Education, 1998, p. 75).

In the next paragraph, "The context of higher education is Pakistan, therefore, is to be within the Islamic ideology which is the genesis of Pakistan and its cultural and religious traditions." Having established that position, the document continues ". . . To realize the vision of a developed nation, we need to enhance the level of skills of its population and to produce highly educated and technically skilled manpower" (p. 75).

Therein lies a profound tension, given the deep suspicion of the ideological nature of foreign (Western and Marxist) education and the rejection by a proportion of Islamic thinkers of the moral dangers inherent in Western approaches to science and mathematics.

Textbooks and curriculum as ideological discourse

Talbani (1996) documents the politicized nature of the Islamization of the Pakistani curriculum, in particular drawing attention to the use of Social Studies to rewrite aspects of history. In his chapter, he provides a valuable discussion of the way in which Islamic content enters the curriculum, in the identification of the use of Islam as the legitimating frame for forms of knowledge, and the invocation of Islam as justification of the state. The tensions between the secular and sectarian have a long tradition in Islam, as in other religions. Initially, two forms of knowledge were recognized as coexistent in Islamic schools: the secular and the sectarian. The merging of the two under the legitimating framework of the sectarian, or religious, started in the twelfth century, and is related to the historical establishment of the *madrasa* schools. In this shift is embedded the interpretative frame of those holding political power.

There has been a significant power shift in Pakistan since independence, from secular visions to a religious state. As Talbani makes clear, even the image of Jinnah, the founder of the country, has been transformed from a westernized intellectual striving for a secular home for Muslims, to a devout Islamist. The links with the power structures need to be understood in the long term; the *madrasa* schools provide an insight into this. Nayyar (1998) provides a useful account, from their eleventh century foundation to their role in present day Pakistan.

That the Pakistani education is still inspired by the Islamic ideology case is evident, at least from the policy point of view in the Matriculation Federal Board's 1994 Education examination paper, in which Question 2 asks "What is the concept of education from Islamic point of view? Explain in the light of Muslim thinkers."

Traditions of rote and the nature of knowledge

Embedded in the traditions of the faith is the reverence of the power to recall and recite the Ḳur'ān, in particular to be able to identify and recite accurately the appropriate sections for a particular question. The extent to which this view of what it means to learn and to know prevails can be gleaned from the same Education examination paper, in which Question 1, in part, asks the candidate whether it is correct that "Learning is confirmed by recapitulation."

Hoodbhoy (1991) writes in relation to Pakistani schooling, ". . . to a significant degree, the rote nature of contemporary education can be traced to attitudes inherited from traditional education, wherein knowledge is something to be acquired rather than discovered, and in which the attitude of the mind is passive and receptive rather than creative and inquisitive. The social conditioning of an authoritarian traditional environment means, as an inescapable consequence, that all knowledge comes to be viewed as unchangeable and all books tend to be memorized or venerated to some degree. The concept of secular knowledge as a problem-solving tool which evolves over time is alien to traditional thought" (Hoodbhoy, 1991, p. 39).

If there is in fact "traditional thought" as a process, interwoven with religious belief, then it is not surprising that it reaches far beyond the teaching of religion. The 1964 thesis by Zaki draws a negative correlation between attitudes to science and to religion among science teachers (cited in Hoodbhoy, 1991, p. 39).

The conflict between "traditional" Islamic thinking and that of the Greco-European tradition can be traced as far back as the 11th century Islamic theologian Al-Ghazzali, who recorded some of the most cogent criticisms of the nature of scientific and mathematical thinking. It is essential to understand that the concern with mathematical and scientific knowledge is not one particularly of content, but rather one of the way of thinking. Hoodbhoy (1991, p. 123) summarizes the differences between what he calls Traditional Education and Modern Education:

Traditional Education	Modern Education
Other-worldly orientation	Modern orientation
Aims at socialization into Islam	Aims at the development of individuality
Curricula unchanged since medieval times	Curricula respond to changes in subject
Knowledge is revealed and unchangeable	
Knowledge is acquired because of a divine command	Knowledge is obtained through empirical and deductive processes
	Knowledge is needed as a problem-solving tool
Questioning of precepts and assumptions not welcomed	Questioning of precepts and assumptions welcomed
Teaching style basically authoritarian	Teaching style involves student participation
Memorization is crucial	Internalization of key concepts is crucial
Mind-set of student is passive-receptive	Mind-set of pupils is anti-positivistic
Education is largely undifferentiated	Education can be very specialized

Official policy in Pakistan is to encourage the Islamisation of the population. This means not only assuring instruction in the beliefs of Islam-religious education—but also instilling the curriculum with the ways of thinking and of dealing with problems which are taken as part of the Islamic tradition. Thus the historical tension enters the curriculum.

A traditional view of schooling, then, can be seen as based around the belief in the centrality of revelation, particularly as found through authority, including the text. Knowledge is externally real to the recipient and to be learnt with accuracy. In his discussion of what he describes as "the crisis of legitimacy of science in Islamic schools", Talbani (1996) identifies the critical and innovative aspects of science as being incommensurable with traditional Islamic schooling.

> [In Islamic society] originality, innovation, and change were never upheld as intrinsic values. The ideal of Islamic culture was not mechanical evolutionary progress but the permanent immutable transcendental divinely revealed moral, theological, spiritual values of the Ḳur'ān and *Sunna* (pp. 77–78).

In contrast, a modern (that is, in this context, Western) view is based on ontological, epistemological and psychological assumptions that are based on diametrically opposing assumptions. Nayyar's (1998) work dealing with the history of *madrasa* education provides a useful summary of the evolution of this traditional education, tracing it to eleventh century Baghdad. The pressure to Islamise the school system has been accompanied by the growth of the *madrasa* schools, which, although diverse in their nature, are generally characterised by a fundamentalist curriculum which purposefully eschews characteristics of modern education. As Nayyar (1998) points out, these schools have in recent years been receiving financial support through the government's *zakāt* fund. It is in these schools that we can see, albeit in an extreme form, the elements of Islamic traditionalism which are brought to bear on mathematics education in the system as a whole.

The true thought is the sectarian: secular thinking stands in opposition to it and is therefore to be treated with caution. Mathematical thinking is of value only insofar as it can contribute to utilitarian application.

What is mathematics education?

The lens through which we will focus is the mathematics curriculum, with emphasis upon the content of Punjabi student texts and the Punjab matriculation examination. We will now consider such evidence of Hoodbhoy's claims as they arise first in the textbooks for year 1 to 8, and then in the level 9/10 text and its culminating external examination.

In the texts for the lower grades, attention is paid to the ways in which explanatory text and problem exercises are used to reflect or actively promote particular aspects of social, religious and political imperatives in Pakistani society. In the case of the secondary school material, the focus is on the nature of the mathematics in the student texts and the relation of the content of the matriculation paper to those books.

The mathematics textbooks for the State of Punjab are produced in two language editions: one series in Urdu, the other in English. In their organizational structures, there is an extremely high level of correlation between the mathematical content of the two sets of books, but there are also subtle differences. We will deal first with the similarities, and then draw those contrasts which strike us as important.

The student mathematics texts and mathematics examination papers were reviewed page by page, and the content noted as to its mathematical topic/content, content of explanatory text, nature of mathematical tasks required of students, and content of examples. The results of this review were classified by emergent themes. These themes were then retested against the content of the material.

Elementary school mathematics: The elements of ideologies

One nation, two languages: The texts in both languages are explicit in their proclamation of their mission to promote nationalism and Islam. All books carry religious and patriotic symbolism on their covers: The outside back cover carries the Pakistani National Anthem, in Urdu, for both English and Urdu editions. The further injunction is offered: ". . . the Board also takes care, through these books to inculcate in the students a love for the Islamic values and an awareness to guard the ideological frontiers of your home land".

Each book contains on the inside back the same green drawing of trees. In the Urdu books the caption translates as "The caretaking of trees is equivalent to free prayer to God." In English, the corresponding caption reads "Greenery is the evidence of Allah". At the high school level, the English text starts with a quote from the Quaid (that is, Jinnah), "You must devote yourself wholeheartedly to your studies, for that is your first obligation to yourselves, your parents and to the state". The Urdu text carries a markedly different quote from Jinnah: "Your attention should only be toward the acquisition

of education. It is only through this that you will attain glory in making your country the biggest, the most powerful and the most technologically advanced in the world". It follows the Islamic quotation, not provided in the English version: "In the name of Allah the most merciful and beneficent".

This use of stronger nationalistic language in the Urdu texts occurs consistently from the beginning of primary school. The extent to which the mathematics texts are used to form national identity as Islamic can be seen in the ways in which religion is incorporated into the materials. We identified three major strands, which we termed Islam as identity, Islamic ethics, and Islamic law. These strands provide an insight into the official interpretations of religious life as it is to be inculcated through the schools.

Islam as identity: The Urdu texts give explanations of the background of the mathematical content. For example, the Islamic and Christian months are discussed in Grade 2 (p. 111) in Chapter 10. The lunar months are referred to, and the solar year is called Eiswy months, that is the months of the followers of Jesus; it has 12 months, counting from the year the prophet Eisa (Jesus) was born.

The accounts of the origins of algebra differ markedly in the two language series. The English Grade 7 text refers to the Arabic origin of the word, to Greece, Egypt and the mathematician Al-Khawarzmi. More detailed information concerning the history of algebra is given a year earlier in the Urdu Grade 6 book. Here the emphasis is different, in that Al-Khawarzmi is described as being a Muslim mathematician, and "the crown for its invention is given to the Muslim Mahomet ben Musa al Khawarzmi."

Islamic Ethics: Percentages, zakāt *and a lack of interest*: That part of the curriculum dealing with percentages provides excellent examples of the ways in which a particular ethic can be infused into a subject such as mathematics. It is to be seen here both as a filter for the inclusion of some classes of problems and the exclusion of others: In particular, the inclusion of discussion and problems relating to the responsibilities of the rich to provide for the poor (*zakāt*) and the exclusion of any reference to interest problems.

English: Section 5.8 of the English Grade 7 text (p. 56) begins:

> *Zakāt.* Islam has laid down fundamental principles for all aspect of life. In order to establish equity and fraternity in social and economic life, the rich have been exhorted to look after the economic need of the poor Muslim brothers. Accordingly in Islam, the rich are duty bound

> to deposit every year 2½% of their savings in a Fund meant for meeting the needs of the poor. This amount is called "*zakāt*". It is the religious duty of every Muslim who saves in a year 6 hectograms of silver or 8.7 decagrams of gold or any amount equal to the value of these metals to give 2½% of that amount as "*zakāt*".

Examples follow. In the English edition, no mention is made of how one should dispose of the *zakāt* obligation. In the Urdu book (p. 51ff., with the *zakāt* starting on S5.13, p. 75), the explanation differs, providing the Arabic root of "*zakāt*": to be clean and pure (that is, from the evil of too much wealth). This implies that the provision of monetary help is incumbent on every Muslim with the means, to follow after prayer and fasting. The help to poor Muslims is then discussed: 2.5 percent of the wealth (annual income) and this seen as the equivalent of 6 hectograms of silver or 8.7 decagrams of gold, or any amount equal to the value of these metals. The government's 1980 *zakāt* Fund is mentioned. It is suggested that one give to this fund for the government to distribute.

In Grade 8, the Urdu book deals with *zakāt* at the start of the chapter on percentages; referring to the importance of reading the Ḳur'ān, and of prayer. The giving of *zakāt* for the cleansing of one's wealth, gives rise to truth and helps prevent the spoiling of money, and gives the donor protection from the agents of bad luck. In English the text starts without explanation—it only refers to the previous year.

There is a total absence in the textbooks of both languages of any discussion of the calculation of interest. This can be ascribed to the strictures under Islam regarding the taking of interest on loans. Thus, in Grades 7 and 8, there are sections dealing with profit and loss as percentages, but all such problems are based upon transactions involving goods or services. No problems deal with the situation of a bank making a percentage profit, although Pakistani banks employ the term "profit" in defining the return to investors.

Islamic law: Proportions and Wills: Again we found the inclusion of particular classes of problems which specifically provided instruction and practice in one aspect of what can only be read as an official interpretation of Islamic law. In Exercise 7.4 of the Urdu Grade 6 text, questions 5–10 deal with the distribution of estates through wills. In every case, debts are paid first; of the balance, the widow (if still living) is to receive one eighth of the estate, and sons and daughters to gain shares in which the sons receive twice the value

given to the daughters. In the English text, no mention of Islamic Law is made in the introduction, or in the worked examples (although they all conform to the law). The 10 English language problems include other proportions in the distribution, although when the ratios vary from the one eighth and 2:1 condition, the relation of the beneficiaries to the deceased is vague. Question 4 has a father leaving an inheritance to be divided in the ratio of 3:5:7, after paying Rs. 1500 in the fund for the poor; questions 7 and 8 assume that students know that sons should receive twice the inheritance that the daughters obtain. The role of Islamic law is mentioned only in the last (tenth) problem, in which students are supposed to know the appropriate ratio to apply.

Traditions of thought: The examination and the text

Embedded in the traditions of the faith is the reverence of the power to recall and recite the Ḳur'ān, in particular to be able to identify and recite accurately the appropriate sections for a particular question. The extent to which this view of what it means to learn and to know prevails can be gleaned from the matriculation Education examination paper, in which Question 1, in part, asks the candidate whether it is correct that "Learning is confirmed by recapitulation." Similarly, every question on old matriculation examination papers could be found, verbatim, in student texts, either as problems or as worked examples.

Discussion

The conscious decision of a series of governments to use the school system to help in the Islamisation process has clear effects on both the content and the processes in the mathematics curriculum—and hence the view of mathematics projected to students.

The effects of the Islamisation push is most obvious on the content of the grades 1 to 8 texts, in the references in explanatory text and in problems, to Islamic law and traditions, some small mention of Islamic mathematics, and in the absence of any content dealing with interest gained from investment or loans. Interestingly, there is a heavier intrusion of nationalistic and Islamic content and exhor-

tatory language in the Urdu texts than in the English, and, insofar as there are differences in difficulty between the two sets of texts, the more challenging work is in the Urdu version.

At the grades 9/10 level, the history of mathematics is almost completely ignored, except for the "Islamic mathematician", al-Khawarzmi and a passing mention of two Islamic mathematicians who made contributions to trigonometry. The rich mathematical tradition of the subcontinent is entirely ignored. The naming of mathematical theorems, etc. reflect the European traditions: Euclid, Pythagoras, and so on are given with European pronunciations even in the Urdu texts, and, at the secondary level, are reproduced in English.

The use of constant repetition, with its emphasis on the importance of the power of recall, reflects an Islamic tradition of recitation and of viewing knowledge as external and to be revealed. Hoodbhoy's recollection of the teaching of chemistry comes to mind in this context. Indeed, a study of the questions in the 1998 Matriculation Federal Board examination in Mathematics and their direct location within the student text reinforces this view. The memorization of the Ḳur'ān as a precedent to coming to an understanding of its meaning is consistent with the approach that one should come to understanding of mathematics only after one is able to quote and reproduce its contents.

Evidence was found to support the view that both short term and long duration influences were inextricably bound in the mathematics curriculum of both elementary and secondary schools in Pakistan. As a case, the country is unique; there are, nevertheless, two general issues which become evident. First, mathematics curriculum is culturally and politically embedded. Secondly, long established world views, with their concomitant assumptions about the nature of knowledge, of learning and of the relation of the intellect to the temporal and the spiritual worlds render problematic assumptions about the simple flow of educational reforms between countries.

Conclusions

The analysis points to the complex ways in which deeply ingrained world views, combined with the policy decisions of successive governments, have penetrated the mathematics curriculum. The influences emerge not only in the nature of examples and content included

and excluded; they also emerge in tacit understandings of the relation between knowledge and the learner. It is instructive to revisit the differentiation made by Hoodbhoy between what he terms "traditional" and "modern" education.

The current mathematics curricular reforms in much of the Western countries aim at the development of the individual student, with curricula which is developing in response to changes in the subject itself. Further, they are predicated upon the use of empiricist activities in combination with both inductive and deductive processes, at least partly with the aim of encouraging the student to become an independent solver of non-standard problems.

In contrast, we found considerable evidence that the Pakistani mathematics curriculum takes a conservative approach to mathematical content, and Islamic principles are incorporated into problems and explanatory text at the primary (elementary) level. The didactic nature of the texts, in concert with the nature of the matriculation examination point to an externalized view of knowledge, revealed through the authority of the text. Memorization of prescribed procedures encourage conformity at the expense of originality in the dealing with standard problems.

The study of the mathematics curriculum provides strong support for the claims made concerning the collapse of the traditional differentiation of the secular and the sectarian forms of knowledge in Pakistani education. Dominance of the revealed view of knowledge has important consequences that emerge from the analysis. In the context of the current international reforms in the teaching of mathematics, it becomes virtually impossible for the Pakistani system to take up the most defining aspects of the reforms as instituted in the West in the face of the incommensurability of the epistemological and ontological assumptions of such new mathematics curricula and those of traditional Islamic educators. The use of Islam in the elementary school mathematics, in particular, as the glue for reinforcing a national identity exacerbates the problem, as it becomes not only one of addressing long held world views, but also the shorter term political concerns of those involved in the struggle for the school curriculum.

Further, the policy directions toward a particular form of Islamisation of formal schooling (not least in the aim to bring about a degree of convergence between formal and *madrasa* schooling) militate against responding in an effective way to the other external pressures to

bring the content and purposes of schooling to bear on meeting the educational outcomes requisite to providing the workforce and expertise needed to meet the human capital aspirations of the government.

As the 1998 Policy document puts it, "Islam emphatically requires the quest for knowledge for all individuals and makes provision of education an obligation for the State" (Ministry of Education, 1998, p. ix). In this context, the aim is "(t)o achieve excellence in different fields of higher education by introducing new disciplines/emerging sciences in the universities, and transform selected disciplines into centres of advanced studies, research and extension" (p. 8). The fundamental questions are: What knowledge, and for what end?

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CHAPTER SIX

MODERNIZATION OF EDUCATION AND ḴUR'ĀNIC ADAPTATION IN MOROCCO

Helen N. Boyle

Introduction

This chapter focuses on providing the reader with information on contemporary schooling in Morocco, especially the varying roles of Ḳur'ānic and public schooling. With the modernization of Morrocan society, Ḳur'ānic schools have had to change their initial functions. However, with the most recent reform—which is highly influenced by the educational world models described in chapter 1—Morroco has, paradoxically, something to learn from the way Ḳur'ānic education is organized.

In order to discuss contemporary Moroccan education, it is necessary to look briefly at Morocco's educational history, as the pre-colonial and colonial periods were characterized by differing models of education, both of which persist to this day.

Pre-Colonial History

Morocco was conquered and settled by the Arab armies which swept across North Africa en route to Spain, during the heyday of Arab expansion in the 7th century AD. The armies brought Islam to the indigenous Berber peoples, and Islam remains the religion of Morocco and the whole Maghreb (North African) region. By the end of the seventh century, most Berber tribes had converted to Islam. In the early eighth century, using Morocco as a foothold, Arab armies began their incursions into Europe.

A succession of Arab/Berber dynasties rose and fell across North Africa. By the 13th century, still under the Almohad dynasty, North Africa split into what are today Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Morocco fought off threats from Portugal, Spain and the Ottoman

Empire under different dynasties. Under the Saadians, Morocco experienced an influx of Muslims from southern Spain when the Christian monarchs reconquered southern Spain and expelled (or killed) non-Christians. By the mid-seventeenth century, Alaouites established themselves as the ruling family of Morocco and they remain so to this day (Gordon, 1998). The Alaouites are of Arab origin and claim ancestry from the Prophet Muḥammad through his grandson, a very key factor in legitimizing the present ruling family's claim to power.

Islamic Education

As Islam came to North Africa, so Islamic educational institutions followed. Islamic "primary" schools are often referred to as Ḳurʾānic schools, or *kuttābs*, because the goal of the schools is to teach children to memorize and recite the Ḳurʾān according to an accepted recitational style. The schools are modeled on the educational practices of the Prophet Muḥammad and his companions and their central and defining feature is their focus on memorization of the Ḳurʾān. At higher levels, Islamic *madrasas* and universities teach lessons on Islamic jurisprudence, philosophy and other subjects.

The underlying philosophy of Islamic education is that knowledge comes from the development of the whole person, the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual dimensions of the person. That these aspects cannot be separated is attested to in the Ḳurʾān, which refers to aspects of the soul—the essence of a human being—as *ruh* (spirit), *ḳalb* (heart), *nafs* (self) and *ʿaḥl* (intellect). In Islam, formal education is concerned with developing the essence of the human—i.e. the soul (Bin Omar, 1993). This is in contrast to more recent European and American traditions where the intellect is often emphasized as the primary focus of formal education. Thus, education—the quest for knowledge—for Muslims necessarily includes religious study; spiritual knowledge is as important as scientific, empirical knowledge and indeed compliments it.

In Islamic education memorization is generally considered the first step in understanding (not a substitute for it) as it ensures that sacred knowledge is passed on in proper form so that it can be understood later. Wagner quotes the philosopher Al-Ghazali who pointed out five centuries ago that memorization of the Ḳurʾān, as a first step to learning did not necessarily preclude comprehension later on:

> [The] creed ought to be taught to a boy in the earliest childhood, so that he may hold it absolutely in memory. Thereafter, the meaning of it will keep gradually unfolding itself to him, point by point, as he grows older. So, first, is the committing to memory; then understanding; then belief and certainty and acceptance (Wagner, 1983b, p. 185).

Thus, memorization was the first step in a life-long enterprise of seeking understanding and thus knowledge. It did not seek to replace understanding with dogmatism, but to plant the seeds that would lead to understanding. The same idea is echoed by historiographer Ibn Khaldūn, cited as part of a project report on *kuttāb* innovations:

> Ibn Khaldūn suggests that this system took advantage of children's submissiveness in order to teach them what they would only be able to understand later: 'Only children are capable of learning a text that they don't understand now and will understand later,' he wrote (Bouzoubaa, 1998, p. 3).

The idea that memorization did not preclude understanding but was a precursor to it is an important distinction since much of the criticism that is leveled at traditional Islamic education centers on the emphasis it places on memorization.

Moroccan Islamic Education

Islamic education in Moroccan education was organized around a system of *kuttābs*, *madrasas* and mosque-universities. *Kuttābs* existed in both rural and urban areas and often constituted the only formal education a child would be exposed to in pre-colonial Morocco. Mosque-universities and to a large extent *madrasas* were generally only located in cities and usually only children who had distinguished themselves in the *kuttāb* or whose parents were wealthy went on to study at a *madrasa.*

Because of their focus on rote memorization of the Ḳur'ān, not to mention their use of corporal punishment, traditional Islamic education was often described as backward, uninspiring to the student and unproductive socially. MacDonald in 1911 said of Islamic education: "It trains the memory and the power of reasoning—always in formal methods—and then gives to neither any adequate materials on which to work (MacDonald, 1911, pp. 288–89)." Sixty one years later, not much had changed; Zerdoumi characterized Ḳur'ānic education as ". . . a purely mechanical, monotonous form of study in which

nothing is likely to arouse his [the child's] interest. The school thus tends to curb his intellectual and moral activity at the precise moment when it should be developing rapidly (Zerdoumi, 1970, p. 196)."

However, a general description of the structure of learning in Islamic higher education in Morocco portrays it as very open and well rounded, emphasizing choice, autonomy, access and personal development:

> . . . its internal structure nevertheless showed an originality which made, for example the Quarawiyin university comparable to an American college. This originality could be seen: (a) in the material organization of education since the place of learning was open both to the student (in the restricted and classical sense of the term) and also to the ordinary citizen who wished to deepen his knowledge of theology without being hindered by strict and paralyzing administrative procedures; (b) in its independence from the administrative and political authorities; (c) in educational terms, for real importance was attached to the periods of training being imposed, emphasis was placed on the freedom of choice of the student and on continuing individual efforts to acquire knowledge; and (d) in that the notions of backwardness, wastage, failures, and maladjustment to school, so important in an educational network subject to the modern demands of production were not considerations in this system of education (Lahjomri, 1985, p. 3417).

These same features characterized the *kuttābs* and *madrasas*. Students studied and progressed at their own pace in mastering material. There was no set school year and no formal tests. In their emphasis on students learning at their own pace, absent notions of uniformity and failure, Islamic institutions had put into practice centuries ago many educational ideals that we embrace today as positive, holistic and student centered.

In addition, Ḳur'ānic schools tended to be loosely organized from an administrative point of view, usually supported and run by community members and, in the larger cities, by wealthy patrons. In this sense, they were genuinely community institutions, responsive to community needs and values without being highly centralized or overly bureaucratic (Wagner, 1983b).

In terms of actual classroom activity, students, especially *kuttāb* students, copied Ḳur'ānic verses onto wooden "*lawḥ*" which were flat wooden slates with a whitewash applied to them that allowed them to act almost like chalkboards. Students wrote on them with pens dipped in a black inky mixture. When they memorized the verse they had written out, they cleaned the *lawḥ* and began writing and memorizing another verse (Abu-Talib, 1987). Teachers coached stu-

dents individually or in small groups, listening to them recite and correcting their mistakes both oral and written. After memorizing the Ḳur'ān, students who stayed in school moved to other subjects and other texts. Methods also evolved to include more explanation.

Teachers of the Ḳur'ān were given great respect in Morocco and there is a proverb that says when fathers brought their sons to the *faḳīh* (traditional teacher) to learn the Ḳur'ān, they would tell him "if you kill him I will bury him" meaning that the *faḳīh* had free reign with the child. This also points to the great prestige associated with learning the Ḳur'ān. It was considered so important and sacred that learning it was worth almost any punishment. Another folk saying goes "any part of the body struck while memorizing the Ḳur'ān will not burn in hell (Wagner, 1983b, p. 184)". Traditional Ḳur'ānic schools did rely heavily on corporal punishment to discipline students and to "correct" mistakes and to "motivate" students to learn better. When students were struck, it was usually on the palms, the back, or the soles of the feet.

The Colonial Period

By the early 20th century, the European colonial age had begun in earnest and there was much competition for colonial territory in Africa. Morocco was taken over as a French protectorate in 1912, in a deal that left Britain to pursue its claims to Egypt while granting Morocco to France. Within this arrangement, Spain obtained the right to occupy the North of Morocco. The period of the protectorate lasted until 1956. The French built roads in Morocco, built the port of Casablanca, introduced European-styled schools into Morocco and built a series of new city sections (practically new cities in and of themselves) next to the old walled *medinas* (cities) of Fes, Marrakech, Meknes and Rabat.

Nationalist feeling grew stronger after World War two and the ruling sultan, Muḥammad V was sympathetic to the nationalist aspirations. Eventually, in the eyes of the French, the sultan became too sympathetic to the nationalist cause and the French banished him to Madagascar. This only increased his popularity and calls for an end to colonization. In late 1955, two years after he had been exiled, under great pressure, the French returned Muḥammad V to Morocco. By 1956 the protectorate formally ended and Muḥammad V was declared king (Munson, 1993).

Colonial Education and Its Aftermath

During the colonial period, from 1912 to 1956, the French introduced an alternative model of schooling into the Moroccan context. This new system was introduced primarily to educate personnel to serve in the French colonial administration. However, it had lasting repercussions, beyond the simple supply of labor to sustain the French administration.

Since French principles of colonization involved strong tendencies toward assimilating natives into French culture (Watson, 1982), the institutions implanted in the colonies were replicas of French institutions in France. In Morocco, not surprisingly, French (not Arabic) was the language of instruction. Moreover, the underlying assumptions that permeated the colonial education in Morocco were based on French educational values and ideas, which had little in common with the Islamic assumptions and values of the original system.

In particular the French school system was based chiefly on the *encyclopaedist* principles of *rationalism*, *universality* and *utility*. The principal of rationality demanded that school subjects have an ordered rational structure, be rigorous and scientific, as opposed to spiritual or intuitive. This entailed a real focus on intellectual development, rather than on the development of the soul, the focus of Islamic education. The principle of universality demanded that students acquire a broad base of knowledge from all areas, without early specialization or concentrations. In Islamic educational tradition, the opposite was true: students concentrated on the Ḳurʾān in their early years, broadening the scope of their education only as they got older and progressed to higher levels. In addition, implementing the principles of rationality and universality required a tightly controlled, centralized curriculum to ensure standardization. All schools, therefore had to have identical structures and requirements so that students could acquire knowledge in the same order, at the same pace nationwide. Promotion was based on a system of national examinations, which were also completely standardized to ensure uniformity and fairness (Holmes and McLean, 1989). This is very different from the traditional Islamic method of having students progress at their own pace, based on mastery of material as opposed to test results. Finally, the principal of utility demanded that rational knowledge be applied for the improvement of society. This was very much in line with Islamic educational thinking, where the goals of schooling and

community life were typically closely linked. However, the application of this principle, which justified many forms of vocational education, was never viewed as highly as the more theoretical focus of study by the French themselves.

In the days immediately following colonialism, the system left behind by the French was deepened and expanded and, eventually, Arabized, especially in terms of the language of instruction. The system remained highly centralized, with a rigidly controlled examination system and a uniform, nationwide curriculum.

During this period of independence, public school education did lead to jobs and to greater economic prosperity. The new government employed almost all university and high school graduates, many of them as teachers in the new Moroccan educational system. Thus, modern education was seen as an avenue not just to private prosperity but an avenue toward national development. Hence, demand for public education grew.

Morocco Today: The Current Context

In the beginning of the new millenium, Morocco has a population of just over 30 million people (World Factbook, 2001). The Moroccan economy runs largely on agriculture and mineral exports, particularly phosphates. Fifty percent of the employed labor force works in the agricultural sector, 35 percent in the services sector and 15 percent in industry (World Factbook, 2001). Remittances from Moroccans abroad (1.7 million people) add foreign exchange to the economy, as does the growing tourism industry (Gordon et al., 1998).

While Morocco has many natural resources, a fairly stable political system and is experiencing more political openness than in the past, it still faces certain problems. These include: high unemployment (around 23 percent), a low adult literacy rate (43.7 percent of adults over 15 are literate) and an extremely low female literacy rate (31 percent) (World Factbook, 2001). In addition, Morocco is still trying to assert its claim over the Western Sahara and in the recent past has had to be vigilant against the spillover of violent fundamentalism from Algeria.

Indeed, many other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, for example Algeria and Egypt, have become either more xenophobic, fearing outside influences, or have experienced much more social

violence. Combs-Schilling attributes Morocco's stability and lack of xenophobia to its ability to maintain what she calls its "selfhood":

> Xenophobia is not much prevalent in Morocco, although it is alive and well in other North African and Middle Eastern countries, especially in those that indiscriminately adopted Western models at the expense of their own selfhood during the 1960s and 1970s (AH 1380s and 1390s). The leadership of these countries experienced widescale popular disenchantment when the First World models did not bring First World economic and political power, as the case of Iran, Egypt, and Tunisia demonstrate (Combs-Schilling, 1989, pp. 293–4).

That is to say that a strong sense of Moroccan identity and culture has tended to stabilize the political climate, differentiating Morocco from other countries in the region. This is not to say that fears of Western hegemony do not exist among the Moroccan population. They certainly do. However, the political climate of Morocco, which reflects a level of cultural comfort and security (among other things), is very different from that in other countries with similar economic conditions.

The Monarchy and Government

King Muḥammad V died unexpectedly in 1961, leaving his son Ḥasan II as ruler. Ḥasan did much to unify Morocco psychologically into one nation. He reigned until 1999 and he had a talent for promoting traditionalism and modernization at the same time. He encouraged Ḳur'ānic schooling, for example, while expanding public schooling. He co-opted Islamic fundamentalist movements by declaring himself the first Islamicist in Morocco. His Classical Arabic was impeccable and he could always find an appropriate passage from the Ḳur'ān to quote for any event or speech (El Ayadi, personal communication).[1] In keeping with his ability to balance East and West, his French was also flawless.

Ḥasan was very politically savvy. He survived two rather spectacular assassination attempts and was believed by his people to pos-

[1] Speaking well in Classical Arabic and being able to quote the Ḳur'ān extensively and appropriately are two admired skills; both attest to his excellent Islamic education.

sess *baraka* or special blessings (Combs-Schilling, 1989). He had almost unchecked powers, but in 1997, he established a bicameral parliament (a move for greater democratization). After his death in 1999, his eldest son, Muḥammad VI became king at the age of 36. As crown prince, Muḥammad VI was known for his concern for the poor. As king, he has signaled more directly than his father his concern with issues of social justice, democratization and poverty alleviation. He has released all political prisoners, including the leader of a fundamentalist group called Justice and Charity. However, he has maintained most of the power of his father while using it in a less heavy-handed and authoritarian manner.

Islam and Politics

Islamic fundamentalist parties have had some growth in Morocco (particularly the once-banned Justice and Charity party) but fundamentalists have never been able to discredit the monarch, as "leader of the faithful" in the minds of Moroccan citizens.

Given Morocco's nearly 100 percent Muslim population (there remains an extremely small minority Jewish population of less than 1percent), religious divisiveness is not an issue. However, competing views of Islam certainly exist within Morocco as exemplified by the existence of Sufi brotherhoods on the one hand and the very right-leaning Justice and Charity party on the other, to name but a few examples. Thus, while politically active, Moroccan fundamentalists tend to operate within the broad contours of "the system" as it exists. This is to say, they tend to be neither violent nor radical and are not generally "at war" with the government (Entelis, 1997; Munson, 1993).

Contemporary Schooling: Options for Parents

While the educational landscape in Morocco has evolved and changed over the course of the 20th century, the popularity of Ḳur'ānic schools has not declined, despite the introduction of "modern" public schooling in the middle of the century. Indeed, in Morocco approximately 80 of all children still attend some form of Ḳur'ānic school for a portion of their school years (Wagner, 1989, 1998).

This fact notwithstanding, the growth of the public education sector had a profound impact on Morocco's system of traditional Islamic schools. Ḳur'ānic schools (much more so than public schools) have had to adapt themselves to a new educational environment. In so doing, they have carved out a niche for themselves through which they have maintained their role as a social and educational force in Moroccan life.

Traditional Ḳur'ānic schools still exist in Morocco as fulltime educational institutions for children. However, their numbers have declined dramatically in the last half of the 20th century and they are generally found only the rural areas. In order to survive, many Ḳur'ānic schools have transformed themselves into preschools, serving children from ages 3–6, before the children start school. Likewise, some Ḳur'ānic schools have managed to get by as supplemental schools, offering Ḳur'ānic lessons on the weekend, in the evenings after public school and over school holidays, especially summer vacation. In general, schools that have followed this latter model of adaptation tend to adhere more closely to the traditional Ḳur'ānic methods than those that have become pre-schools. However, both models are distinguished by their still heavy focus on Ḳur'ānic memorization. Public schools are the main source of schooling in Morocco. There are private schools as well which offer the full complement of academic subjects and there are religious schools (public and private) which offer academic subjects with a heavier focus on religious subjects. There are also traditional Ḳur'ānic schools of the type which have existed for centuries in Morocco. These are less commonly found and less frequently serve as the sole source of education for children.

In general, for all of these types of schooling, except the traditional Ḳur'ānic school, *basic* education in Morocco is a nine-year program, including the primary and the preparatory cycles. The primary cycle is six years and the preparatory cycle is three years. The secondary cycle is three years after preparatory school. Upon completion of the secondary cycle, students can take the baccalaureate. If they pass they are eligible to go to university. Most children do not get this far. There are opportunities for children who have received a traditional Ḳur'ānic education to integrate into the public system, to go to an Islamic secondary school or even to university, although this is not a frequent occurrence.

Public education in Morocco is free, but there are substantial expenses associated with sending a child to school. The main costs

are books and supplies as well as a smock. In rural areas, these costs are often prohibitive. Coupled with the demand for children's labor in the home, on the farm or in a shop or cottage industry, the cost of education can act (and does) as a barrier to access. Thus, while education is compulsory, not all children attend, even if they are enrolled. University education is free as well and students receive a living stipend. This diminishes each year that a student fails.

The education children receive within the public school system (and even in the private system, although this system is more flexible) is very academic and very theoretical at all levels. The system is still quite oriented toward rote learning. Memorization is still widely practiced as a study mechanism and is often encouraged at the expense of really understanding concepts and being able to apply knowledge. It is important to note that Islam is taught as a subject in the public schools and students do memorize some Ḳur'ānic verses, especially in the early years. However, the focus is not as intense as in traditional Ḳur'ānic schools. Islamic public secondary schools with a stronger orientation toward Islamic studies do exist for students who wish to pursue this track.

The Relationship Between Ḳur'ānic and Public Schools Today

Complementarity of Purpose

Morocco has managed to integrate two very different educational traditions into a system of education that is both traditional and modern. In encouraging the use of its traditional system of Ḳur'ānic schools in a "new" way (as preschools and supplemental schools), the country has been able to maintain a link with the basics of a hallowed Moroccan tradition and foster a sense of educational continuity with the past. By channeling this tradition into a means of support to the public education sector in general, the two systems become linked in a shared mission to promote education, school success and literacy, as well as religious practice and Ḳur'ānic knowledge. The co-existence and complementarity of these two disparate educational traditions suggests that the two strands of the system play different roles in the overall formation of Moroccan children, such that neither one is rendered redundant by the other.

Differing Roles

The role of the public education system is fairly straightforward. Despite growing unemployment, parents still believe that their children stand a greater chance of upward social mobility and economic success if they have a public school diploma and preferably a university degree. Public schools clearly and explicitly teach children to read and write, to do math and to speak foreign languages, all skills that parents see as indispensable in today's world.

The role of the Ḳur'ānic school is less straightforward to describe in that its value to parents and communities is not limited to strictly religious instruction (Boyle, 2000). Ḳur'ānic schools have been able to survive and adapt to the current and overwhelming demand for public schooling because they are valued for things that public schools do not do or are not perceived to do well.

First and foremost, they facilitate memorization of the Ḳur'ān at an early age, when children are most able to memorize and retain. The memorized Ḳur'ānic verses act as a point of reference, a compass, as children grow older, understand more of what they have memorized and make decisions about the direction of their lives. Parents and community members want their children to follow the path of Islam and to be good citizens in their immediate communities and also in their national and global communities. The compass acquired in the Ḳur'ānic school helps the growing child to navigate along the paths of tradition and modernity, to find direction and orientation and to make decisions about which way to go, which path to chose (Ibid.).

In addition, Ḳur'ānic schools provide discipline for children, keeping them from the idleness of the street and explicitly teaching them culturally valued forms of behavior, including how to be polite, how to greet elders, how to pray, how to wash for prayers and other aspects of traditional knowledge and behavior. Parents in Morocco really want to see their children internalize and exhibit these traditional behaviors, even as they want them to go to public schools and learn math and science and French (Ibid.).

At the national level, Ḳur'ānic schools embody the continuation of a valued traditional institution—the Moroccan Ḳur'ānic school—and thus represent a link with times past, with cultural roots, and with Moroccan identity. Ḳur'ānic schools are one source of forming a Moroccan Islamic identity in children, something critical to the political culture in Morocco at the national level, where the monar-

chy draws it legitimacy from its ancestry from the Prophet Muḥammad. Because they offer a tangible link to the past and render a service, especially to lower income parents, they are a source—one among many, to be sure—of political stability (Ibid.).

Likewise, Ḳur'ānic schools offer students the opportunity to participate in a very Moroccan *rite of passage*, one that their parents and grandparents probably experienced. As Ḳur'ānic memorization was particularly emphasized in Moroccan precolonial educational traditions, this exercise in memorizing the Ḳur'ān in the contemporary Ḳur'ānic school still allows students to partake of this way of learning. Maintaining tradition is an important aspect of social life in Morocco. This is especially true given the proximity of Morocco to Europe and the often overwhelming exposure to Western values, customs and cultures that comes with this proximity (Ibid.).

Lastly, Ḳur'ānic pre-schools are seen by parents and even by the Moroccan government as preparing children for public schooling. Ḳur'ānic schools teach children to sit in rows, recite in unison, recite individually, socialize with other children, respect the teacher, and learn to count and recognize numbers and learn to recognize and write letters and sometimes even words (Wagner, 1989). In short, Ḳur'ānic schools initiate children into the culture, behavior and expectations of formal schooling, possibly making them more ready to learn and succeed in school.

Similarity of mission between modern and traditional schools extends beyond the behavioral to the content areas as well:

> As it happens, many indigenous schools provide, as a by-product of religious training, language, cognitive, and social skills very similar to those which are taught in the contemporary secular school system (Wagner, 1989, p. 7).

For this reason Ḳur'ānic schools are often cited as sources of literacy in Arabic. Traditionally, the idea of literacy in the Ḳur'ānic school context included the ability to recite the Ḳur'ān, although not necessarily the ability to decode words and sentences. However, even using the "modern" conception of literacy as encompassing the ability to read and write, Ḳur'ānic schools do provide literacy education:

> . . . Ḳur'ānic school includes a number of common features for literacy instruction: oral memorization of the Ḳur'ān; emphasis on correct (that is, accurate and aesthetic) oral recitation; training in the Arabic script; and strict authoritarian instruction (Wagner, 1983a, p. 81).

Wagner also raises some questions as to whether rote learning—a common feature of Ḳur'ānic schools—is as detrimental as previously thought. He cites evidence from work he has done with the Morocco Literacy Project which suggests that prior memorization is a help to reading acquisition in Arabic. He also cites work by Chomsky which suggests that being able to orally recite passages before having to decode them helped children who normally had trouble with reading fluency (Wagner, 1983b, p. 187).

Blurring methodologies

The rise of public schooling has had a profound effect on the pedagogy in traditional Ḳur'ānic schools. Of late, Ḳur'ānic schools have begun to mimic the teaching methods used in public schools. Moroccan public schools are changing but they still tend to cling to the idea of the teacher as the giver of knowledge, a figure of authority not to be too overtly challenged. Methods tend to be lecture, "chalk and talk" as opposed to really interactive or student centered. Ḳur'ānic schools have tended to imitate these methods more and more, having children sit in rows, sometimes at desks and chairs, use blackboards, pencils and paper, and listen to the teacher lecture. Many of the traditional methods of instruction found in Ḳur'ānic schools of old have been jettisoned in favor of these more "modern" methods (Boyle, 2000). The chart below compares the pedagogical strategies of traditional Ḳur'ānic schools with those of public schools.

That Ḳur'ānic schools are increasingly turning to the public school model of teaching for inspiration is very unfortunate as, in their heyday (corporal punishment notwithstanding), traditional Ḳur'ānic schools provided a very individualized education, tailored to the child's needs and abilities. Instructional strategies such as peer tutoring and group work, individual writing work with the *lawḥ* and one-on-one instruction with the *faḳīh* provided the student with a variety of learning "channels" and suited a wider variety of learning styles than do the contemporary *kuttābs* and public schools, both of which use a much more teacher-centered instructional model.

Indeed, many of the pedagogical techniques found in traditional Ḳur'ānic schools could be described as student-centered and cooperative. Group work, peer tutoring, independent work, mastery learning are all things that have gained prominence and approval in current educational discourse, as educators learn more and more

Table 5.1 Traditional Ḳur'ānic Pedagogy and Modern Public School Pedagogy in Morocco

Traditional Ḳur'ānic Pedagogy	Modern Public School Pedagogy
Students use of whitewashed wooden slate called a *lawḥ* on which to write.	Teachers use a blackboard and students use pencils and notebooks.
Students are seated on the floor around the *faḳīh*. The *faḳīh* himself sits on the floor.	Students are seated at desks, in rows, facing the teacher or the blackboard.
Still accepts corporal punishment as a disciplining technique, although less so than it was in the past.	Does not use corporal punishment.
Serves students of varying ages in group classes—not age segregated classes.	Groups students in classes by age and level.
Utilizes a good deal of one-on-one coaching as an instructional technique.	Utilizes whole group instruction as primary technique.
Allows students a great deal of independent work time to write and memorize verses before presenting them to the *faḳīh*.	Does not generally allow children independent work time or time to work with each other.
Utilizes peer tutoring among students, with older children helping out and quizzing the younger ones, as an instructional technique.	Does not generally utilize peer tutoring or group work.
Fosters a sort of master/apprentice relationship between the *faḳīh* and the student over time (this is for the students that generally stay on to memorize the whole Ḳur'ān).	Does not foster a master/apprentice relationship between teacher and student. Relation is generally more impersonal but a bit less authoritative.
Allows students to progress by material mastered, moving on to a new verse or text once they have memorized the one before.	Sets a more defined pace for students' work and achievement and relies on formal tests for assessment. There is a great deal of "failing out" and there is little acceptance of varied rates of achievement.

about how children learn and what sorts of techniques and environments foster learning. In this sense, Ḳur'ānic schools in Morocco have valuable lessons to offer to public schooling, both in Morocco and elsewhere, but these lessons have been ignored and continue to be ignored, even by the Ḳur'ānic schools themselves.

Conclusion

In conclusion, public and Ḳur'ānic schools coexist in Morocco. Each type of school plays an important role in educating children to participate in the modern economy, to promote the development of their country and to maintain their sense of national and religious identity. It is worth noting that Morocco is one of the few countries in the Arab world whose traditional Islamic schools have flourished without interruption up until the present time. Even under colonial rule, Morocco did not suffer the loss of many of its traditions and traditional institutions as did other countries, notably its neighbor Algeria. The continuity of traditional institutions like the Ḳur'ānic school has proven to be a stabilizing force in Morocco, providing a sense of "balance", even as social, political and economic changes have happened consistently and rapidly in the last half century. In short, far from simply helping people to adhere to Moroccan traditions or imparting religious knowledge, Ḳur'ānic school education helps children, parents and the community in general to mediate between traditional Moroccan Islamic values and practices and the desire for "modern" education and knowledge that they believe will lead to greater social and economic development.

While public and Ḳur'ānic schools do co-exist, Ḳur'ānic schools have by and large been the institutions which have changed and adapted in order to maintain their relevancy to local communities. Under a new reform initiative, started in 1999, public schools, and the infrastructure supporting them, are gradually beginning to change and reform, with the goal of improving educational quality and linking it more directly to the needs of the Moroccan economy.

While Ḳur'ānic schools have borrowed liberally from public school methodologies, public schools have not generally looked to Ḳur'ānic schools for inspiration in their moves to reform. However, Morocco's new reform initiative, with its focus on quality improvement and decentralization might find real inspiration in the examples provided

by traditional Islamic institutions, with their focus on student centered and cooperative instructional techniques and close community involvement in school administration and support.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND EDUCATION IN SOMALIA

Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Ḥasan and Salada M. Robleh

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine Islamic revival and education in Somalia. The concept of Islamic revival is used here in a way defined by Legum (1992), Islamic revival is a struggle against Western hegemony; the post-colonial Arab and other Muslim leaders, and the growth of secularism in the Middle East and other countries. It favors modernizing political systems but without weakening a deep commitment to Islamic ideas and teachings. According to Ahmed Akhbar (1992) the revivalist movements demand assertiveness of Islamic knowledge and the Islamic way of life, and challenges the universal global view based on Western knowledge. Similarly Halliday (1995) argues that Islamic revivalism is a response to what is conceived as hostility to Islamic threat to the West. Racism in some European countries, above all France, has taken on a more explicitly anti-Muslim character. In the United States anti-Islamic ethic is significant in political discourse. Halliday (1995) rejects the prediction that there will be a direct confrontation between Islam and the West as Samuel Huntington predicted in his book "*The clash of civilizations*". In Halliday's view there has never been a united Islamic force, which advocates one particular Islamic revival. However, those who advocate Islamic revival have a common agenda: restoration of the Islamic system of government, education and culture.

The form of struggle of the revivalist movements differ from country to country and it also vary in different periods. For instance, Islamic revival in post-colonial Africa manifests contradictory causes. It often arises from economic difficulties, especially at a time of famine and drought as Susan MacDonald's (in Mazrui, 1993) in her account of Senegal and the Sahel asserts.

> Now, Islam is consolidating its position as people turn to the strict Muslim moral code to give them a sense of direction . . . Persistent

> drought and the spreading desert have caused poverty, misery and hardship. This diversity has created a favorable terrain for increased religious fervor (p. 261).

In the Horn of Africa and Sahel, Islamic revivalism came up as a result of drought and hardship, while revivalism in Libya was partly the product of obtaining new wealth and economic prosperity. A similar case can be related to Iran, where revivalism was linked to convergence of oil wealth and threat of Western hegemony (Mazrui, 1997).

Two issues relating to Islam have been manifested in the Horn and North Africa and also in the sub-Saharan African countries since they gained their independence: Islamic expansion and Islamic revivalism. The former involves the spread of Islam and conversion of the non-Moslems, "*in search of new worlds to conquer*", while revivalism is "*rebirth of faith*" among those who are already converted. Countries such as Sudan and Saudi Arabia have revived Islamic legal systems and other features of the Islamic way of life, aspects of which go back fourteen centuries. Islamic movements in countries like Algeria, Egypt, and Afghanistan are also seeking revivalist goals. A similar sacred nostalgia is evident in other religions, such as the born-again Christian sects in the United States and Africa (Mazrui, 1997). Islamic revival has developed in rather different ways in different Islamic countries. Somalia and Senegal have shown similar features. As explained by Loimeier (2000):

> . . . Their radicalness and role as movements expressing opposition to existing political and social structures in religious terms is directly connected with the degree to which they have been integrated into the political structures of their society (p. 168).

Background of Somalia

Somalia is situated in the Horn of Africa, and in 1999 United Nations estimated the population about 9.7 million.[1] More than half of the population is distinguished as nomads and semi-nomads (55 percent) that live in semi-desert area and their livelihood depend on pastorals. About 25 percent live in the fertile areas between two rivers, *Jubba*

[1] http:/www.unfpa.org/swp/1999/swep_search.html.

and *Shabelli*, and the rest live in the urban areas (Metz, 1993). Somali society is one big ethnic group or tribe, which is divided into various clans. Despite variations in kin relationships, they have same culture, language (despite dialect variations) and religion. 99 percent of the Somalis are Sunnī Muslims (Touval, 1963). The clan[2] is very important because it is a kind of a welfare system for the society, and source of security. People from different classes or different levels of the economy are bound together by customs of kinship and Islam (Drysdale, 1991). Somalis possess an exceptional and extraordinary culture of oral and instant poetry. Furthermore, Islam is very important in the Somali society and this is reflected in the constitution that declares Islam as the religion of the newborn state, Somali Republic in 1st July 1960.[3] Article 35 of the constitution, which deals the education, states that it is compulsory to teach the Ḳur'ān in primary and secondary state schools (Contini, 1969). Somali nation state experienced different political turbulence. Civilian governments, military dictatorship, civil war and anarchy, and lastly was followed by the breakdown of the Somali Republic into three parts: Somalia (south and central), Somaliland (northwest) and Puntland (northeast).

Islam is believed to have reached the Somalia Coast in 615 AD. The arrival of Islam in northeastern Africa was accompanied by the spread of Arab culture, trade and communications (Mazrui, 1993; Erlich, 1994). The stimulating and unifying effects of the Arab-Islamic influence was greater on the Somalis than on any other northeast African people, and Islam became an integral part of Somali culture (Mazrui, 1993). According to Laitin & Samatar (1987), Islam is deeply and extensively reinforced as a faith and also as one of the vital wellspring of Somali culture. Their universal feeling of a common Islamic cultural community reinforces Somali awareness of a shared national identity. Furthermore, Cassanelli (1982) asserts:

> What gives Somalis this strong senses of common identity, despite more than eighty years of political partition, is their long-time occupation of nearly four hundred thousand square miles of contiguous territory; a common language (albeit with regional dialect differences) a shared

[2] There are six main clans: Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn), Hawiye, Darood, Isaq and Dir, and other minorities.

[3] First July 1960 was also when the two Somali territories, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland gained independence and officially unified and became Somali Republic.

> Islamic heritage; a wide belief that all Somalis are ultimately descended from a small number of common ancestors; and a way of life that is overwhelmingly pastoral (p. 3).

Of all the factors Cassanelli mentioned as contributing to a common Somali identity, the Islamic identity outweighs all other explanations; Islam has become the most important reference for sanction, identification, and the classification of what is permissible (*halāl*), and what is forbidden (*harām*) and for the basis of the moral order of society.

In Somalia, Islam is incorporated within the existing non-Islamic African culture and value systems. The Somali culture still reflects the mixture of the two, and this is largely expressed in poetry, songs and dances. In addition, Islam refers primarily to the spiritual side of life. In some parts in the country the traces of pre-Islamic tradition are clearly visible. In the north Somalia, the common pre-Islamic ritual culture is the annual celebrations of the clan ancestors, which is an expression of solidarity. While in the southern Somalia, the collective rainmaking ritual "*roobdoon*" is practiced (Laitin & Samatar, 1987).

Before the imposition of the colonial rules and the independent period, Somali people steered and organized their political and social life through kinship association together with Islamic Law (*ḳānūn*) or *Sharīʿa* Law, and these are the two components of the Somali Moral Order (see Figure 1). The distinctive qualities of the culture were established on kin divisions based on patrilineally traced blood relationship. This "propinquity ordered identity" grouped the Somali people into kin families and again into subkin units, and these are divided again into smaller units, ending at the household (Samatar, 1994).

The Somali kinship has two main elements; the first one is that people are related through blood ties, which is either through common male lineage '*tol*', or through marriage relationship '*hidid*'. The second one is the customary law '*heer*', which consists of a set of unwritten but memorised rules and regulations. Other components of the Moral Order are the Islamic culture with Ḳurʾān and *ḥadīth* and the Islamic law '*ḳānūn*' as the main component. The combination of the customary law '*heer*' and the Islamic law '*ḳānūn*' furnished the "stateless Somalis" a lawful political centre of gravity. The two laws were also efficiently managing and regulating all kinds of

Figure 1 Somali Moral Order



Source: Adapted from Samatar, 1994.

difficulties and predicaments both private and public and offering order and continuity (Ibid.).

The application of the customary law takes place in community leaders' meetings known as *Shir* where important matters of the community are discussed and resolutions are made. It is extremely important for the functioning and the survival of the society, and it largely incorporates Islamic law *ḳānūn* and its concomitant values. The *heer* and Islamic laws are interdependent entities. For instance, it is very important that the council members of the *heer committee* must be people who are known to follow the basic tenets of Islam, and they must be trustworthy (Hassan, 1993).

After independence in 1960, the customary law was replaced by a parliamentary constitution with specific political and civil rights. But still the three models survived and continued, and these are the kinship, Islam and the secular law. The first and second laws are strongly employed in the rural areas, both by the nomads and agrarians (Hassan, 1993).

Islamic Revival in Somalia

Islamic revival in Somalia has gone through two different episodes: (1) The first Islamic revival was due to the reaction to the intrusion of colonialism at the later end of 19th century, and (2) The second Islamic revival was after independence, but it became stronger after the collapse of the nation-state.

Islamic Revival in the Colonial Era

The driving force behind the ideas and actions of this revival were the mystical Islamic movements, "Sufi orders" or Sufi brotherhood. There are several interpretations, what Sufism is. Sufism is a kind of mysticism mainly concerned with the mystery of the Kingdom of Heaven or the transcendental world. The Sufi may claim to have two centers of consciousness; 'one human', and 'one divine' and he may reflect both at the same time and thus appear contradictory to the ordinary mind (Hassan, 1999). As Cruise O'Brien (1971) described the word Sufi as:

> It is probably derived from the Sufi (wool) and the term was apparently first applied (in the ninth century) to certain Muslim ascetics who dressed in rough woollen clothes and who gave up their lives to ascetic practices, Later (in the tenth century) it acquired a theosophical connotation, and was applied to those who sought through the performance of various ritual exercises to attain state of fusion with God. Still later (in the twelfth century) it became associated with the brotherhoods, which were neither particularly ascetic nor necessarily devoted to ritual exercises of this latter kind (p. 25).

This Islamic revival was not only limited to Somalia, but it was a widespread phenomenon in the Muslim world, as well as in Africa (Samatar, 1992). The response of all Muslim brotherhoods to the anti-imperialism was not identical. Martin (1976) states, three different groups of brotherhoods on the basis of their reaction towards the colonialism:

> The rebels and 'resisters' whose call was struggle; The 'moderates' who occasionally created rebellions but, mostly, went about their pedagogical works in mysticism; and The conservatives who were untroubled and untouched by the upheavals around them, and who practiced Islam largely divorced from its social environment or openly collaborated with the new rulers (in Samatar, 1988: 25).

The reaction towards Western hegemony differed from one Muslim country to another. For instance in the case of the 'Ottomans' in Turkey, there was a complete breakdown of the traditional system and the contingent rise of a secular state on the 'European model', but from the 1950s increasing Islamic influence in education and politics (Trimingham, 1971; Martin, 1976 in Samatar, 1992).

The revivalist spirit in Islam started in Somalia in the 1890s. There were two types of Sufi[4] orders or paths (*tariqa, turuq*, pl.): the *Ḳādirīyya* and *Salihiya* brotherhoods. The *Ḳādirīyya* was more traditionalists and more mystically oriented, while the Salihiya, an off-shot of the already established older tariiqa *Ahmediya* in the country was more radical and puritanical. The *Ḳādirīyya* Tariqa was established by the saint Sheikh Abdulqadir Jeilani (died AD 1166) in Baghdad, Iraq. While the Ahmediya trace to the mystic teacher, Sheikh Ahmed Idris Al-Fasi (1760–1837) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (Samatar, 1992; Abdi, 1993; Lewis, 1998).

The *Salihiya* brotherhood led by the poet and mystic, Sayed Muḥammad Abdalla Ḥasan was the most important revivalist Islamic movement. Sayed Muḥammad's movement was called the "*Dervish*", and they fought with the British colonial rule from 1900 to 1920. His objectives were not only to liberate the country from the colonial rule but also to restore the Islamic system of government with Islamic education as its foundation (Samatar, 1992).

The Sayed remains a controversial figure among the Somalis. Some people regard him as a national figure and the founder of modern Somali nationalism. On the other hand others see him simply as the ambitious chieftain of a leader of a militant Muslim sect *Salihiya* bent on wresting power by force, a man who destroyed Somalis' chances for modernization and development (Abdi, 1993).

The *Uwaysiya*, an offshoot of the *Ḳādirīyya* order was the most significant Sufi order in the southern part of Somalia, and it was founded by Sheikh Uways Bin Muḥammad from Barava, Somalia. The significant feature of this order was the creation of settlements or *Jamaoyin*. These settlements were mostly formed in the farming areas between the two rivers, and they had double purposes: one was the establishment of the 'religion-communal' groups that cultivate

[4] Sufism is Islamic mysticism (Lings, 1995).

together under the direction of a Sheikh. The second endeavor was basically the teaching of the Ḳur'ān (Samatar, 1988; Hassan, 1999). Although Sheikh Uways and his disciples were fighting with the Italian colonialists and against its Christian model of education, they never reached the level of mass involvement seen in the Sayed's movements in the central and northern part of the territory (Ibid.).

The Sufi brotherhoods in Somalia did not breed to Sufi institutions with hierarchical powers and prestige like in Senegal, as described by Cruise O'Brien (see the Mourides of Senegal, 1971). They were less hierarchical in power structure and ideologically more flexible. They largely depended on the voluntary donations of the rural communities, and there was always a charismatic Sufi master who headed the group. The Sufi movements in Somalia and Senegal were similar. For instance, the role played by the Mourides in the Wolof states in Senegal in opposition to French colonialism, can be analogous to Sayed Muḥammad's Dervish movement against the British colonialism (Hassan, 1999).

Apart from the charismatic qualities that a Sufi master must have, two other important qualities are also associated with all Sufism, *Karama* or *Baraka*, (Godly secret powers) and Sainthood *Wali*. Somali Sufi sheikhs such as Sheikh Uwes, Sheikh Abdirahman Zeyl'i, were believed to have all these qualities.

O'Brien and Coulon (1988) commented on the relevance of charisma in the Islamic mysticism, and he wrote that "Sufism or Islamic mysticism is required for production of this Muslim charisma: one might indeed see Sufism as providing and Islamic handbook to production of charisma" (p. 4).

The most celebrated Sufi activities in Somalia are the *Siyaro*, and the *dikri*. The *Siyaro*, is a yearly mass celebration around a particular Shrine of a Sheikh, or a Sufi, as a tribute to his contributions to Islamic learning and spiritual teachings. Sometimes it lasts a few days, sometimes weeks. All the time the people are in a religious exited mood. The *dikri* is the ritual songs and dances and it is performed during the festivities.

There are other activities associated with Sufi practices, such as retreat or *qilwa*, or *qilawa*. It describes a situation where the Sufi stays away from people for a period of time, including his close family and lives in isolation. In this period the Sufi person reads the Ḳur'ān and religious poetry and contemplates continuous memorization and utterances of *wardi* with help of *Tusbax* (counting the beads).

Contemporary Islamic Organizations

At present there are several Islamic organizations in Somalia but the two main ones are Islamic Brotherhood "Al-Ikhwaan Al Muslimiin" and Islamic Unity "Al-Itixaad". The Islamic brotherhood has existed in the country since 1965 and focused on education. One of their first activities was the opening of an Islamic library at the center of Mogadishu, to advance Arabic and Islamic knowledge. They have their roots in Egypt where the founder of the organization lived (Hassan, 1999; Mazrui, 1993). During the civilian rule, Islamic organizations and the secular government were seen as interdependent. The state did not intervene in the religious sphere, and the Islamists were mostly avoiding challenging the hegemony of the state. Meanwhile the Islamic Unity is more recent and derived its Islamic orientation and ideological tenets from the "Wahabiya" in Saudi Arabia, where its founder was one of the twin builders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ahmed, 1988).

The military government that came to power in 1969 adopted the socialist ideology. The leader of the military council, Siad Barre made a speech in which he reiterated the regime's conception of the relations between socialism and Islam:

> If both Islam and Socialism advocate justice, equality and improvement of people's lives, who can tell me where they differ? Where do they contradict one another? What harm is there in having the faith of Islam, and the same time applying socialism as an economic and political system through which our country can make progress? I would say there is none (Barre, 1979).

This statement made Islamic scholars in the country angry and they equally stated that Islam and socialism with Marxist atheist ideology are incompatible. In 1975 ten Sheikhs were executed and this incident further stirred the consciousness of the nation, and gave rise to unprecedented Islamic revival. Some religious leaders who were till then silent came to the open, to challenge the legitimacy of the Marxist military regime. This challenge was often expressed in speeches in the mosques during Friday prayers. Hundreds of young people of both sexes poured into the mosques to listen to the speeches made by the *imāms*. The contents and the presentations of these speeches had political overtones, with new emphases on the tenets of the *Sharīʿa* (Hassan, 1993). In the aftermath of collapse of Siad Barre's regime and the civil war broke in the country, all the religious organizations

became united. These organizations did not relate to any political group, their only aim has been to initiate Islamic education and also to create an Islamic court in the country.

Learning Systems

Indigenous education as an early Socialization

The essence of indigenous education in Somalia is combined with Islamic education. Between the pastoralist and agrarian societies in Somalia, there are some slight diversities in the modes of transmitting indigenous education, but the common factor for all Somalis is the provision of Islamic tradition through Ḳur'ānic education. Describing the Somali culture, Trimingham (1964) asserts that the traditional education system in Somalia was essentially religious before it succumbed to the colonial intrusion.

Orally based indigenous education has had deep roots in Somalia for centuries. The indigenous education is both delivered and sustained through the oral tradition, which includes both the history of the community and moral and spiritual values and it is illustrated in everyday life. Children are taught about their tradition by word of mouth. Each generation in the process restrictively perpetuates and continues its wisdom and that of proceeding generations for successor. Apart from the '*aesthetic*' quality and '*epistemological*' nature of the oral literature, it safeguards the survival of the tradition in the minds of the young (Mazrui and Wagaw, 1985; Ahmed, 1996). Indigenous education takes place within the context of the extended family, which simultaneously merges with the Ḳur'ānic education. The nature of this education tends to be immediately appropriate to the people's basic needs, which signifies vast flexibility and conformity to the environment.

Poetry is an important medium of expression in Somalia, and it is the principal instrument of communication as well as an enormous repository of knowledge. It is also an integral part of everyday life (Mazrui and Wagaw, 1985). Furthermore, Mazrui (1986) indicates that

> No country in Africa is as deeply wedded to poetry and verse as Somalia, and no society has evolved as elaborate a culture of verbal

> composition and eloquence, a ritual use of the Muse, as these nomads have done (p. 70).

The process of initiation is also another prominent feature of traditional education. This process helps the adolescents to be transformed, socially and spiritually, into adulthood. It differs remarkably from one African society to another (Ibid.). As an initiation process, the Somalis and some people from the Kikuyu tribe in Kenya, practice circumcision for boys and girls and its related ritual ceremonies (Robleh, 1984; Ahlberg, 1991).

Elementary Ḳur'ānic schools (Madrasa)

Somali parents believe the learning of 114 *jus* (verses) of the Ḳur'ān is a duty that every parent must provide for his/her child. This process starts with the early socialization of the child. The Ḳur'ānic school (*madrasa*), known in Somali as *Dugsi*, and is the elementary level of Islamic education which is referred to as "the slate system of education", is non-formal education.[5] It is often organized by one teacher, who most of the time uses his or her verandah to teach or sometimes teaches in the local mosque. According to Mazrui and Wagaw (1985) Muslim communities in Africa safeguarded the continuation of Islamic education. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the establishment of Ḳur'ānic schools is not the responsibility of the government, but it is often organized and financed by local communities. The teacher is a learned and respected person in the community, and he/she has full authority, and is active as a transmitter and conveyor of knowledge, while the pupil is passive.

According to Talbani (1996) the Islamic pedagogy emphasizes authorization and commands, and education is often based on listening and memorization. The material used is the Holy Ḳur'ān, through which the children not only learn how to read and write, but also how to memorize (Galadanci, 1993). The message of the Ḳur'ān has to be apprehended in the original Arabic in which it was revealed, and it is important that the pupils master the Ḳur'ān

[5] Non-formal education is an educational activity that is organized outside the formal system of education (Coombs and Ahmed, 1974).

by heart and pick up the foundations of Arabic morphology, while they are still young (Haneef, 1982; Habte & Wagaw, 1993). Ḳur'ānic education in Somalia has not only created people who can read the Ḳur'ān properly; it has also sustained and preserved the continuity of Islamic tradition. The pupils are taught also the five pillars of Islam and moral advice.

In the Ḳur'ānic schools there are not rigidly codified rules, but there are a few conventional ways of behavior, which guide the pupils and teachers.

They are not structured according to age. Muslims learn the Ḳur'ān at any time in their life, and there is no time limit. Ḳur'ānic schools do not depend on specific administrative and institutional patterns for their operation (Sifuna, 1990; Keynan, 1993).

They are not competitive. No entrance admission and examination are required. The schools put less emphasis on certificates and diplomas but alternatively, Islam uses the mechanism of the *iḏjāza*.[6] The student that obtains the *iḏjāza* has the authorization to teach the Ḳur'ān (Sifuna, 1990).

There are no fixed fees. There is a duty and obligations for every Muslim teacher to pass on his/her learning, which according to Islamic tradition is rewarded by Allah. The fees are paid either in cash or in kind (Sifuna, 1990; Keynan, 1993).

Flexible attendance. The time when the classes begin varies from place to place, and is organized by individual teachers (Sifuna, 1990; Keynan, 1993).

Status of the teachers. Mallims are highly respected people by their society, and are essential and fundamental since they transmit the knowledge of the Ḳur'ān. They are believed to be people of God whose prayers are efficacious (Oseni, 1996).

Homogeneity. The curriculum of Ḳur'ānic schools in Africa is rather homogeneous, while the institutions, the structure and the localization of the schools vary considerably. It is quite evident and pragmatic that Muslim children are inculcated with the Ḳur'ān and the rudiments of their religion (Sifuna, 1990; Daun, 1992).

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[6] A scholarly genealogy which links the student with the line of scholars and teachers to whom he is indebted for his knowledge.

It will be inadequate to discuss Ḳur'ānic education in Somalia without mentioning Sheikh Yussuf Al-Kawneyn. He is one of the most widely remembered saints in Somalia, and he was one of the principal early teachers of Islam, and the inventor of a Somali notation for the Arabic short vowels which helped to facilitate the teaching of Arabic.[7] In other words, he was the one who laid the foundation for the system of learning the Ḳur'ān in Somali language. This model has provided for the Somali children whose language is not Arabic, to grasp the basics of Islam in their own language. The interesting point about Sheikh Yussuf's model is that this method and its conceptions still dominate Ḳur'ānic schools in all the Somali territories (Lewis, 1998).

The model of Yussuf Al-Kawnayn is divided into two stages: in the first stage the pupils learn the Arabic alphabet and the wording in Somali notation, and this system has accelerated and made easier for the Somali children to understand the Arabic words. The second stage is the writing and reading of the chapter of the Ḳur'ān from the end (*sūra* 114) to the beginning (*sūra* al-Fātiha).

Ḳur'ānic schools are sustained by and continue to operate and expand due to the help of the community and parents, who want their children to be educated in the Ḳur'ān. One of the reasons for the endurance and continuation of Ḳur'ānic education is that it was the only education, which was available for many children both in the agrarian and in the nomadic communities. Another reason is that it is an education that exclusively depends on local materials.

Post-elementary schools (Heer Institutions)

The *Heer* institution comprises a mobile student/teacher unit, and sometimes it includes one or more itinerant young students/teachers. As soon as the pupils finish memorization of the 114 verses of the Ḳur'ān, some of them search more knowledge in the field of Islamic education. They establish a journey to search for knowledge early

[7] *Alif* which is surmounted, represents in Somali as *alif la kordhabay*; alif which is undercut, represents as *alif la hoos dhabay*; and *alif* which is hollowed, represents as *alif la goden* (See: Lewis, I. M. (1958) *The Gadabuursi Somali script* BSOAS, 1958, XXI. P. 135).

in their youth. The journey takes them to distant *Heer* centers of learning, in, which recognized Sheikhs reside and teach. These young itinerants have unique inspiration, motivation and encouragement to take very long journeys, sometimes even across the borders of Somalia, and they dedicate a great deal of time and energy in order to achieve Islamic knowledge (Keynan, 1993).

The post-elementary education has a much broader curriculum, comprising a variety of Islamic, theological and legal subjects. This includes '*tafsīr*' which is the interpretation of the Ḳur'ān and the study of literature, the *ḥadīṯ* (The saying of Prophet Muḥammad), and the study of 'figh' (Islamic jurisprudence) and theology *tawḥīd*. All these subjects embrace and occupy the central position in Islamic society and prescribe peoples' status, duties and rights as well as their prospects of eternal reward or punishment (Daun, 1992; Galadanci, 1993).

The students also learn Arabic literature, which includes '*madith*', praises addressed to the Prophet Muḥammad. There is also '*sīra*' literature in prose and verse which contains stories about the life of the Prophet. The goals and aspirations of post-elementary Islamic education are to produce "experts" in Muslim Law, Islamic religion and Arabic language. These experts are considered and regarded to possess perfect knowledge in the domain in which they have specialized (Galadanci, 1993).

Arabic schools

Somalia has always had a very good relation with the Arab World and this has consisted of cultural exchange and trade. This relationship was further enhanced after the arrival of Islam in Somalia. Although Somalis ethnically are not Arabs, most of them identify themselves more with the Arabs than with their fellow Africans (Touval, 1963), "*. . . a topic that remains disputed among many Somali*" (Helander, 1999). During the colonial era the Egyptian government opened doors for many African countries including Somalia and it provided scholarships for higher education, especially in the prestigious and ancient Islamic University, Al-Azha[8] University in Cairo.

[8] This university existed over thousand years. It is well known for the study of Islamic religion and Law. It is still functioning.

Under President Giamal Abdi Nasser, who was a popular leader in Egypt began the center of three circles: '*circles of Islam*', '*circles of the Arab world*' and '*circles of Africa*'. In addition, he had strong pan-Arab, pan-Islam and pan-African aspirations (Mazrui, 1993). Furthermore, the Egyptian government increased its contributions to advance education inside Somalia. They offered two types of formal education. One which was devoted exclusively to Islamic education, and the other was a more secularly oriented education (primary and secondary levels) (Mekki, 1990).

Western System of Education

Colonial Education Policies

In Somalia the Western education began with the colonial administration. The first instructors were mainly the Italians in the South and the British in the North. According to Sifuna (1990) in Africa, the colonials implemented two disparate administrative strategies in the educational domain, and these were known as '*adaptation*' and '*assimilation*'. In the case of Somalia, the Italian colonial administration employed '*direct rule*' and the British employed '*indirect rule*'. British colonial practice accentuated the concept of cultural adaptation. This meant the adjustment of European institutions to local political and social organizations and the creation of a group of educated Somalis, who at the same time would be rooted in their own culture. The Italian colonial strategy was characterized as *assimilation* and endeavored at producing elite Black Italians. The utmost ambition of colonization in assimilationist terms was the political, social and cultural integration of colonial peoples into the Italian nation (Contini, 1969; Goldthorpe, 1985; Samatar, 1988).

Education after Independence

After independence, Somalia had two Western education systems, one introduced by the British in the north, the other by the Italians in the south (Contini, 1969). In the north, the British-based education system consisted of seven years of primary education (3 years of elementary, 4 years of intermediate) and 4 years of secondary schooling, with two languages, Arabic and English used as the medium

of instruction. In the south the Italian-based education consisted of 5–3–4 systems, with Arabic and Italian as the languages of instruction. In 1965, Somali government established same system of education for the whole Republic, which consisted of the 4–4–4 system, and adopted Arabic and English as the languages of instruction and Italian remained as the language of instruction in the private schools and in the university. The new system was completed in 1969 (Goldthorpe, 1985; Keynan, 1993).

The idea of having a written script for the Somali language had been in the minds of the Somalis since the 13th century. But it was only in 1972 that the government at the time (military government) eventually decided that the Somali language[9] would be written in Latin script. Soon after the introduction of the Latin alphabet to the Somali language, the civil servants and students were ordered to master the language in six months, and then it was introduced in the primary and secondary schools as the language of instruction (Touval, 1963; Laitin, 1977; Goldthorpe, 1985; Samatar, 1988).

There was only one university in the whole country, Somali National University and the language of instruction was Italian. It had affiliation with the Italian universities that served both administration and academic consultation. There were other higher institutions like teacher training colleges and administration and management for upgrading the civil servants (Ibid.).

Education after the State Collapse

The collapse of Somali State implied massive human and material destruction. State collapse is distinct from the overthrow of a government and its armed forces by a rebel group, when one government is replaced by another government without any major break of continuity of governance. In Somalia, the overthrow of the military regime in 1991 was quickly followed by deadlocked civil war at the state center, and by the disintegration of the state as well as government institutions (Hill, 1998). The severe dislocation of both the economic and cultural institutions accompanied the collapse of the political order.

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[9] There were three scripts that has been proposed: Arabic, Osmaniya (named after the inventor of the script) and Latin.

Children remain among the chief victims of the continuing violence. Boys as young as 14 or 15 years of age participated in militia groups, and many of them joined the violent and homicidal gangs known as "*Moryan*". Even in areas with relative security, the lack of resources has limited the opportunity for children to attend schools. The damage done to a generation of children deprived of access to formal education is impossible to assess at this point in time. During these periods of crises, Ḳur'ānic schools have operated throughout the country, providing not only educational instruction but also moral, spiritual and psychological support for the children and their families stressed and traumatized by the civil war. With hardly any schools functioning during the 1990s, emergencies (relief) services were offered as a solution.

The Role of International Agencies

In Somalia, non-governmental organizations played decisive roles of governance, and provided some of the elementary functions of governments, such as education and famine relief (Hirst & Thompson, 1996). During the first phase of the emergency the priority of the international agencies was relief operation. The restoration began during the relief phase when the main concern was food, health and shelter, and education for emergencies was also urgently required.

Education in an emergency situation needed to address problems of various kinds: children traumatized by war, women and youth in distress, school infrastructure destroyed, absence of standardized curriculum, lack of trained teachers, and overall underdevelopment. In the emergency situation, principles and policies for education focused on rapid re-establishment of basic education, training of teachers and community participation and ownership sustainability (Devados et al. 1995).

During the relief operations, United Nations responded through UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) to structure the complex emergencies that would operate in the country. To this end, UNESCO PEER (Program for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction) was established in January 1993, and began its first operation in Mogadishu. The Education Development Center (EDC) was set up and brought together a number of Somali educationalists, and the program was expanded to the rest of the country. Another strategy

developed by the UN agencies was to strengthen the Community School Committees (CSCs), which have to bear the responsibility of supporting schools until a ministry of education comes into existence (Brennaars et al., 1996). In this emergency situation, no single UN agency or non-governmental organization was capable alone of assuming responsibility for the task of rehabilitation. Accordingly, an inter-agency approach was required, as it was seen to be the most expedient and logical response in the circumstances.

The Islamic Presence

In this bewildering situation of interclan conflicts, Somalis strongly maintain their Islamic faith as the only hope, and Laitin & Samatar (1987) put it succinctly that "while ethnicity divides the Somalis through binary oppositions of lineage segmentation, Islam unifies the Somalis under the umbrella of nontribal mystical associations" (p. 45).

The Somali proverb "*Marki la yaabo yaasiinka*" means "read the Ḳur'ān especially the 'chapter Yasin' at times of tragedy, despair or bewilderment". The proverb has a metaphorical meaning, which is revivalism or "rebirth of faith". For Somali individuals, Islam is seen as a cohesive and exclusive self-contained system. When the Somali State disintegrated in 1991, Islamic revivalists wanted to re-claim the entire social space and hence intensified Islamic education in the country. However, it is also important to bear in mind these Islamic groups belonged to different schools of thought, and were supported by various Islamic countries.

When the restoration commenced, International Islamic NGOs gave tremendous assistance to Ḳur'ānic schools, including rehabilitation of the schools and teacher remuneration. Table 7.1 shows the Islamic organizations that granted assistance to the Ḳur'ānic schools and the number of schools, teachers and students involved.

Reformed Traditional Islamic Education

Again, after the disintegration of the Somali Central Government, there came into existence a number of Islamic schools. These schools, primary, junior and senior secondary can be found throughout

Table 7.1 Number of Ḳur'ānic schools, teachers and students, aided by Islamic NGOs and foundations

Islamic NGOs and Foundations	Schools	Teachers	Students
Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization (AWO)	3	3	360
Africa Muslims Agency (AMA)	86	86	–
Munazamat Al Dawa Al Islamia (MDI)	5	5	890
Al Eslah Charity Society	33	33	15,478
Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF)	115	115	13,712
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)	172	172	51,600
Muslim Aid (MA)	5	5	–
Muwafaqa Charity Foundation	10	10	–

Source: NGO consortium, individual NGOs concerned (in Keynan, 1993).

Somalia, and they all display certain unique characteristics. There is first of all a pervasive religious climate in these schools, defined in terms of a strongly Islamic-orientated curriculum. Arabic is the chief medium of instruction, with language courses being offered in English and Arabic. Highly qualified and motivated teachers place emphasis on Islamic education. Not surprisingly, these schools have a high enrolment and graduation rate. Unlike traditional Islamic education, *madrasa*, this reformed variety prudently recognizes Western education elements such as the planning, administrative and teaching techniques of which it adopts to chagrin of the traditional *'ulamā'*. See Table 7.2.

The management of these Islamic schools is of special interest. A number of them are directly linked to, and financed by, international donors, the Al-Azhar University (Cairo), the Egyptian government, the government of Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Most Islamic schools charge tuition fees, ranging from 15,000 to 30,000 Somali shillings per month.[10] In this way, teachers and administrators receive monthly salaries on a permanent basis. The combination of a sound financial and educational management with a strong Islamic orientation is a recent phenomenon that deserves serious attention (Brennaars et al., 1996; UIEP, 1999).

[10] http://www.africahome.com/currencyconvert.shtml.

Table 7.2 School enrolment in Somalia by region: primary, junior and senior secondary schools

Regions	Total Enrolment	Male Enrolment	Percent of Male Enrolment	Female Enrolment	Percent of Female Enrolment	No. of Schools
Benadir	15325	10037	65.5%	5288	34.5%	395
Hiran	2347	1678	71.5%	669	28.5%	47
Lower Juba	1555	978	62.9%	577	37.1%	21
Lower Shabelle	1639	1094	66.7%	545	33.2%	47
Middle Shabelle	349	231	66.2%	118	33.8%	6
North West	212	142	67.0%	70	33.0%	7
Bay	234	155	66.2%	79	33.8%	11
Galgaduud	480	345	72.0%	135	28.1%	14
Total	22141	14660	66.2%	7481	33.8%	548

Source: Adapted from United Islamic educational program in Somalia, Mogadishu. 1998–1999.[11]

This new system of Islamic education, on one hand, evolves from the people's way of life and, on the other hand, does not eliminate Islamic education, which is essential for moral, spiritual and cultural guidance, especially when it is reformed in the light of modern life. This new system of Islamisation of knowledge is not something new in the case of Somalia, for it has happened in many places in Africa, for example Sudan and Nigeria (Raji, 1996). Whatever the case may be, if human existence is transformed by forces identified to be modern thought or Western education, the only means of understanding the new existence is through a deep understanding of the universal and dynamic principles of Islam (Ibid.). The stronger role of Islamic education should be understood also against the background of Islamic revival.

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[11] This information was received via telex from local Islamic NGOs that is based in Mogadishu.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

ISLAMIC, SECULAR OR BOTH—THE STRUGGLE OVER EDUCATION IN WEST AFRICA

Holger Daun, Michiyo Kiwako Okuma-Nyström and Abdoulaye Sane

Introduction

In several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a struggle between the secular state and Muslim interests over education. In some cases, this struggle has resulted in conflict and competition between Western primary schools and Islamic schools, while in other cases, compromises have been achieved in that pupils in otherwise public schools are taught some Islamic matters.

This chapter presents a general overview of the development of Islam and its educational institutions in West Africa. More specifically, educational developments in three countries—Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia—are described. These three countries had to a large extent a common history until the colonial period. The same ethnic groups inhabit and the same Islamic brotherhoods are in the majority all three countries. They have, however, experienced three different colonial powers: The Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau, the British in the Gambia and the French in Senegal. The colonial history and the differences in policies formulated and implemented by the independent states have placed the Muslims in somewhat different educational situations. Now they have confronted and confront the same influences of globalization: Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), secularization and privatization as well as increasing Islamic influence via mass media and personal contacts.

The State, the Economy and Islam

At independence, the formation of the state in Africa was conditioned by what Mazrui (1986: 107) calls the triple influences of existing state formations: indigenous, Islamic and Western. However, a

Muslim state has not been established anywhere in Sub-Saharan Africa (if we do not consider the regions in Nigeria where *Sharĭ'a* was introduced as legal system in the 1990s). The states are secular and so are the public schools.

During the first decade of independence for the most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the state was seen as the motor of development; it intervened and made investments primarily in agriculture and industry (Mengisteab, 1995). The state was expanded also as a way for political leaders to maintain the loyalty of their supporters (Bratton and de Walle, 1997). Farmers, who constitute the largest proportion of the population in the region, have been adversely affected by these state interventions and the economic changes. Those who suffered most from state repression or neglect (youths marginalized from production; women; peasants that had been exploited by the state; and Muslims) reacted in ways termed "withdrawal", "revenge", "guerrilla warfare", "economy of affection" by different researchers (Bayart, 1983; Bgoya and Hydén, 1987; Éla, 1990). From the 1970s onwards, the informal sector has been increasingly important for production and employment, due initially to the expansion of an ineffective state and later on to the economic recession, structural adjustment programs and liberalizations. In Hoerner's (1995) view, "the informal" is not just a sector for production but also one of solidarity ties and a culture for surviving the pressures from globalization forces or internal factors such as natural disasters, rapid population growth and war. Apart from the informal sector, the state is still the most important employer, mostly requiring the Western type of education among the employees.

During the colonial period, but also after independence, the three states avoided religious matters in the education systems and a large proportion of the Muslim population was trained exclusively in independent Islamic educational institutions (Coulon, 1983; Nicolas, 1981). Following the colonial states, the independent states were reluctant to challenge the Muslim educational arrangements. The three states have followed different development strategies, but all of them have given priority to the Western type of education.

Due to local variations in their economies and cultures, pre-Islamic learning and Islamic systems have been affected differently from one country to another. Also, most of the former French colonies and the most Islamized countries are situated in the Sahel area, which means that they are comparatively poor. In countries where Islam

is predominant (such as Mali, Mauretania and Senegal), there has always been a struggle between the state and Muslims over the running of the state itself as well as the education system. Islamic subjects have nowhere been allowed to enter the curriculum and Islamic educational arrangements have been supported by the state only in a few cases such as The Gambia and Mali. In some West African countries, compromises between Islam and Westernism have been found in the forms of: Franco-Arabic schools in Senegal, which in principle follow the national curriculum but also teach religious elements; the teaching of Islamic subjects in the otherwise secular public schools, as in The Gambia and Senegal (BREDA, 1995). In Chad, Mali, and Mauritania, for instance, there are two types of Ḳur'ānic schools: one that allows the teaching of non-religious subjects such as natural science, and is thus given government subsidies, and another that is entirely religious (Belloncle, 1984; UNESCO, 1993). In The Gambia, in the last few decades, many Arabic schools have started to adopt English as a foreign language.

During the past two decades, religions of African origin as well as Islam have been revived and reinterpreted (Nyang, 1993; Ranger, 1986). First the extension of the secular state and then the chaotic conditions emerging from economic crisis and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) contributed to

> enfeeblement of secular political structures and a revival of religions and other value systems. . . . The 1980s have also proven to be a breeding ground for the insertion of religious, primarily Islamic, thought patterns into the realm of official African political discourse . . . Recourse to religious or particularistic arguments is another manifestation of the retreat from secularism that has developed this third and latest wave of ideological experimentation (Chazan, 1988: 155).

Moreover, there has always been a section of the population that has rejected all colonialist, Western or "white" projects. For instance, in several West African countries, there are Muslims who see the Western-type school as the "Tubab school", which means "the school of the white man".

Case Countries

The three countries utilized three different development strategies until they implemented Structural Adjustment Programs initiated by

the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank. The three development strategies were: (i) a comparatively low degree of state intervention in the economy and the civil sphere (The Gambia); (ii) a medium degree of intervention (Senegal); and (iii) a high degree of intervention for radical transformation of society (Guinea-Bissau). The first two strategies did not challenge the Islamic educational arrangements, while the third did. However, after the implementation of SAPs, the development strategies in the three countries became more similar than before in that state intervention in the civil sphere became considerably less frequent and religious forces were allowed to act.

In all three countries, the official primary school age range is seven to twelve or thirteen years, but in reality, many children, especially in rural areas, start school much later than stipulated. This is partially because they attend Ḳur'ānic education during a certain period in order to give them immunity against Western ideas before they enter primary education (Daun, 1992, 1998; Okuma-Nyström, 2003).

Table 8.1 Some Characteristics of the Three Countries

	The Gambia	Guinea-Bissau	Senegal
Largest ethnic groups			
Mandinka	42	10	4
Fula	18	20	23
Wolof	16	1	43
Diola	10	4	7
Serer	<1	0	14
Balanta	<1	27	<1
Muslims, percent	85	35	90
Islamic Brotherhoods			
Quadiriyya	An important proportion of adherents	A large proportion of adherents	Some adherents
Tiḏjānīyya	An important proportion of adherents	Some adherents	A large proportion of adherents
Murīdīyya	Few adherents	Very few adherents	An important proportion of adherents

Table 8.1 (*cont.*)

	The Gambia	Guinea-Bissau	Senegal Ḳur'ānic
Islamic education	Ḳur'ānic and Arabic schools, none of which is subsidized by the state	Ḳur'ānic and Arabic schools, none of which is subsidized by the state	Ḳur'ānic and Arabic schools. Franco-Arabic schools that are subsidized by the state
State education religion	Private schools legitimized by the state are subsidized and highly regulated, follow the established national curriculum and are monitored. National curriculum includes Islamic matters. A few Catholic schools accepted. Predominantly Islamic schools not accepted and function outside the state sphere.	Private schools legitimized by the state are subsidized and highly regulated, follow the established national curriculum and are monitored. Religious matters not included in curriculum. A few Catholic-owned schools have been accepted. Islamic schools not accepted and function outside the state sphere.	Private schools legitimized by the state are subsidized and highly regulated, follow the established national curriculum and are monitored. Religious matters not included in curriculum. A few Catholic schools accepted. Islamic schools not accepted and function outside the state sphere. Exceptions are Franco-Arabic schools that teach Islamic matters and Arabic as well as components of the national curriculum.

In several places in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic educational arrangements have adapted to the expansion of Western education (Owen and Wasi, 1987, and chapter 5 in this volume). In the three countries studied here, there are some Ḳur'ānic and post-elementary Islamic schools that compete with primary schools for the same pupils (see combinations 1 and 3 in Table 8.2). Also, a prolongation of schooling has taken place; children first attend Ḳur'ānic education for a couple of years and then primary (and secondary) education or vice versa (William and Amer, 1988). The following combinations of school attendance (parental choice of education for the children) might be found: (a) Western primary and Ḳur'ānic education; (b) Western primary and Arabic education; (c) Arabic and Ḳur'ānic education; and (d) all children in one and the same type of education (Daun, 1992; Okuma-Nyström, 2003).

Table 8.2 Different Types of Islamic Education

	Full time	Part time
Ḳur'ānic	1. Murīd dāra	2. Tiḏjānīyya and Ḳādirīyya dāra (evening courses)
Post-Ḳur'ānic	3. Arabic school (*madrasa*)	4. System of seeking teachers. Some Arabic schools

Type 1 is a day-time Ḳur'ānic school (in Senegal, often a boarding school) and attendance does not allow attendance in primary education. The same applies to Arabic schools (Type 3) (Daun, 2000). However, some Arabic schools have a rather short school-day so children can attend both the primary school and the Arabic school. The system of seeking teachers (see Chapter 1) still exists, but it is not known how widespread it is. The teachers in post-Ḳur'ānic education have completed Ḳur'ānic education themselves and have specialized in some subject(s) on the post-Ḳur'ānic level. Increasingly they have received higher education at a university in North Africa or the Middle East (Ndiaye, 1985; Santerre, 1974).

As mentioned in chapter one, UNESCO organized a conference in Sudan in 1993 in order to find out if and how Islamic educational institutions could be involved in the struggle for education for all (UNESCO, 1993). Since the beginning of the 1990s, Islamic NGOs have received financial support from Unicef for their alternative schools (i.e. Arabic schools) in West Africa (BREDA, 1995; Coloquio Internacional, 1993).

Dāra *and* Madrasa *Education in Senegal*

Senegal, a former French colony in West Africa, has 10 million inhabitants drawn from more than ten ethnic groups. Eighty percent of the population live on activities in the agriculture sector. Peanut production is one of the most important economic activities but since the 1980s, the role of tourism has increased.

The formal political and civic rights and liberties have been extended more in Senegal than in most of the other African countries. The country has had a multi-party system since the middle of the 1970s,

the degree of freedom of speech has been comparatively high and the elections have been relatively fair. In practice, the Socialist Party monopolized the state apparatus until it lost the presidential election in 2000.

Approximately 85–90 percent of the Senegalese are Muslims, 10–15 percent have maintained a religion of African origin and about one percent are Catholics. The Muslims belong to four major brotherhoods: Tiḏjānīyya 60 percent, Ḳādirīyya 30 percent, Murīdīyya 10 percent and Layenne one percent. The Murīdīyya sect originated within the country (among the Wolofs) in the beginning of the 20th century. All sects are characterized by *Marabutism*, which means that there are Muslim leaders (*Marabuts*) at different levels and each of them has a number of *Talibés* (followers). The *Marabuts* control large areas of land where their *Talibés* work for them but they have also made investments in industry, commerce and service during the past decades

The *Marabuts* were linked to the state and the government in a clientelistic structure for a long duration; the government relied upon their consent when important decisions were to be implemented. This structure has weakened over time but the *Marabuts* have generally functioned as a buffer and mediator between the population and the state and they are able to influence the state directly (Boone, 1989; Villalón, 1995). Also, there is a strong link between the *Talibé* and the *Marabut* even when the former migrates to another country. Such networks, at least among the Murīds, have large scale international extension (Ebin, 1993; Grégorie and Labazée, 1993).

During the colonial period, the Catholic and the colonial schools had the same structure and curricula as the French. When Senegal became independent in 1960, the structure of the system was maintained: six years of primary education, four years of lower secondary and four years of upper secondary education. Changes were made mainly to the curriculum and textbooks. Education at all levels is secular. The system is very selective, even at the primary level (Rideout and Bagayoko, 1994), and the rate of repetition of classes is comparatively high (Barrier et al., 1997).

At the end of the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s, after a series of strikes among the teachers, general meetings were organized, and a number of committees were formed for the elaboration of a proposal for a new education system. Two of the principal points presented in a Ministry document were: (i) Introduction of

new subjects such as religious/moral education and the Arabic language; and (ii) National languages instead of French as the languages of instruction (MINED, 1986a; Sylla, 1985). However, none of these themes has been realized.

Between 1968 and 1996, the rate of net enrollment in primary education increased from 31 percent to 51 percent (MINEC, 1997; MINED, 1962). However, in the region of Diourbel, where the centre of the Mouridiyya brotherhood is situated, the enrollment rate has always been the lowest in the country. In 1996 it was 31 percent (15.5 among the girls) (MINED, 1998). The proportion of primary school pupils enrolling in private (Catholic) schools has been around ten percent since independence.

Islamic Education

In all the brotherhoods, there is a hierarchy of Marabuts and those at the intermediate and village levels run Ḳur'ānic or Arabic schools. The ordinary believer has to work for his *Marabut.* In the *Murīd* brotherhood, the work may replace prayer and Ḳur'ānic education as a means to reach paradise in the next life. Some of these schools are boarding schools; the children stay away from home for some years with the Marabut.

The whole country is covered by Ḳur'ānic schools (*dāras*). In the 1970s, it was estimated that 60,000–70,000 children participated in Ḳur'ānic education full-time, while some tens of thousands attended such schools part-time (Mbaye, 1977; MINED, 1982; Ndiaye, 1985). Nowadays, the dāra may vary considerably but can for the present purpose be divided into four different categories: (a) simple Ḳur'ānic schools; (b) boarding schools in which the pupils spend most of their time on farming or commerce; (c) boarding schools which have deteriorated into homes for large groups of begging children; and (d) hyper-modern (Murīd) boarding schools in Dakar. The fourth type of school has introduced computers and IT and the pupils (mostly older than 14–15 years) learn, among other things, how to use the computers and to contact other individuals all over the world.

An expansion of Arabic schools (*écoles arabes* or *Madrasa*) took place in the beginning of the 1970s. The oil-producing Arab countries, among others, started to support such schools in Sub-Saharan Africa, economically and technically in the 1970s. In Arabic schools, the

Table 8.3 Distribution of Time in Two Arabic Schools in Senegal in the Beginning of the 1980s

	School A	School B
	percent	percent
Ḳur'ānic matters	32	20
Islamic matters	22	7
Arabic language	32	53
Other subjects	14	20

Source: Daun, 1992.

pupils should learn the 'theory' of Islam, the Arabic language and some natural science and history in addition to the religious subjects. Table 8.3 shows the distribution of time spent on various categories of subjects in two Arabic schools in Senegal representing two different brotherhoods in the beginning of the 1980s. Education is divided into grades or stages, and the duration of education varies from four years in some schools and six years in others

In response to a demand from the Muslim leaders that Ḳur'ānic schools be supported economically by the government, like the Catholic schools, an investigation was made by the Ministry of Education in 1980. It was concluded that most of the Ḳur'ānic schools did not live up to any of the requirements which the government made. Some years later, the Ministry of Education decided to include Arabic schools in the general educational system only if they had the same structure and the same curriculum in the most important subjects as the public primary/secondary schools, accepted government control and inspection, and had competent teachers and appropriate buildings. These schools would be allowed to teach Islamic matters and Arabic and to use this language as the language of instruction during certain classes per week and be subsidized (MINED, 1981a). Thus, Franco-Arabic schools—a synthesis of Western and Islamic education—were accepted and some of these schools came to receive government subsidies.

Despite the efforts to compromise, there is in many districts and villages some competition between Western and Islamic educational institutions (Types 1 and 3 in Table 8.2 above). However, during the 1990s, Muslim-owned schools (following the government regulations and the national curriculum) have been subsidized in the same way

as Catholic schools. Such schools have been established principally in the regions where the Murīd brotherhood is strong. This fact has contributed to the growing enrollment in these areas. Also, Islamic education has become an object for development assistance from the middle of the 1990s. Students in private Catholic schools are to a large extent Muslims, while students with a Catholic background never attend Islamic schools.

Ḳur'ānic and Arabic Education in Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau borders Senegal in the North. After more than ten years of armed struggle against the Portuguese, the country became independent in 1974. Today, the country has about one million inhabitants. Agriculture is the predominant activity, from which about 90 percent of the population subsist. Apart from rice, the principal crop for local consumption, millet and cassava are also important, while peanuts are produced for export. Most of the manufactured goods have to be imported, since industrial production is negligible. With the economic liberalization, harvesting cashew nuts (mainly from wild trees) has become one of the most important economic activities.

Although a small country, Guinea-Bissau is characterized by important cultural and economic differences. The population is divided into more than ten ethnic groups; the largest being the Balanta (27 percent), Fula (20), Mandinka (10), Manjaco (8), and Mancanya (7). The Fula and Mandinka are Muslims. Each ethnic group has its own language, but through the liberation struggle, and later through the system of transferring teachers from one area to another, Creole has become a lingua franca, understood by about 70 percent of the population. In the western areas of the country, there are mainly rice cultivators and people who confess to African religions or Christianity. In the eastern areas of the country, the majority are Muslim Fula or Mandinka. In all, about 60 percent of the population are adherents to African religions, 35 percent are Muslims and five percent are Catholics (Guinea-Bissau Ministry of Planning, 1991).

After independence, the party having led the armed liberation struggle took control of the state and attempted to penetrate all aspects of the economic and civil spheres of society (Lopes, 1982). The principal goal was to create a new and socialist society and a

new man. The party decided upon a strategy of complete transformation of the Guinean society in order to eradicate poverty, bad health conditions, colonial ways of thought and so on. This would require radical changes of people's lives. Although the constitution declared freedom of religion, the New Man (as described in the political documents) was not supposed to have strong religious beliefs (Cabral, 1970; Chabal, 1986; Lopes, 1988). In this strategy of transformation, the education system was perhaps the most important instrument (Lopes, 1982). Education was given the somewhat contradictory role to: (i) preserve and revitalize local cultures; (ii) create a national culture, and (iii) contribute to the radical change of the society (Cabral, 1974, 1976; MINED, 1977).

A coup d'état was conducted by the military in 1980 but the development strategy was not changed in practice. After a period of economic stagnation and declining state capability and legitimacy, a structural adjustment program, similar to those implemented in many other countries, was introduced in 1987. It implied, for instance, liberalisation of the economy, privatization of state enterprises and shrinking of the state (Aguilar and Stenman, 1996; Aguilar and Zejan, 1992; Cardoso and Imbali, 1993). One of the first and most visible results was an increase in the number of small businessmen conducting street and local market business and diversification of products for sale. There was also more flexibility in choice of crops and fluctuations in prices of, for instance, agricultural products.

When the World Bank intervened, primary education became more oriented towards meeting the (economic, social and so on) needs of the country (MINED, 1987). A more instrumental type of knowledge was defined in the documents; education was given more of a "technologist" and "instrumental" role than a "moral/political" and "expressive" role (MINED, 1981b, 1986b, 1987). The content of education became more linked to economic and technical items than to nation building and education of citizens. (For a discussion of the terms used here, see Carnoy, 1990). The overtly hegemonic and monolithic type of curriculum was changed. Private primary education had existed secretly (as private tuition) for some years, but a legal change provided such schools with legitimacy. More private (Catholic) primary schools were established in the capital.

Islamic education is of two principal types: (1) the Ḳurʾānic schools, and (2) the Arabic schools (*Madrasa*). The former have a long tradition in the eastern areas of Guinea-Bissau. In general, there are no special

institutions for Ḳur'ānic teaching but classes are held in the teacher's yard. Since the Ḳur'ānic schools generally have evening courses, it is possible for pupils to attend a primary school as well as a Ḳur'ānic school. It was estimated in 1979, that around 16,000 children attended Ḳur'ānic schools (World Bank, 1988). At the same time, primary schools had some 65,000 students.

It is evident that Islamic education has been revived. The expansion of Islamic education was initiated and supported morally and economically by the Arab countries through The Islamic Organisation for Education, Science and Culture (ISESCO, 1985). The description of Islamic education in Senegal applies also to Guinea-Bissau (structure, type of schools, grades, curricula, etc.) (Barbosa de Oliveira et al., 1994; Embalo, Bandjai and Canne, 1993). Although some Arabic schools charge school fees, their number and the number of pupils have increased rapidly since the beginning of the 1990s. The academic year is more or less similar to the one of the primary school. Education takes place during day-time. Several Islamic associations exist in the country and the number of students enrolled in the schools organized by the three largest ones amounted to 4,800 in 1990/91 and to more than 11,200 in 1992/93 (Estimated on the basis of Coloquio Internacional, 1993).

With the introduction of political pluralism and economic liberalization, the Arabic associations demanded the same rights as the Catholic Church to get state subsidies for their schools. However, since they did not agree to follow the national curriculum and accept the control from the Ministry, none of them has been defined as eligible for subsidies. With the structural adjustment and liberalization, the possibility for self-employment in trade, artisanship, and so on, has increased; boys and girls can generate their own jobs as traders in the local market or as domestic servants from the age of eleven or twelve years, jobs that do not require years of Western schooling (Daun and Sane, 2002).

Dāra *and* Madrasa *Education in The Gambia*

The Gambia is completely surrounded by Senegal save for the short Atlantic coast. The population is approximately one million. Local languages, French and Arabic are in use but English is the official language. Approximately 85 percent of the population are Muslims.

Among the remainder, eight percent are Christians (mainly in the capital city of Banjul) and there are a few who have maintained their religions of African origin (Europe Publications, 1999; McPherson and Radelet, 1995a). Despite its small size, The Gambia is a heterogeneous country, economically, culturally and politically.

There are five major ethnic groups: the Mandinka (42 percent), the Fula (18 percent), the Wolof (16 percent), the Jola (ten percent), and the Serahuli (nine percent), and they have own distinct languages (The Gambia, 2001). The Jola have not been Islamized to the same degree as others, and some practice religions of African origin. Intermarriage between different ethnic groups is widely practised, and the relationship between Muslims and Christians is not exclusive.

At independence, The Gambia was one of the few democratic countries in Africa, having a multi-party political system (McPherson and Radelet, 1995a) despite the fact that, in practice, the largest political party remained in power from independence in 1965 to 1994. After the coup d'état in 1994, the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) was established to work during the transition period prior to the establishment of the Second Republic. A democratic presidential election was held in 1996, and the new constitution for the Second Republic was approved in a national referendum in the same year (The Gambia, 2001).

The country's economy depends heavily on agriculture including small-scale farming, peanut production, livestock, forestry, and fishing (McPherson and Radelet, 1995a). The predominant cash crop is the peanut. While this production has been a male responsibility, the production of rice, the main traditional subsistence crop, has been a female responsibility (Quinn, 1972). Today, although the country produces less than one percent of the world's exported peanuts, the national significance of this production is great. Peanut production, processing, and trade account for 15 percent of GDP, and peanut-processing is the major industry (Europe Publications Limited, 1999; McPherson and Radelet, 1995a).

Apart from the peanut production, trade has been a major economic activity. The country imports "about half of its food supplies, all of its fuel, and most of its capital and manufactured goods" (McPherson and Radelet, 1995a, p. 8). Manufacturing is limited, and accounts for six percent of GDP, of which about half is peanut processing, while the tourist industry represents an important economic activity

(Europe Publications Limited, 1999). After the late 1970s, sub-Saharan African countries experienced deteriorating economies, and The Gambia was not an exception. In 1985, an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) was implemented.

Western and Islamic Education

The Western type of education was introduced in The Gambia in the nineteenth century by Christian missionaries. However, this introduction met strong resistance from Muslims, who regarded these schools as a tool for conversion of their children to Christianity (Clarke, 1986). In the rural area where the population was exclusively Muslim, the British could hardly establish schools. In 1938, only 0.5 percent of children in the British protectorate (today's rural areas) attended primary schools. On the other hand, the enrollment rate in Bathurst (presently Banjul, the capital) was 83 percent (Crowder, 1976).

Today, primary education consists of six years and is free but not compulsory. However, as UNESCO (1998) states, "[d]eveloping countries frequently impose de facto tuition charges in the form of fees for registration, examinations and other services. In many cases these 'user fees' total many times the amount the government's expenditure per pupil" (p. 31). The Gambia is not an exception. Post-primary education consists of three years of the junior secondary school and another three years of the senior secondary school respectively (DOSE, 1997). Students who completed grade six can automatically continue to the junior secondary school today. However, at the junior secondary school as well as the senior secondary school, school fees and other costs are to be paid by the parents or guardians.

There are both public and private schools. Public schools are run by the state, while private schools are often run either by Christian organizations, Islamic organizations or individuals. However, religious background of the students is not necessarily restricted to the religion of the running organization. For instance, the majority of the students in Catholic schools are Muslims. In 1977, religious education was introduced into all levels of public education. According to the national curriculum, schools must have teachers of religious education both for Muslims and Christians.

If a school has a mixed population of Muslims and Christians, which often is the case in the greater Banjul area, the school has to

Table 8.4 Types of Schools and Systems in The Gambia

Type	Original Founder	Curriculum	Teacher Recruitment	Teacher Salaries
Public	Government	National	Government	Government
	Christian or Islamic Organizations (taken over by the government)	National	In principle: Government	Government
Private	Catholic Missionary	National	Catholic missionary	Government
	Individuals	National	Individual schools	School fees

Source: Okuma-Nyström, 2003.

provide religious teachers for both religions. Both public and private schools follow the same national curriculum, and the salary for private school teachers is paid by the central state. (Table 8.4 summarises different types of schools).

In the nineteenth century, most of the people in what is today's The Gambia converted to Islam, and since that time, there has been strong Islamic-Arabic educational tradition in the country (Crowder, 1976). In the rural areas, the majority of children attend schools called "dāra" (Ḳurʾānic school) or "*madrasa*" (Arabic school) (Central Statistics Department, 1995a). As the Central Statistics Department (1995b) states, "The increasing development of Islamic education as an alternative to the formal Western type of education in The Gambia has been realised in recent times" (p. 47).

The *madrasa* has often been developed from dāra by villagers with the support from Islamic organizations, such as the Gambia Islamic Union, the Gambia Islamic Solidarity, the African Muslim Agency, and Munazamt Al Dawa Al Islamia (MADI: Islamic Call Organization).[1] Teachers at the *madrasa* primary level must have at least nine grades of *madrasa* education, and at the *madrasa* secondary level, at least twelve grades of *madrasa* education, although this is not always the case in reality. English teachers must have graduated from a

[1] This information was obtained from an interview with a *madrasa* headmaster during the field study conducted by Michiyo Kiwako Okuma-Nyström in 2001.

Western-type school. There is no post-secondary Islamic institution in The Gambia. Those who wish to pursue further studies must seek opportunities in other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The students follow different alternatives: (a) only the *madrasa*, (b) the Western-type school and the *madrasa*, (c) the Western-type school and the dāra, or (d) the *madrasa* and the dāra.[2] Table 8.5 shows the gross enrollment rates in primary *madrasa* in The Gambia, by sex and region.

Why do parents choose as they do? Data does not allow for a full explanation, but two factors indicate that the principal guide lines are (a) the costs, and (b) the priority given to moral training. One indication of the costs is the amount of fees paid in different schools. Appendix 7.1 shows the average amount paid per student in the last grade of primary Western education and in the last grade of the elementary *madrasa*. The fees are much higher in the former schools than in the latter. The differences are largest when it comes to school lunches/pocket money, transport and private tuition. In 1995, the fees in primary education were almost double of those in the madrasa. As to the moral issue, according to a study conducted by Central Statistics Department in The Gambia, 96 percent of parents mentioned religious and moral instruction in *madrasa* as the reason for enrolling children. "In their view, formal Western education serves a worldly function which is inadequate to secure one's place in the hereafter" (Central Statistics Department, 1995b, p. 49)

Table 8.5 Gross Primary *Madrasa* Enrollment Rates by Sex and Division (percent)

	Banjul and Kombo St. Mary	Western Division	North Bank Division	Lower River Division	Central River Division	Upper River Division
Female	13	19	20	11	6	3
Male	14	25	25	14	9	7
Both Sex	13	22	22	12	7	5

Source: Adopted from the Central Statistics Department, 1995b, p. 49.

[2] The latter two combinations were observed in the case in this study. In one village, there were students who attended all three types of school.

Conclusions

Muslim parents in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to demand Islamic moral training for their children. In countries where Islam is strong, Muslims make efforts to maintain their life-style and deeper values, sometimes in confrontation with the secular state (Lubeck, 1985; Nyang, 1993; Stewart, 1985). Muslim educational arrangements are a substitute for or a complement to primary schools. It is evident that for Muslims in West Africa, education is not merely an economic matter and should be seen from a holistic perspective, i.e., the whole life situation of the child should be considered. This is made evident by the fact that parents in certain Islamized areas are prepared to pay school fees to Arabic schools, fees that sometimes are higher than the costs related to schooling in the public system. Liberalization and privatization of the state, the economy and the civil sphere have made it possible for local Muslims (with international connections) to occupy educational space left when the state is withdrawing.

Studies of parental strategies of education show that there are at least three different categories of Muslim parents. One category of parents does not enroll a single child (at least not a girl) in the public primary school; the Ḳur'ānic education is perceived to be sufficient. The first strategy implies a defense against "Westernization". Another category of parents enroll children who have already spent some years in Ḳur'ānic education; these children are, consequently, above the officially stipulated age when they enter the first grade. A third category enroll some children and expect them to complete at least lower primary education. The second strategy seems to be an effort to make the children immune against this Westernization but at the same time to reap some of its blessings.

Some Muslim parents seem to distinguish "Westernization" from "modernization". They are positive towards the latter and if it is assured through schooling of the children, then they are prepared to accept some of the former. If schooling is perceived to contribute neither to the relevant cultural reproduction nor to "social mobilitity into modernity", the fathers do not enroll their children. Another point is the fact that Ḳur'ānic education is defended by local powers. Local Muslim leaders need the labour provided by the pupils in the Ḳur'ānic schools for maintaining their position in the local community.

The effects of globalization processes are most evident in the declining terms of trade, which worsen the economic situation of the

parents and in the dissemination of the Western life style as well as the increasing Islamic influence.

Appendix 8.1 Average Expenditure Per Pupil in the Last Grade of Primary Education and In the Final Grade of the Madrasa, dalasi

	Registr.	Parent Ass.	Clothes	Books	Supplies	Transport	Lunch/ pocket	Exam.	Private tuition	Other	Total
Primary	39	7	66	45	6	26	159	4	38	9	399
Madrasa	67	3	29	19	3	9	76	2	1	2	211

Source: Adopted from the Central Statistics Department, 1995b, p. 36 and p. 51.

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CHAPTER NINE

EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES AMONG SOME MUSLIM GROUPS IN SWEDEN

Holger Daun, Åsa Brattlund and Salada Robleh

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of immigration policies in Sweden and briefly presents the reforms that have facilitated the conditions for Muslim schools to emerge. Findings are given from one case study conducted in Muslim schools approved by the government and another case study in a Somali community in the Stockholm area in Sweden. In the second case study parents were interviewed about Islamic identity as well as other relevant themes.

In the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden radically changed its policy in relation to private schools—from a situation of strong regulation and control, low subsidies and less than one percent of primary school pupils in private education—to more favourable conditions of deregulation and large subsidies for private education. These reforms were precisely of the type suggested in the globalized world models: privatization and response to multi-cultural interests.

In 2001, some twelve of the private schools in Sweden were Muslim schools. Prior to the 1990s, the regulations did not leave much space for school choice or the establishment of private schools. Such schools received very low subsidies. Now, the municipalities must guarantee that the national goals are achieved by all schools, i.e. that a certain level educational quality is maintained. They must also subsidize private schools at the same level as public schools.

For a long time, Sweden was known for its "Third Way" in political economy, the long term Social Democratic (SD) rule and educational policies including comprehensive school where an equivalent education (regardless of socioeconomic, geographical and ethnic background) was given priority. The existence of private schools and subsidies for such schools have always been a source of political conflict. According to the leftist parties, the role of the private schools was to serve as a model for the improvement of public schools, and not

just for improvement for single pupils and their parents (SOU, 1981). Other parties saw private schools as a legitimate option in freedom of choice.

Background

Sweden has experienced different phases of migration. Before 1960, very few people immigrated into the country and there was a net outflow. With the economic boom during the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, there was a strong need for labour power; Swedish companies and authorities recruited people directly from abroad, especially the other Nordic countries and southern Europe. After the 1970s, a large proportion of the immigrants have been refugees. There were few Muslim immigrants before the 1980s but thereafter, Muslim refugees have come in large numbers from North Africa, Iraq, Iran, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia.

In the 1970s, an explicit immigration policy was formulated for the first time (Widgren, 1980). Immigrants should be integrated in economic and labour market but have freedom of choice as to culture, life style and language, without needing to violate their cultural and ethnic identity. At the same time, it was decided that immigrant children should, if they so wished, be given classes in their home language/mother tongue and Swedish as the second language. Three principal policy goals are:

Equality. ("Full equality between immigrants and Swedes"). The essence of equality is that immigrants holding permanent residence permits are to enjoy the same basic social, educational and economic rights as Swedish citizens.

Freedom of choice. ("Freedom of cultural choice for immigrants"). This implies that individual migrants are not required to assimilate into a Swedish cultural identity but are permitted to maintain their own cultural identity. A program for the mother tongue is organized.

Partnership. ("Co-operation and solidarity between the Swedish majority and the ethnic minorities"). This means support to immigrant organizations, and, more radically, the right for non-Swedish citizens to vote for local government. Sweden has encouraged permanent residents to apply for Swedish citizenship (Graham, 1999; Nielsen, 1992; Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 1997).

The government stresses integration but not assimilation because the Swedish society is considered a multicultural society in which no one form of culture, faith or ideology may be dominant over any others. The principle of equal treatment, which strengthens the recognition of a multicultural society, has been enshrined in the Swedish integration policy since 1975 (Nielsen, 1992). Integration is frequently described in terms of continuity versus change, continuity being synonymous with socio-cultural retention and change with integration (Utteh, 1997). For example, the government provides funds to immigrant associations, and also supports both the press and broadcasting in minority languages (Nielsen, 1992).

Despite extensive immigration during the 1960s and 1970s, Swedish culture is comparatively homogeneous. In the middle of the 1990s approximately ten percent of the population were immigrants or children of immigrants. The municipalities vary in the percentage of immigrant residents, from zero in many rural municipalities to twenty in the Stockholm area. A high percentage of immigrants in a particular area tends to be associated with high levels of unemployment (thus less collective taxpaying power) and additional educational expenses for the instruction of home language and Swedish as a Second Language courses.

Today, 300,000 people in Sweden are defined as Muslims (either immigrants from Muslim countries or children of such immigrants). 100,000 of them are considered religious believers (Brattlund, 2001). For them, Sweden is a very secularized country and Swedish schools are perceived to be not teaching morals. Full time Muslim schools or Ḳurʾānic education (as a complement) during leisure time are seen as means in the struggle for the maintenance of the Muslim life-style.

Some important changes affecting the potential for choice among Muslim parents and children were implemented between mid-1980s and mid-1990s and may be summarized as: (i) decentralization; (ii) introduction of choice; (iii) stimulation of private education; (iv) new curricula; and (v) a new type of national evaluation. Decentralization started in the 1980s, when the schools were "municipalized". However, in the beginning of the 1990s, the Social Democratic party still argued that a common (public) school for everybody was the best way for children to learn multiculturalism, democracy, tolerance, and so on (Motion 1991/92: Ub62). According to the SDs, freedom of choice should not be a goal replacing the educational goals expressed in the national curriculum (ibid.).

The subsidies to private schools have been changed several times since the beginning of the 1990s, but from 1997, these subsidies have been determined by the municipalities themselves on the basis of common needs among all the schools and pupils in each municipality.[1] Establishment of new private schools should not imply "essential organizational or economic difficulties for education" (in the municipality) (Education Act, Chapter 9, SFS, 1997) and that the school does not levy fees for pupils for whom the school receives support. The municipality allocates subsidies to public and private schools according to the needs: ". . . subsidies to private school should be determined in regard to the school's responsibility and needs of the pupils and according to the same principles as for public schools" (Skolverket, 1998, p. 6).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, school choice includes public as well as private schools. However, Sweden is a sparsely populated country; the distance between the schools is large so the possibility of actually exercising the right to choose a school other than the closest one to home is unrealistic except in the cities (Skolverket, 1998).

As far as the curricula are concerned, the first curriculum of the comprehensive school (1962) had been modified in 1969 and 1980. Training for citizenship role, democracy and equivalency had become important themes (Lgr 1962; Lgr 1969; Lgr 1980; Lundgren, Svingby and Wallin, 1981). These themes ranked lower in the 1994 curriculum (Lpo 94). In the 1994 national curriculum for primary as well as upper secondary education, the basic principle that "everybody should have access to an equivalent education, regardless of their sex, ethnic or social background, or place of residence" (SMES, 1997:7) was still more emphasized. In addition to this, the curriculum indicates the broad areas to be covered and the minimum and maximum time to be spent on each area. Each subject is described in rather broad terms as to what goals to achieve (SFS, 1994), and the curriculum leaves room for local adaption and for some indi-

[1] Among the conditions for being approved as an private primary school in Sweden are that the school is open to everyone, with exception of pupils who *would entail significant organisational or economic difficulties for the school.* (Chapter 9 Section 2 of the Education Act SFS, 1985:1100, 1996:1044) and that the school complies with all the rules for education, for admission, and leadership of the school enacted by the government (Chapter 1 Section 6 of the Ordinance on private schools).

vidual options for the pupils. The pupils are required to earn at least the passing grade in each of the eight core subjects. Religion is taught as a general subject presenting all world religions. The pupils are not taught *in* a specific religion but taught *about* different religions.

At the central state level, the National Agency for Education is monitoring the achievement of the national goals as stated in the latest curriculum, and assessing the pupils' achievement in grades 5 and 9 through national tests.

Private Education and Choice in Sweden

Private schools are obligated to follow the national curriculum and the various regulations and laws. This means, for instance, that a private school has to accept all applicants regardless of their background or abilities: private schools "must, in the same way as municipal schools, be based on a democratic foundation and characterized by democratic values, openness, tolerance, objectivity and versatility" (SMES, 1997:12). Before formally establishing a private school, approval must be granted by the National Agency of Education.

All private schools are under state supervision while the municipality in which the school is situated has the right of access to information on the school's operations. It is stipulated that private schools must conform to the value premises and the general goals which apply for primary schools within the public municipal school system. Private primary schools with Muslim profiles must not have a content which deviates from the value premises of Swedish society.[2]

The percentage of compulsory school pupils at private schools has increased from a little more than one percent in 1991 to nearly four percent in 2001, with large variations between the municipalities (from 0 in some municipalities to 11–12 percent in others). As for the upper secondary schools, there has been a national increase from less than two percent to more than three percent (with a variation from zero to 23 percent in some municipalities). In some urban

[2] However, in the spring of 2003, two Muslims school were presented in a critical television program and it was said that the pupils were taught in Islamic matters and that they used corporal punishment. This made the National Agency for Education start an investigation of these schools.

municipalities, such as Stockholm, more then ten percent of the pupils attend private school and the percentage has continuously increased since 1991. One-quarter of all private schools are located in the Greater Stockholm (Skolverket, 1999b).

There are large variations not only between the private and public sectors but also within the private sector. Differences in cost per pupil are enormous among the schools in the private sector (Skolverket, 1996b, 1997b, 1998, 1999a). For instance, expenditures, especially those for teaching, vary much more in the private sector than in the public sector. Private schools are on the average considerably smaller than public sector schools (Skolverket, 1996c, 1999a). These schools should employ teachers with pedagogical training but it is difficult for the National Agency to assess beforehand that this really happens. In 1998, for instance, 57 percent of teachers at private schools and 85 percent at the public schools fulfilled the national training requirements (Skolverket, 1999c).

As to ownership, most schools belong to non-profit organizations (Skolverket, 1999b). With regard to profiles, most of the private schools have a particular pedagogical profile, a general educational philosophy or a religious/ethnic foundation. In January 2001, out of the total number of approved primary schools, 75 had a confessional orientation. Of these 59 had a Christian profile, eight had an Islamic or Muslim profile, two a Jewish profile and one a Hindu profile. Some other schools had officially an ethnic/linguistic profile but had been chosen by parents because of its perceived Muslim profile. All private schools with an explicit or implicit Muslim profile were operated chiefly as foundations, corporations, or associations.

In 1997, the National Agency for Education made an evaluation of the denominational/ethnic schools and found that they were most commonly chosen by parents with low formal education as a means to maintain their home culture and religion. One of the conclusions drawn by the evaluator was that self-segregation of this nature contributed to more overall segregation in society (Skolverket, 1997a).

On average, performance has always been higher at the private schools but the variation is larger within the private sector than between the sectors. On the one hand, there are private elite schools run by companies and on the other hand, small low performing schools run by immigrants. The state policy in relation to non-profit and for-profit schools has varied, but during the last years, schools charging high school fees have been treated like other independent

schools with the exception that they have not been eligible for state subsidies.

The reasons parents give for choosing a specific private school are the same reasons they give for choosing among public schools (Skolverket, 1996a). In urban areas, private schools are chosen predominantly by pupils of Nordic origin and whose parents have higher levels of education. Among those choosing a Muslim school, reasons frequently mentioned are that the parents felt that their children were bullied or marginalized, and that racist attitudes were common, in the public schools.

As far as it has been possible to confirm, only two of the private schools have been closed on the initiative from the National Agency. Both of them were Muslim schools that were closed in mid-1990s due to economic and administrative mismanagement. However, one of them was re-opened under the ownership of another Muslim association (Brattlund, forthcoming).

At the upper secondary level (gymnasium), the schools are distributed geographically similar to that of the private comprehensive schools.

Muslim Schools in Sweden

Primary Schools with a Muslim Profile

The first private primary school started by Muslims in Sweden was established in 1993. The resistance from municipality authorities and politicians which Muslims have experienced when they have applied for licences to start private primary schools with a Muslim profile, has often reflected the fear that these schools would increase segregation in society. In addition, some of the politicians who otherwise actively promote the positive aspects of private schools sometimes express uncertainty when it comes to confessional schools and Muslim schools in particular.

Opponents of the private primary schools with a Muslim profile tend to argue that the municipal school is the meeting place where pupils of different religions and cultures learn to respect one another and "Swedish culture" and "Swedish values." But the Muslims included in this study had a different experience of the public schools. Their impression of the public primary school was that they were completely

exposed to the values of the majority culture and that the public school very seldom took into consideration the views of the minority cultures on various questions.

In terms of total numbers, only a small segment of Muslim children in Sweden attend a school with a Muslim profile. Most of these children attend public schools or other private schools. Some Muslim parents, children and the Muslim staff came to Sweden as refugees. These are children and adults who have themselves experienced war and been exposed to various types of violence and repression. Those parents have in the first instance endeavoured to create a feeling of security for their children. Some of the children attend the public schools during the initial period in Sweden while others start directly at a private school. They have their roots in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Bosnia. Consequently, they represent different directions and branches of Islam.

For some of the pupils, the private schools were their first encounter with Sweden, Swedes, the Swedish language, and the values and the premises which are formulated in the Swedish national curriculum. Pupils in such schools are instructed by teachers with Swedish teacher training as well as teachers with foreign teacher training, Muslims and non-Muslims. Teachers and other staff have their roots in Sweden or other Nordic countries and also in various countries in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.

The following section is based upon preliminary results from field studies at two private primary schools with Muslim profiles, schools A and B and from experiences derived from the training and supervision of principals, teachers, and other staff at five private primary schools with Muslim profiles (among them schools A and B), from 1997 to 2003.[3]

School A started operations in the autumn term 1996. In the spring term of 1998 it had 84 pupils in grades 1–6. The school is operated by a foundation and is situated in a larger city in an area which does not have a large percentage of immigrants. The school's principal is a Muslim and is one of the persons who took the ini-

[3] The field studies are included in a prospective PhD dissertation Åsa Brattlund, *The State and Islamic Primary Schools in Europe. Case Studies in Sweden and England*. Stockholm: Institute of International Education.

tiative to start the school. All of the students, except one, are Muslims (when the field work was conducted in 1998/99). The students are from various parts of the city and, therefore, travel on the school's own bus or via the public transportation system to school. The school staff consists of Muslims and non-Muslims.

School B started in the autumn term of 1993. Five years later, the school had 120 students in grades 1–9. The school is located in the suburb of a major metropolis in an area also not very densely populated by immigrants. The school principal is Muslim, while the Director of studies is a non-Muslim. The school is run as a corporation. The students come from all over the metropolitan area. The staff consists of Muslims and non-Muslims. Parents and children in schools A and B had chosen these schools primarily for the security offered by the Muslim profile. They did this despite the fact that one of these schools, school B, marketed itself as a school with language/cultural profile and not with a confessional profile.

Primary schools in Sweden with a Muslim profile have recruited many non-Muslim teachers due to the requirement of the Education Act that schools have to secure competent teachers and because the schools themselves put demands on the high quality of their education. The result has been that the schools have become a cultural meeting place for teachers from various different religious and cultural and language backgrounds. The staff at the two schools, A and B, represent fourteen different languages, among them Arabic and Somali. A strong common incentive among the Muslim and non Muslim staff is the improvement of the Swedish language skills of the students and to help them to achieve better grades. This means giving them a good foundation for continued studies in the seventh grade or in the various programmes in upper secondary education.

Some of the Muslim parents whose children previously attended a Swedish municipal school said that they felt more secure when they subsequently sent their children to a school with a Muslim profile. They felt secure because the children would not be subjected to bullying, or be confronted by teachers who acted negatively to Muslims, or teachers who were striving for cultural "eradication" of the student's cultural heritage.

In the private school, parents have also experienced greater participation in the child's education and they feel that they have been treated with greater respect by the school management and staff compared to the case when their children attended a municipal

school. Some parents are of the opinion that it is easier for them to present their viewpoints and to put demands on a school if it has a Muslim profile. Another reason for parents and children to chose such a school was the desire to make it possible for the children to learn more about Islam and to become Swedish Muslims. The choice of a school with a Muslim profile was also due to parents' desire to save their children from what they felt was bullying, negative stereotypes and racist attitudes that they had encountered in the public school. That negative experience of the public primary school was also reported by female Muslim teachers with previous teaching experience in public schools. They also reported that they had been bullied and harassed by their non Muslim colleagues.

The principal at School A (himself a Muslim) mentioned that basically there were two groups of parents who had chosen to send their children to the school with a Muslim profile. These were (i) the conscienscious parents who wanted to give their children stronger roots, a stronger foundation to stand upon and (ii) the parents who have transferred their children from the public school in the belief that they could *protect the child . . . from this social system* (the Swedish), *its laws and rules and social mores* (AR: 1).[4]

According to the principal, the latter group have problems of various kinds. They have two basic goals; to amass as much money as possible and move away from Sweden, and *to exploit this society as much as possible* (AR: 1). These parents who are totally occupied with their own problems neglect their children and view the school with a Muslim profile as the answer to their problem. *Someone else will have to do what we, as parents have not been able to manage* (AR: 1). These parents placed their children in the separate school in the belief that the school would completely assume responsibility for the children. In general, such children do not fare well—*they are boisterous and violent, an expression of a cry for help* (AR: 1). The school does not accept these parental ideas. Some of the parents have not understood that a Muslim separate school functions in a way similar to that of the public school. *"Therefore, many find it shocking when I as principal contact the social authorities"* (AR: 1).

The Muslim profile schools at the primary level do not recruit students by being value neutral. Rather, they have been chosen just

[4] AR: 1 Interview, May 1998, at School A, Principal 1.

because they are perceived by parents and students to be private schools with a Muslim profile. For most of those schools, therefore, the recruitment strategy has been to strive to be as clear and frank as possible in stressing their Muslim profile. Even if the schools are open to all and some schools have made an effort to recruit other groups of students, they succeed to recruit mainly Muslim children. The principal of school B said that the best school for Muslim children is the school that meets their needs in the best manner. In the public schools Swedish children are favored (BR: 1).[5]

Most of the Muslim parents engaged in choosing school for their children are active parents. They visit the school, they are interested and make questions to both the staff and students and they are attentive to the atmosphere in the school. They also want to have information about the student body of the school. What is stated in the school's local school charter is important when the parents make initial contact with the school but then other factors play into their choice. These factors include the quality of the school (which is often judged on the basis of other parents' opinion), whether the school has a positive reputation, whether the parents have confidence in the owner of the school and the school management, and what students are enrolled at the school.

In school B, there was a concern that the school would be viewed in the community as a primary school with a Muslim profile. This anxiety contributed to the fact that the same school had difficulty in elucidating, discussing and resolving conflicts that arose at the school. On the one hand, the school leader wanted to present the school as a cultural meeting place and not as a school with a Muslim profile. On the other hand, parents and children had chosen this school basically for four important reasons (a) the school's unexpressed but perceived Muslim profile, (b) the school is owned by a Muslim who at the same time is chairman and principal of the school, (c) the school has Muslim teachers, and (d) all the students are Muslim. The school had attempted without success to attract children with other backgrounds, Muslim and non-Muslim.

The Muslim parental groups at schools A and B are not homogenous groups. On the contrary, the parents come from many different countries and cultures. There are parents among them who are

[5] BR: 1 Interview, September 1998, at School B, Principal 1.

illiterate and others who have a qualified university education. There are parents who have lived in Sweden for only some weeks and other parents who have lived most of their lives in the country.

As the number of schools with a Muslim profile has increased, the competition between the schools to attract students has also increased. Some of the schools with a Muslim profile have participated in various quality enhancement projects and have arranged continuing education for the staff as a means to maintain a high level of quality in education and to continue to be an attractive school option for the future.

Islam, the Somali Community and Ḳur'ānic education in Sweden

To what extent does Islamic revival take place among the Somalis in Sweden? Is it a reflection of what is happening in Somalia, a reflection of the erosion of their Islamic culture by the Swedish culture or both? Do these factors affect their educational strategies? These questions cannot be answered here but they have guided the fieldwork among Somali immigrants in the Stockholm area. Immigrant groups such as the Somali create community centers with the support from the central state and the municipalities. Issues of concern are Islamic education that is offered within the community centers, and integration, both external and internal. Tibi (1995) comments that there is a general tendency by Islamic communities in diaspora, to avoid the secular knowledge based on the cultural project of modernity. Despite the Western education introduced to them, Islamic education is taught in almost all Somali community centers in Sweden. In addition, some of the families send their children to Muslim schools.

The sudden collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted in misery for millions of Somalis, ushering in a decade of anarchy and violence. These events cost the loss of thousands of lives and led to the search for asylum outside the country. At the beginning of 1990, Somalis started arriving in Sweden in large numbers, and at the end of the 1990s, their number was approximately 13,450 (see Table 9.1). Somalis are the largest immigrant group of African origin in Sweden (SCB, 1998). Out of this population, more than 50 percent are children and adolescents under the age of 20 (SIV, 1998).

In Sweden, Somalis face a culture in which the relationship between

the individual and society is perceived and evaluated differently from what is the case in their home country. The view of man in the Somali culture may be referred to as sociocentric while in the Swedish culture the view of the person is egocentric. In sociocentric cultures, *man-in-society* (Shweder and Bourne, 1984) is not an autonomous individual but is regulated by strict rules of interdependence, for example rules governing exchanges of services and behaviour towards kinsmen. In egocentric cultures, *man-in-society* is instead an autonomous, abstract individual existing free of society yet living in society (Ibid.). In many Western societies, a highly personalized self becomes an object of interest and the individual is seen as inviolate, a supreme value in itself. A Protestant self, which is also the Scandinavian self, is seen as bounded, autonomous, self-regulated and self-reflective (Gaines, 1984). In the Somali culture, self is a social self. A crucial aspect of personhood in the Somali culture is that one belongs to an agnatic group. At birth, children are ascribed members of their father's lineage (Talle, 1993).

Swedish authorities emphasize an individualistic approach, which the Somalis often find difficult to accept. There are also, for instance, differences in relation to child-rearing practices. The Swedish culture acknowledges a certain amount of autonomy and privacy for small children. Somalis living in Sweden often live in close communities, because there is always the fear of their cultural identity being eroded.

A number of immigrant associations have been established in Sweden, and some have specific reference to their countries of origin, such as those of the Somalis and the Gambians, while others have an Islamic orientation. There are about 160 Somali associations in Sweden,[6] a majority of them engage in close networking. These associations provide different services for the communities:

Table 9.1 Somali Population in Sweden, 1970–1998

Year	1970	1980	1985	1990	1996	1997	1998
Population	25	106	172	1,410	12,163	13,122	13,450

Source: SCB Statistics of Population 3, 1998.

[6] http://www.integration.se/föreningar/

Ḳur'ānic schools for children according to the traditional pedagogical model; general guidance for the parents; assistance in various conflicts, marital or generational; a strong core of religious activities including prayers and other religious rites; *zakāt* (one of the pillars of Islam—see Chapter 1) at the end of the Month of Ramadan (the Month of fasting); premises for most Islamic ceremonies; and a platform for women's meetings.

In general, the associations help the Somali community to follow a Muslim way of life and they defend not only the right to religious life and worship, but also the social and cultural interests of their members. Aspects of the services also include the lending of Islamic and Somali books, cassettes and videos. These provisions made by the Somali community centers are mainly to sustain and reinforce the Islamic up-bringing (*tarbiya*), which is very essential in the earlier socialization of the Muslim children.

Tarbiya links to a lifelong process; all Muslim parents must guide their children to understand and execute the necessary acts concerning religious ceremonies, prayer and fasting. They are supported in their spiritual growth as members of a Muslim community. Moral advice and how to impede bad habits are inculcated in the children (Roald, 1994).

The Somali parents recognize that their role and influence as parents have been changing as their children became more a part of the Swedish culture. They are concerned that their children might abandon their cultural heritage and for Somalis the most important of this heritage is Islam. In Rinkeby and Tensta (two areas of Stockholm), the majority of Somali parents send their children to attend Saturday Ḳur'ānic lessons in the community center. According to these parents, teaching the Ḳur'ān for the children is part of Islamic *tarbiya*, and the purpose of these schools is to help the children to develop skills required for reading, memorizing, understanding and applying the Ḳur'ān and *ḥadīṯ*. This will assist the children to acquire knowledge of the Islamic faith and practice. In addition, these schools are supposed to breed an awareness of the Islamic heritage, and to inculcate its values.

During the Ḳur'ān lessons, the children are less exposed to outside influence and the parents strongly believe that Islamic education inspires the development of an Islamic personality. Additional motives on the part of the parents are group pressure and the expectation that traditionally oriented education could stabilize the Somali-

Islamic identification of their children and reduce the sharp family and generational conflicts.

Somali refugees in Sweden are in a process of integration. There are a number of barriers that stand between them, as an ethnic group, and ready mobility in social, economic, and political fields. These include language, education, employment, color and religion. In addition, the issue of *ḥiḏjāb* (Islamic scarf) for Muslim women is an important feature in the process of integration. This issue has been a controversy for centuries all over the world.[7]

Often Muslims and non-Muslims ask the question "Why do Muslim women have to cover their head"? For many women, it is the certain test of being a Muslim. The answer to this question is very simple—Muslim women observe *ḥiḏjāb* (covering the head and body) because, according to the Ḳur'ān, Allah has told them to do so (Ibid.). Different Muslim societies use *ḥiḏjāb* differently. Some of the Somali women in Sweden wear the *ḥiḏjāb* and others do not, while some of them start wearing the *ḥiḏjāb* only when they arrive in Sweden.

A study based on participant observation in a Muslim (Somali) center in a Stockholm sub-urban area and interviews were conducted with some 50 parents. This study confronts four problems, which are interrelated in different ways: Preserving a Muslim identity; Rejection of Western values; Uniformity with the home country; and Fear of cultural shock. During the interviews, this matter of *ḥiḏjāb* was raised and many of the female respondents admitted that they started dressing in the Muslim way only after they arrived in Sweden. They explained that they were not less religious in Somalia but they had their traditional Somali dress. In Somalia there is no specific culturally defined *ḥiḏjāb*.

Another aspect of the Somali culture is the clan network, which gives primary importance for its members to help each other like a large extended family bound by ancestral relations. While this clan structure is basically threatened by the individualist conception of the West, the Somali communities in Sweden are more bound by their Islamic faith and, of course, their belonging to the same nation.

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[7] Some Islamic scholars do not consider the subject open to discussion and consider covering the face is required, while a majority are of the opinion that it is not required. A middle line position is taken by some who claim that the instructions are vague and open to individual discretion depending on the situation (Haneef, 1982).

The family is a fundamental unit of the Somali society, just like in other Muslim societies. The extended family system exists in Somalia where joint responsibility and co-operation between family members is taken seriously. In an extended family system, members depend on each other in order to manage in life. Siblings and other relatives form the core of an individual's economic and emotional support group and they are expected to respond in time of need. Adolescents and young adults are dependent on the help of both parents and other kin people who help them to become good Muslims. The relations between adolescents, their parents and other family members are seen as a lifelong family unity.

There is a constant fear that the Muslim identity of the children is being dissolved in the melting pot of the Swedish society. One man said: "We feel that the identity of our children is under threat". Another similar complaint was:

> When we were in Somalia, we were not worried for our children's behavior because the values and norms of the whole society were the same. Here the preservation of our Muslim identity has become a challenge rather than something we can take for granted.

An important issue is how to ensure that the home environment is conducive to Islamic learning through examples and encouragement. In order to live in this multi-religious world like Sweden and preserve their faith and that of their children, they send their children to Ḳur'ānic schools in the community center. A woman said:

> My desire is that my children learn the Ḳur'ān before I die, in order to secure the Islamic value, and when I die they will pray for me.

Another woman said:

> The best inheritance that we as parents can provide for our children is to teach them the Ḳur'ān. We are not creating extremists but we are only teaching our children the right path of Islam.

Somalis recognize Ḳur'ānic schools as a crucial element in the socialization of the child and central in the binding cohesion of the community. For many first generation Somalis living in Sweden, Islam has become one of the guiding lights and strategies in a different cultural and religious setting, and as an answer to the suffering from the civil war. Some parents say that it is more important to tell the children about Islam than about Somali culture. A Muslim identity is seen as more important than a Somali identity. One woman argued:

> Back at home in Somalia, I had never attended Friday congregational prayer in the Mosque, and I occasionally prayed at home. Here in Sweden my life has changed, I am a good Muslim; I pray regularly and cover my head. After what happened in my country, Islam gives me inner peace, and I want to become a good example for my children.

The general observation is that the Somali community in Stockholm, both females and males are very concerned with their adherence to their Islamic faith, as well as their children's faith. How to avoid and subdue the external influences is an everyday challenge. Somali children in Sweden are brought into an education system grounded in the humanistic and scientific traditions of the West. And besides schooling, young people learn new ways of thinking and behavior through music, videotapes, television etc. Somali families are not free from the regulation of the state. The intervention takes various forms within family law and other laws regulating events within families. According to a woman:

> Here nobody worries about the spiritual growth of the family unit. The only thing that the government emphasizes is the economic and material growth of the family unit. Therefore, we find ways to sustain our Muslim identity, and that is to follow strictly the Ḳur'ān and the *ḥadīṯh*. If our children receive the proper Islamic education, it will prevent them from outside temptations.

An example of this regulation is the upbringing of children, which in Somalia was the responsibility of the parents and the kin. In Sweden, instead, laws and regulations of the state have weakened the authority of the parents. For example, physical punishment of the children is forbidden in Sweden and parents may be accused of child abuse. In severe cases children may be taken away from their home and settled in foster homes. One man informed that

> In Sweden I worry too much that my children may get into trouble. For this reason I send them to a Ḳur'ānic school, in order for them to learn the Ḳur'ān, respect and learn what is just (halaal) and what is forbidden (haram), and this will prevent them from doing evil things.

Another man showed similar concern and he said:

> Here in Sweden I cannot discipline my child because the laws are on the side of the children, so it is easy for children to oppose their parents. I do not want my child to become like Swedish, for this reason I send her to a Ḳur'ānic school.

This fear increases the sense of powerlessness experienced by Somali parents. Somali parents claim that authorities listen more to the children than to the parents.

A general conclusion based on observations and interviews is that the decline in adult authority over children is a cause of grave concern and distress. According to these parents, the only solution open for them is to teach their children fundamental Islamic rules at home, such as prayer and fasting and to send them to the Ḳur'ānic school in the community centre during the weekend.

One important factor that strengthens the teaching of the Ḳur'ān for the children is that most of the adult Somalis in Sweden have dreams of going back to Somalia. According to them, there is a need to prepare the children in advance by teaching them to follow Islam strictly. In addition, they embrace an ideological attitude to Islam, which is identical to the contemporary Islamic revival in Somalia. Somalis try to identify and accept the interpretations and the work of the Islamists in Somalia. The reason for this behaviour is their desire to be similar to the people in Somalia is to avoid cultural shock when they return home.

The Somali communities in Sweden mainly identify themselves as Muslims. Some of their previous identities such as being nomads or agriculturists no longer exist. This means Somalis in Sweden have developed their present identity through Islamic consciousness, and this is enhanced more by the fact that they now live in a predominately non-Muslim culture. They usually do not differentiate Islamic heritage and Somali heritage; for them the two are interdependent. Since in Sweden there exists freedom of religion, their practice of Islam remains constant in clinging to that inner "link", in surrendering themselves to God's Will, and in practising Islamic ethics to the highest degree.

Some Muslim scholars believe that Islam is flexible and has the capacity to adapt to modernity (see, for instance, Arkoun, 1984). They stress that knowledge seeking, and demand for progress are strongly encouraged in the Ḳur'ān. They only reject modernization when they consider that its aim is to fulfill material needs, while disregarding moral ethics and spirituality. They see the latter has already caused disintegration and moral decay. They argue that Islamic education can prevent a whole range of evils such as drug addiction. The fear of the Muslims is that the overpowering of Western values, particularly those related to material needs, are not only taught at

schools, but disseminated by the mass media (television, radio and videos). In order to avoid these, Muslims encourage their children to learn Islam, particularly the reading of the Ḳur'ān (Nielsen, 1992).

Conclusion

There are considerable differences between the Muslims living in Sweden. The majority accept enrolling their children in public schools. Some of these parents do not see a need for any education apart from the one given in these schools, while others see a complementary need for religious and moral training and send their children to Ḳur'ānic education organized by different Muslim organization in the local community. A third category of Muslims enroll their children in Muslim schools that teach the Swedish national curriculum, receive state subsidies and have to accept regulation and monitoring exercised by the Swedish authorities.

The leaders in such Muslims schools struggle to keep a balance between the Swedish laws and norms, on the one hand, and the demands from the Muslim owners of the schools and the Muslim parents, on the other hand.

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CHAPTER TEN

ENGLISH EDUCATION AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND MUSLIM SCHOOLS

Geoffrey Walford

Introduction—a brief history of religious involvement

Historically, the English education system has been characterised by its diversity and the involvement of various Christian denominations in the provision of schooling. Before the nineteenth century the education of children was considered to be the private affair of parents. Apart from a few schools for children in workhouses, all schools were private schools. Those with sufficient means could employ private tutors for their children or send them to a variety of grammar or other fee-paying schools. Schooling for the poor, if they had any schooling at all, was in dame schools and charity schools. The charity school movement started with the founding of the Society for Promotion of Christian Knowledge (SPCK) in 1698, whose schools were intended to restore morals and religious belief to the poor children of what was then seen as an increasingly degenerate country. A range of religiously-based schools developed which were supported by the churches, both through direct charitable donations and through the local clergy often teaching in the schools for no fee. As urbanisation and industrialisation progressed, the somewhat contradictory drives of philanthropy, religious conviction, and the practical need for a better educated and disciplined work force led to the gradual expansion of a network of schools for the poor.

The British government has always been reluctant to become involved in the provision of schooling, preferring to leave it to the various churches and other charitable organisations. The first formal involvement of the state in education was the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act of 1802, which forced employers to provide for the teaching of apprentices during the working day and for at least an hour on Sundays. This was followed by two parliamentary committees in 1816 and 1818 which attempted to survey the extent and

nature of elementary education available for the 'lower orders'. As expected, the report chronicled 'grave deficiencies in general provision, accommodation and actual teaching', but the resulting first attempt to establish a national education system failed completely, as it became embroiled in a controversy with the churches over control. The Church of England wanted overall control of any new system. Not surprisingly, the Roman Catholic and other Protestant Churches objected.

The next move to establish a national system was made in 1833. This failed as well, but it did lead to the first grant of £20,000 being made by government to aid 'private subscription for the erection of school houses'. This grant was given to the two main religious providers of schooling at the time—the Church of England's National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor and the Nonconformists' British and Foreign School Society. Grants to the Roman Catholic Poor School Committee were first given in 1847. Government grants to build and maintain schools gradually increased over the century and an Education Department was established in 1856 to control this funding. By that time, the Victorian government of the day recognised the need to ensure that education was provided for all, but was still happy to leave this to the charitable and religious organisations wherever possible, and would only help financially where other sources were insufficient.

It was only following the 1870 Education Act that the State became involved in the provision, maintenance and organisation of its own elementary schools. A national system was established, but one where responsibility for provision was still shared by a multitude of providers. The key 1944 Education Act for England and Wales built upon this existing understanding. Coming into law while the war was still in progress, it promised a brighter and fairer future to all children irrespective of social class. The slogan 'secondary education for all' meant that all children would leave their elementary or primary schools at age eleven and move on to secondary schools that were supposedly appropriate for their differing abilities and aptitudes. In most places, the Local Education Authorities (LEAs), that were given responsibility for implementing the new system, developed two or three different types of school to which children were directed according to the results of an 11 plus selection examination (Walford, 1990). But another cross-cutting factor was the religious orientation of the students and the schools. Many of the pre-existing secondary schools

had been founded by the various Churches and, to enable secondary schooling to be provided for all children, it was seen as necessary to include as many of these schools as possible into the state-maintained sector. While some religious schools remained as private schools, the majority entered the state-maintained system in one of three categories—voluntary controlled, voluntary aided or special agreement. The main distinction between the three was the degree of control that the Governors maintained over the school and the size of the financial contribution expected from the Churches in return for their remaining powers. While these schools retained their religious denominational character, they became an integral part of the state-maintained local authority system.

During the 1960s and 1970s the selective system of secondary schooling was gradually replaced by comprehensive schools, still provided by the churches together with the Local Education Authorities. By 1979 about 90 percent of secondary age children in the state-maintained sector were in comprehensive schools, but there remained a few grammar schools and secondary modern schools. There were about 28 percent of primary aged pupils in state-maintained religious schools, and 17 percent of secondary pupils. Over all ages, 22 percent of pupils were in religious schools, which was made up of 11 percent Church of England, nine percent Roman Catholic, and less than one percent each of Jewish and Methodist (O'Keeffe, 1986). A further eight percent of school age children were in fee-paying private schools, most of which were originally established by church related groups or individuals.

By 2000 about 35 percent of primary and 16 percent of secondary state-maintained schools in England and Wales were still religious schools (Lankshear, 2001). The bulk of such schools were Church of England or Roman Catholic, but there were also some Jewish and a very few schools of other Christian origins. What is of note here is that, while it was theoretically possible for the state to support schools of any faiths, in practice, until 1998 it was only established Christian and Jewish schools that obtained funding. Until that date there were no state-funded schools for children of the various new immigrant minority religions.

Since 1944 two interlinked trends have effected the state-maintained religious schools. First, the proportion of funding that the government required the schools to contribute to the capital and maintenance costs of the school buildings has gradually reduced. It now

stands at 10 percent for schools. Second, the schools have become increasingly secularised. Whilst being more true of the Church of England schools, which are often hardly distinguishable from Local Education Authority owned schools, it is also true for Catholic schools (Arthur, 1995; McLaughlin et al., 1996; Grace, 2002). Many of the teachers in these religious schools no longer adhere to the beliefs of the founding church, and religious practice within the schools is often restricted to a brief assembly and the compulsory study of religious education by the students. Indeed, the degree of secularisation of the existing state-maintained religious schools was one of the main reasons for some Christian and Muslim groups wishing to establish their own private schools and, subsequently, campaigning for state support for these schools (Walford, 1995).

Overview of immigration and education policies

England is a land of immigrants. From the invasions of the Romans, Danes and Normans, through to modern-day refugees from Bosnia and Eastern Europe, England has received a wide diversity of political and economic immigrants. But most discussion of immigration is actually concerned with the black and Asian ethnic minorities who first came to England following the Second World War. The 1950s and 1960s were a time of economic boom coupled with severe labour shortages, such that many employers actively encouraged workers from the so-called New Commonwealth to come to England to fill lowly-paid jobs. London Transport, for example, advertised in Jamaica and the Caribbean for staff for the London Underground and busses and provided a recruiting office in Kingston itself to speed their passage. A little later came many from Pakistan and India again destined to take low-paid jobs not wanted by others. Originally those from the New Commonwealth came on British passports, but the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 began a process of limiting the inflow—especially of black immigrants. These policies were racially explicit as there was growing fear of being 'overrun' by people of other 'races'—England has remained open to all (white) Irish immigrants throughout the 20th century. There are now tight controls which limit the entry of those from India, Pakistan and the Carribean but borders are completely open to those from the European Union.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, the usual pattern was that men from the New Commonwealth initially travelled alone with the intention of returning to their country of origin once sufficient money had been accumulated. While some did return, many others stayed and gradually brought over wives and other dependents. During the 1960s children of these immigrants first had a significant impact on schools.

While there are obviously no direct linkages between the country of origin, ethnicity and religious adherence, many of the immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh were Muslims, while many from the Punjab were Sikhs and most from the rest of India were Hindu. However, the situation is complex, with Muslims in Britain having significant numbers from eight different countries of origin—Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Egypt, Libya and Morocco—as well as many from the various countries of the Middle East (Parker-Jenkins, 1995). People from each of these groups tended to settle in particular urban areas within such cities as Birmingham, Blackburn, Bradford, Coventry, Dewsbury, Leicester, London and Manchester. There is now a range of Muslim communities based not only on country of origin, but also on the various groups within Islam. A similar pattern of local concentration is found for Hindu, Sikh and Seventh Day Adventist adherents and is of obvious benefit in their desire to maintain and practice their religion and build Mosques, Temples and Gurdwārās. It also allowed the development of specialist shops and services designed to meet the social and cultural needs of particular ethnic groups.

In the 1950s and early 1960s government policy was broadly assimilationist. This is usually taken to mean cultural assimilation rather than physical assimilation, such that blacks should not be seen by themselves or others as a discrete group other than in terms of skin colour (Troyna and Williams, 1986). Schools were thus seen as having the principle goal of transmitting the dominant culture and socialising black children into that culture. The potentially disruptive effects of having culturally and linguistically different children in schools was to be minimised by trying to eradicate both. Different cultures were assumed to be deprived cultures which needed to be compensated for by additional English language teaching and other special measures.

One of the most important 'special measure' of the mid-1960s was the acceptance of bussing of black children from areas of particular

concentration such that black immigrant children were always in a minority in any one school. The pattern of immigration was such that immigrant groups tended to cluster in particular areas of England's large cities. It was argued by Government that, for assimilation to take place, it was necessary for black children to be bussed such that they were always in a school which was dominated by the white mainstream culture and the English language. This was intended to help these children loose the 'disadvantages' of their own language and culture, but also to placate those white parents and teachers who feared the effects of large numbers of black children in any one school. Troyna and Williams (1986) have argued that this policy of dispersal was neither a legitimate nor logical response to perceived educational needs, but was a surrender to racism for it attempted to overrule the rights, identity and culture of a minority within what was multicultural society.

In practice, bussing did not last long and was not widespread. By the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s there was no longer a general acceptance of the idea of assimilation, and policy gradually moved towards integration and then multiculturalism. The 1970s have been caricatured as the era of 'saris, samosas and steel bands' as teachers sought to find elements of the various immigrants' cultures which could be valorised within a dominant white culture. One particularly important aspect of multiculturalism was the changes made to religious education, such that Christianity (while still dominant) became only one of several religions about which children were given information. Islam, Sikhism, Hinduism and Buddhism were frequently added to the curriculum—so much so that right wing apologists decried the 'multi-cultural mish-mash' that they claimed resulted. Multi-faith teaching was partly reversed through the 1988 Education Reform Act which gave a special place to Christianity within religious education and acts of worship in schools, but children are still expected to have knowledge of at least one other faith in most religious education examinations.

During the 1980s and 1990s there were also many who called for a move beyond multiculturalism to anti-racist teaching in schools. Troyna (1993), for example, strongly believed that it was insufficient for children to simply know about other faiths and cultures and advocated that schools should explicitly teach anti-racism in an attempt to reduce the disadvantage that many black and Asian children experience in schools. Such policies have only been partially implemented,

and it is undoubtedly true that perceptions of racism within existing state-maintained schools are one of the reasons why some Muslim parents have opened their own schools.

Education system and options for Muslims

Within England and Wales in 1997 about 20 percent of pupils were educated within religiously-based state-maintained schools. Almost 7000 (out of about 30,000) state-maintained schools had an explicit religious affiliation; there being some 4800 Church of England, 2140 Roman Catholic, 55 Methodist (some in association with the Church of England) and 23 Jewish schools. What is very evident from this list is that it reflects the predominant religious affiliations of the population of 1944 rather than that of the far more religiously and ethnically diverse population of the 1990s. The pattern of religious schools available within the state-maintained sector takes little account of the increased religious diversity within England that resulted from immigration since that time of families from such countries as India, Pakistan, Kenya and the Caribbean.

It is estimated that there by the mid-1990s there were about a million Muslims in England, with about 75 percent having origins in the Indian subcontinent (Peach and Glebe, 1995; Vertovec, 2002), and about 400,000 children of Muslim parents of school age in England (Sarwar, 1994). Most religious minority children are now, of course, second or third generation immigrants, and the vast majority are in state-maintained schools under the governance of local education authorities or, ironically, the Church of England or the Roman Catholic church. While many of these children's parents are content for them to attend LEA or Christian religious schools, others would wish them to be in specifically Muslim schools. It might seem particularly anomalous that these children attend Church of England schools, but the Anglicans have long seen their task as one of serving the inhabitants of the entire local Parish (Chadwick, 1997). Being the Established Church, the Church of England has provided certain services for atheists as well as believers of various religions so that it is now possible to find Church of England schools that have a majority of Muslim children in attendance. In the early 1990s it was estimated that there were about 60 schools with a Muslim intake of 90–100 percent and over 200 with over 75 percent (Parker-

Jenkins, 1995: 86). Where this has occurred, these schools typically have made significant adaptions to meet many of the particular cultural and religious needs of these children. In contrast, the Roman Catholic Church has usually seen its mission in schooling as being that of providing a Catholic education for Catholic children. While significant numbers of non-Catholic children do attend such schools, fewer concessions are usually made to their lack of faith or alternative faith.

As the various ethnic minorities became increasingly financially well established, during the 1980s and 1990s, it became more possible for these parents to consider establishing their own private faith-based schools. As local and central governments were reluctant to support state-maintained schools for these religious minorities, the alternative was to start their own fee-paying schools. There has been considerable debate about the desirability of separate Muslim schools (see, for example, Halstead, 1986a & b; Hiskett, 1989; McLaughlin, 1992) but this option has been increasingly taken up. During the late 1980s and 1990s Muslim, Sikh and Seventh Day Adventists established their own fee-paying private schools in what has come to be known as the 'reluctant private sector' (Walford, 1991). By 1998 there were about 60 full-time private Muslim schools, several of which would ideally wish to become state funded. By 2002 there were over 100.

The private Muslim schools in England exhibit a great diversity. It is estimated that the private Muslim schools provide for a total of about 8000 children—about two percent of Muslim children in England. They range from one expensive London-based school, which is predominantly attended by children of diplomats, industrialists and professionals from the Far East to small one-room schools for five or more children based in domestic houses. The largest school has nearly 2000 pupils, but the average is about 120. Separate schooling for boys and girls is an important feature of Muslim schools, especially for children beyond puberty. Thus there are more schools serving secondary age children than primary and there are no coeducational secondary schools. The majority of the boys' secondary schools are boarding schools which are linked to seminaries whose purpose is to train future religious leaders (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 47). There are many small schools that serve primary age children only (most being coeducational) and the remaining schools serve both primary and secondary children, some being coeducational at primary and for girls only at secondary.

In contrast to the Muslims, the other new religious minorities have a far smaller number of schools. While the Seventh Day Adventists claim about 18 million followers worldwide, there are only about 25,000 in England. They support about 12 small primary schools scattered throughout the country and two small secondary schools—one in Watford and one in Tottenham, London. In contrast to the position in many other countries, in England the Seventh Day Adventist Church, particularly in London, is largely an Afro-Caribbean church. This means that the John Loughborough School in Tottenham, for example, is an almost totally black school. There are currently very few private schools for Hindu and Sikh children, although one Sikh school has recently entered the state-maintained sector.

Technically, it has always been possible for Local Education Authorities to give support to various religiously-based schools. Although the 1944 Education Act was designed to protect the interests of the various Christian denominations, the legislation was such that other religious groups could also benefit. Support for some Jewish schools has been longstanding. During the 1980s and 1990s several existing Muslim private schools applied to their LEAs to become state-maintained religious schools, but all such requests were turned down. Usually this happened at the LEA level, but occasionally the LEA agreed and central government refused the request. This was the case in the well publicised example of Islamia primary school where, following a long campaign, Brent local education authority eventually and reluctantly supported the application. It is interesting to remember that this Labour dominated council only finally voted in favour by the Labour councillors abstaining on the issue and the councillors from the other parties voting in favour. However, the proposal was finally turned down by the Conservative government's Department for Education in August 1993.

I have written elsewhere about the political campaign which led to a change in legislation such that it became easier for existing private religious schools to enter the state-maintained sector and become fully funded (Walford, 2000a & b, 2001). The 1993 Education Act gave the chance for such schools to apply directly to the Department for Education to become state-maintained. In practice, very few schools were allowed to take this route and it was only on a change of government from Conservative to Labour in 1997 that the first decision was made to allow any religious minority schools to become state-maintained schools. The new Labour government made positive decisions on two Muslim primary schools and one Seventh Day

Adventist secondary school. Since then the School Standards and Framework Act of 1998 has changed the framework under which schools operate, however, it is still possible for private religious minority schools to enter the state-maintained sector as religious (Voluntary) schools and one Sikh and one Greek Orthodox school have since made this transition. Two further Muslim secondary schools converted in September 2001 and September 2002. The Labour government elected in 2001 used its election manifesto to argue for an increase in schools supported by all faiths (Labour Party, 2001: 19).

Case studies

In this final main section I shall outline three case histories. The first two are of the two Muslim schools which became part of the state-maintained sector under the 1993 legislation, but only following the election of a Labour government in 1997. The third case study is of a Muslim secondary school in Bradford which entered the state sector in September 2001.

Two Muslim primary schools

The legislation to make it easier for private schools to enter the state-maintained sector was initiated under a Conservative government in 1993. However, it was only under a Labour government, following their 1997 victory, that any minority religious schools were accepted. The first two Muslim primary schools to be accepted were Al-Furqan and Islamia. Al-Furqan school in Birmingham also became a state-maintained religious school in September 1998. This Muslim primary school started in 1989 as a drop-in centre for families who were home-schooling their girls rather than sending them to non-Muslim schools. It was originally a self-help organisation for parents, several of whom had been teachers in state-maintained schools. The group quickly developed, and started to run a small primary school in 1992. For the first year, this school took girls only as it had been girls who had been most frequently home-schooled. However, parental demand was such that, in the second year of its existence, the school was persuaded to take boys as well as girls. Parents believed that their sons should also be able to benefit from what they perceived

to be a high level of general schooling as well as the Islamic ethos of the school. The drop-in centre continued, catering mainly for home-schooled senior girls.

When I visited the school in 1999 there were seven classes. The reception class included some of the year 1s, the second class had the remained of the year 1s and all of the year 2s, and the other five classes were double age, single sex groups. There were less than 100 children in all, who spent their time largely in small crowded rooms with poor furniture and facilities. The boys were dresses in a similar way to other 'uniform schools' with black trousers and socks, white shirt and either a red or blue pullover (with school logo) according to age. The girls, on the other hand wore a black pinafore with trousers, white shirt and socks, with a red or blue pullover and *ḥiḏjāb* according to age. The staffing of the school at this time is indicative of a wider problem that the schools face—there were seven ful time teachers four of whom were Christian and only three Muslim. There were also three classroom assistants and the headteacher who were Muslim. The school recognises that there are still few trained Muslim teachers who wish to work in private Muslim schools and they thus recruit teachers who they feel are good at their job and are prepared to recognise the religious character of the school. These Christian teachers all wore headscarves while at the school. While Britain still has a low number of trained Muslim teachers, an additional reason for the difficulty in recruitment is that most of these private schools pay less than the national pay scales.

The curriculum of the school was based on the national curriculum with the addition of the Arabic language (Walford, 2002). Most of the children did not speak Arabic at home, so had to be taught it if they are to be able to read the Ḳur'ān. This was taught by a separate teacher as, I was told, most second generation Muslims in Britain are self-taught in Arabic and have very bad pronunciation. The school aimed to teach the standard Saudi Arabian pronunciation. Most of this teaching appeared to be aimed at learning and reciting *sūras* from the Ḳur'ān. The children were involved in this for about a half hour per day.

The curriculum was also modified in several other smaller ways. In English, for example, several books had words cut out or deleted with a felt-tip pen because the content was not deemed appropriate. This included references to 'magic' in the Oxford Reading Tree and to such things as drugs and sex in a document on 'being healthy'.

In music stringed and blowing instruments are not allowed, and even drums are somewhat suspect. PE is done in a limited way with the children fully covered throughout. Art often focuses on patterns and the children should not draw images of living things.

Al-Furqan is situated in a poor neighbourhood of Birmingham and it serves a largely poor clientele. In 1998, the fees were nominally set at £1050 per year, but this was hardly ever actually paid. The Muslim community paid the difference to ensure that the school survived. Fairly quickly, the school established a charitable trust to ensure its continued existence, and it looked for ways by which it could be financially supported. Initial discussion with the local education authority indicated that it was unlikely to support the schools for many years but, by that time, the new legislation allowing direct application to central government was imminent. In 1995 a meeting of parents and teachers decided that it wished the school to apply to become state-maintained.

The process was far from straightforward. The school occupied buildings that were cramped, and it was not possible to accommodate many more than about 100 pupils. If the school wished to expand to 210 pupils, which was a reasonable number for a state-maintained primary school, there was a need for a new site. A former small hospital was located which, with substantial new building and renovation, would accommodate the proposed new school. So, for about two years, the school negotiated with the Funding Agency for Schools, the local planning authority, their own architects and those of the Department for Education and Employment, and was eventually able to publish proposals in late 1996. An important aspect to the application was that the Trust was prepared to pay 50 percent of the costs of the new buildings and renovations. Although the legislation allows sponsors to provide as little as 15 percent of the capital costs, it had become clear by that stage that the higher the percentage of the capital costs the sponsors could provide, the greater was the likelihood that the proposal would be successful (Walford, 1997). Fifty percent offered good 'value for money'.

It was January 1997, following the statutory objection period when only minor objections were lodged, before the case could start to be considered by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment. With a General Election on its way in May, he made no quick decisions, and it was left to the new Labour government to announce

in January 1998 that it would support the application. The school was jubilant, as was Islamia School in Brent which had its acceptance into the state-maintained system announced on the same day. But Al-Furqan's problems were not quite over, for they found that another round of further negotiations over the site and buildings was still required. Although the school entered the state-maintained sector in September 1998, it had to remain in its existing building for some time before the new building was completed.

The case of Islamia School in Brent, north-west London, is well known and documented (e.g. Dwyer and Meyer, 1995), in part, perhaps, because of the close involvement in the school of Yusuf Islam who was formerly the pop singer Cat Stevens and is now Chairman of the Association of Muslim Schools. But the case is also well known because of its highly controversial nature and the way that the school became a legal test-case.

Islamia was established in 1982 under a private foundation, the Islamia Schools Trust, and has tried many times to obtain state funding by applying to its local education authority. The first application was made in 1986 and, after eventually being accepted by the LEA, was rejected by the Secretary of State for Education. The basis for rejection at this point was that the school was too small to be viable. A change of politics to Labour in Brent led to a lack of support for the school on appeal, and the application was again formally rejected in 1990. This time, the reason for rejection was that there were surplus places in other local schools. The school applied for a judicial review and in 1992 the High Court ruled that there was 'manifest unfairness' in the decision (Dwyer and Meyer, 1995: 45). The decision was thus referred back to the Secretary of State, but in August 1993 the application was once again refused on the basis of surplus places. This was a particularly strange decision since the 1993 Education Act which encouraged 'choice and diversity' had become law in July, and it had been stated that 'denominational need' would be taken into account in making decisions about new religious state-maintained schools.

The next step was to try to take advantage of this 1993 legislation, and full proposals for a state-maintained primary school were published in January 1997. Following the 1997 May General Election, the Labour government made a rapid decision to start funding Islamia from April 1998.

A third Muslim school

The third Muslim school to be considered here is Feversham College in Bradford. This is a school for Muslim girls aged 11 to 18 years, and is an example of a school designed for parents who wish their girls to be educated separately from boys.

The College started with 26 girls in September 1984. The founding body was the Muslim Association of Bradford, and the school was formerly known as the Bradford Muslim Girls Community School. The school outgrew its original cramped premises, and expanded by leasing a redundant Victorian school building on Feversham Street near the city centre. The school operated on a split site for a year then completed the move to the Feversham site in 1995. In 2000 it had just over 200 girls and a two form intake of 60 girls in years 9, 10 and 11. From September 2000 it also took 30 girls in years 7 and 8. It now offers 10 GCSE subjects, 4 A level subjects and a GNVQ course. The subjects offered at A-Level in 2000 were, however, highly limited—English Literature, religious Studies, Sociology and Urdu. At GCSE level, in 2000, the subjects offered were: English, Mathematics, Science, Art and Design, Design and Technology, Religious Studies, Islamic Studies, Urdu, Arabic an History, with additional non-examination courses in physical education and personal social education. Religious observation is also an integral part of the timetable and each day time is given for reading the Ḳur'ān, studying *ḥadīth* and learning the *Sharī'a*.

The College Prospectus emphasises that the school 'aims to provide a caring environment that is secure, stable, consistent and fair'. It 'gives the highest priority to discipline in both moral and general behaviour', which the college hopes will 'help our students to enhance their self-esteem, build their confidence, and motivate them to pursue excellence in all their endeavours'.

The school has a compulsory uniform which includes the Shalwar-Kameez, Jilbab, and head-covering. Flat shoes are to be worn with no make-up or jewellery allowed. The aim is for a simple and modest form of dress.

The school has a very good relationship with the Local Education Authority such that, when I visited in late 2000, an ex-deputy (non-Muslim) headteacher was being paid by the LEA (through a special grant) to act as an advisor during the transition to state-maintained status. She was actually acting as the headteacher while the real

head was away on maternity leave. The LEA has given some limited support to the school throughout its existence. At first this was simply because, before the school opened, there had been some 400 girls in Bradford not going to school at all as there was no single sex provision. Parents were illegally keeping these girls at home (or sending them to Pakistan) rather than using coeducational secondary schools. Support from the LEA was initially not of a Muslim school as such, but of a school which offered some schooling to girls who would otherwise have had none. Of course, with such a large Muslim community in Bradford, it is also true that any local politician would be wise to offer some support to the school. The LEA also gave direct support to the school once it moved to the Feversham site as this was rented by the school from the LEA at a peppercorn rent. There are also links with the LEA controlled Bradford College which some students eventually go on to. Some of the girls at the school are actually registered at Bradford College while at the school and taught in the school. The College has also given furniture and equipment to the school. Such support has helped keep the fees low, but the major contribution here comes from the teachers who are on salaries far lower than those available in the state sector. One result of this is that the school has several newly qualified teachers who are prepared to accept low salaries, but is lacking in more experienced teachers. Evenso, while the school fee in June 2000 was only £930 per year, this is a considerable sum for many of the poor families that the school serves. The desire for state support is thus longstanding.

With the support of Bradford Local Education Authority the school applied to become a religious state-maintained school and this was eventually granted as part of a wide-ranging reorganisation of schooling in Bradford. The whole LEA moved in 2000 from a scheme with primary, middle and high schools to the more usual English system of just primary and secondary schools with a break at age 11. Feversham School expand to a full secondary school and will move to a new school on a site which is currently owned by the LEA. In many ways the old system had suited this Muslim school well, as parents are generally prepared for their girls to mix with boys until they are mature and were thus able to use the middle schools in most cases. However the new school will take children from age 11 and there will be 90 girls entering year 7 each year.

There were still some problems to be solved or evaded. As the school became a religious maintained school it had to find the legal

minimum of 15 percent of the costs of a new building on the new site. This meant that they needed to find about £1 million—a sum way beyond the school's resources. However, it was hoped that once building started it would become easier to fundraise. Other problems relate to the school's ability to cover the National Curriculum. The interpretation of Islam that is followed by the school prohibits the use of any musical instruments apart from the voice and drums—a feature that also make aerobics difficult. The racist way in which the National Curriculum favours European languages means that the children's Urdu is downgraded. The school is forced to offer a modern European language as the first choice of second language and then have Urdu as another choice. While it is not technically necessary within the National Curriculum, the school's interpretation of Islam which prohibits any representations of people or animals does make art teaching limited. In addition to Arabic, which is currently taught by a non-trained teacher, students also have Islamic Studies for three periods each week and religious education where they study one Christian Gospel in addition to Islamic texts. Of course, there is nothing odd about Muslims reading the Gospels as Islam accepts most of the Christian story and teaching. Again, some of the teachers are non-Muslims as no Muslim teachers could be found to teach particular subjects.

As with all schools, parents have chosen this school for a variety of reasons. Some girls are refugees from the state system—having either actually been failed by the system or because they were being bullied. No doubt some of these problems were racist in nature. Other girls had been playing truant from their state sector schools and parents had moved them to this school because they thought they needed more control. As a result, my impression was very much that some of the parents (and some of the girls) did not so much want a Muslim education, as such, but chose the school to discipline their girls and to ensure that they were separated from boys. Some parents and girls, for example, wanted the uniform changed so that they did not have to wear the Shalwar-Kameez and Jilbab.

Conclusion

The vast majority of children of Muslim parents attend schools that are fully funded by the state and are provided by Local Education

Authorities, the Church of England or the Roman Catholic Church. Within this range of schools there is a wide diversity of accommodation to the needs of Muslim students. Where there are many Muslim students, schools take often account of the need for halal food, offer prayer times and a prayer room, allow the wearing of particular clothing, and take account of prohibitions on certain aspects of art, music, physical education and sex education. As with followers of any other religion, Muslim parents vary in their orthodoxy and in the centrality of their faith in their lives. While some desire no special treatment in for their children in schools, it would appear that most are satisfied if schools are prepared to make some degree of accommodation to the needs of their faith (Parker-Jenkins, 1991). Others are not.

During the 1980s and 1990s a small proportion of parents became so disillusioned with state schooling that they started their own private Muslim schools and have been prepared to pay fees to ensure that their children receive the Islamic education that they desire. The desire to establish separate Muslim schools has many roots. It can be linked to the growing wealth, self-confidence and organisational abilities of British Muslims, along with their perceptions the actuality that some schools were unable to challenge racism (Troyna and Carrington, 1987) or adequately to educate minority children. This was coupled to a rise in traditionalist and fundamentalist Islam, a greater secularisation of Christian Church schools (which were previously attractive to some Muslim parents), and an increased desire on the part of some parents to have their adolescent girls taught separately from boys.

While there will be variation between the parents who use these private schools, it is inevitable that they will tend to be more orthodox or fundamentalist in their views of the faith than those who remain using the state sector (Osler and Hussain, 1995). This obvious tendency towards orthodoxy or fundamentalism is the main reason why there has been criticism of such schools. Separate secondary schools for girls has been a particular issue as such schools have been seen by some feminists as a way by which male dominance over women can be reproduced (see Haw, 1994, 1998). This idea is linked to the particular interpretation of Islam that is current in the social and cultural backgrounds of some of some of the British immigrant groups. But for others, such schools are seen as trying to inculcate a deeply conformist and repressive idea of the role of

women. While it is recognised that girls may resist as well as accept such ideas, it is argued that they would have a better chance of breaking away from this repression if they attended a coeducational non-Muslim school (see Basit, 1996, 1997a & b). Similar arguments have been made about the possible detrimental effects on gay teenagers of schools which teach that homosexual practice is an 'abomination' (Halstead and Lewicka, 1998).

But the further significant issue is that, in England, the Muslim minority is largely an ethnic minority as well. These separate Muslim schools reduce ethnic mixing of children. The recent riots between Asian and white English youth in Bradford (June 2001) and other Northern English cities emphasise the need for greater knowledge and understanding between the ethnic groups if we are to have a stable society. Within a liberal state that values equity in terms of gender, sexuality and ethnicity, the best solution is probably for all state-maintained schools to take account of the religious needs of all of their students, so that all can attend the same schools. Failing that, bringing some existing private Muslim schools into the state sector does at least ensure that all students follow the bulk of the National Curriculum and that issues of equity and equality of opportunity are brought to the fore.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

MUSLIM MINORITIES AND EDUCATION IN GERMANY—THE CASE OF BERLIN

Jürgen Henze

Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of recent developments in reformulating German immigration policy and the provision of education to minorities, with special reference to Muslim children and youths. The case of schooling in the State of Berlin will provide evidence for the current interpretation of multi-cultural and multi-language education in Germany and for the variety of problems which need to be solved by city and state level schooling authorities.

Background

In 2001 the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung)[1] published its report with a remarkable statement that would not have been made years before:

> It is now obvious that the guiding political principle and standard that applied for many decades, namely that "Germany is not a country of immigrants", has become untenable as the maxim of German immigration and integration policy. "The Commission acknowledges that Germany has become a country of immigrants—incidentally, not for the first time in history." (Independent Commission, 2001, p. 13)

[1] The Commission had been assigned by the Federal Minister of the Interior in 2000 in order to facilitate public and political discussion of new concepts for managing immigration to Germany. One of the key issues was to come up with a concept for an immigration law (Zuwanderungsgesetz), to discuss ways to improve the current asylum procedure and to develop a frame of reference which would fit to a broad European concept of immigration and integration. See Independent Commission (2001), p. 21.

This new perspective is something like a turning point in the history of migration in Germany although the phenomenon of emigration and immigration are be no means new: Early migration can be traced back to the mid-twelfth century but, it was not before the eighteenth century that a growing number of German migrants left, predominantly for North America. This trend of "going west" picked up momentum in the 1830s and lead to "emigration waves" which peaked between 1857 and 1859 (Bade 1997, p. 4ff.). After the late nineteenth century transatlantic migration decreased and immigration into Germany increased, mainly comprising "Poles from Central Poland, at that time part of Russia, as well as Poles and Ruthenians from Austrian Galicia and Italians and Italians" (Bade 1997, p. 10). The now reversed trend of emigration could be attributed to a growing labour shortage as a result of rapid industrial growth during the two decades before World War. The prevailing perspective of the state on how to handle growing immigration was captured in the phrase "polonization of the East" and clearly marked some kind of ideological foundation for coping with foreigners and the aspect of "being foreign". Basically the same perspective, namely to view foreign immigrants predominantly as strangers which have to be treated differently in order to cope with their strangeness (cultural difference) seemed to last until the very recent past.

But, changes are underway: There is growing concern about the interpretation of a "successful integration" of immigrants, especially in the light of latest developments in the labour market, nationally as well as internationally. In education, "diversity" (instead of difference) has become a widely accepted paradigm for understanding cross-cultural (or: intercultural) competence building. Acquiring a multi-level perspective for understanding and valueing "the other" has become a new goal in education. At least to some degree this seems to be part of the globalisation process in curricular development.

Finally, the results from the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) had a decisive impact on the discussion of migrants' children success in schooling.[2] In contrast to other indus-

[2] "The results of PISA suggest that educational success may be related to patterns of communication between parents and children. An important objective for public policy may therefore be to support parents, particularly those whose own educational attainment is limited, to facilitate their interaction with their children and their children's schools in ways that enhance their children`s learning. The

trialized countries Germany is characterized by a strong socio-cultural bias in channelling primary school students to secondary schools. This bias leads to disadvantages for those students who come from lower level professional families, and most severely this applies to students from migrants' families, where both parents are of non-German language origin.[3] As a consequence state governments have come forward with new initiatives to improve language competencies among those students of non-German language origin.

Patterns of Immigration 1949–2000

The history of postwar immigration to Germany is characterised by a number of distinctive periods with changing patterns of migration inflows and outflows. Conventionally, developments until the early nineties have been divided into six phases as given in Table 1.

The first phase mainly comprised the immigration of German nationals as refugees and expellees. The second period marked the high tide of migration between the former GDR and West Germany, when approximately 2.7 million GDR citizens left the territory (Übersiedler) to settle in the FRG. The third phase finally marks the beginning of an active recruitment of foreign nationals as additional labor force, although first attempts to attract foreign nationals as "guest workers" for a restricted period of time can be traced back to 1955 At that time the export-oriented growth of the German economy lead to growing demand for labor. During the 1950s this demand was largely satisfied by migration as mentioned in the first phase. In addition, as early as in 1995, a formal agreement with Italy was signed to allow Italians to work in Germany as "guest workers". Similar agreements followed with Spain and Greece in 1960, with

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nature of the educational disadvantage that students with ethnic minority background and/or the children of migrants suffer is substantially influenced by the circumstances from which they have come. These students may be academically disadvantaged either because they are immigrants entering a new education system or because they need to learn a new language in a home environment that may not facilitate this learning. In either case, they may be in need of special or extra attention." (OECD 2001, p. 157) In Germany it seems that the disadvantage effect of schooling is stronger at the secondary level, differences at the primary level do not seem to be that important.

[3] Deutsches PISA-Konsortium (2001, 2002).

Turkey in 1961, and with Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia between 1963 and 1968. By 1973 the employment of "guest workers" peaked at the level of "2.6 million, or 12 percent of all gainfully employed people in West Germany. Labor migrants from Turkey (605.000), Yugoslavia (535.000), and Italy (450.000) constituted the largest group, and a total of almost 4 million foreigners lived in West Germany" (Münz & Ulrich, 1997, 79).

At first, foreign migrants acting as guest workers, received work and residence permits valid for one year, a policy, which left migrant workers in a state of uncertainty, not beneficial to any form of cultural integration. Since 1971 migrants with at least five years of contract work experience could claim special work permits which would be valid for another five years. This change of legal entitlement increasingly led to the immigration of family members to a growing demand in the provision of social services (e.g. schooling). The process was reinforced by the announcement of the German government in 1973 of changes in policies, to end foreign recruitment. It is impor-

Table 11.1 Phases in the History of German Migration, 1945–1995

1945 to 1949	Mainly immigration of ethnic German refugees and expellees (Vertriebene) and reimigration of non-German forced labor, prisoners of war, and survivors of the concentration camps of Nazi Germany
1949–1961	First peak of migration between East and West Germany (Übersiedler)
1961–1973	Active recruitment of foreign labor by the FRG (guest workers); rapid growth of foreign population
1973–1988–89	Recruitment stop; failed attempts to reduce the number of foreigners living in the FRG; consolidation and further growth of the foreign population in West Germany by way of family reunion; recruitment of foreign labor by the GDR
1988–1991	Immigration of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler), asylum seekers, refugees, new labor migrants; second peak of migration between East and West Germany
1992–	Introduction of new restrictions against the immigration of Aussiedler and asylum seekers

Source: Münz & Ulrich 1997, p. 68.

tant to note, that—from a governmental perspective—immigration policy was mainly labor recruitment policy "to counterbalance cyclical and demographic bottlenecks in the West German labor market" (Münz & Ulrich, 1997, 79f.). The fifth period covering 1988–91 marked a dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers and ethnic German immigrants, predominantly from territories within the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.

Finally, a new period might have started in 2001–02 when the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany published its report Structuring Immigration—Fostering Integration which for the first time accepted the notion that Germany has become a "country of immigrants". Consequently public discussion quickly focussed on the legal improvement of migrants' conditions in Germany and following the suggestion of the commission, an Immigration Law was finally signed by the Bundespräsident.

Educational provision for minorities

Religious education

The Basic Law (R1) guarantees freedom of belief and conscience and the freedom of creed, religious or ideological; the undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed. There is no state church in the Federal Republic of Germany; the Basic Law guarantees individual religious freedom and tolerance (Art. 140). The relationship between church and state has been adopted from the 1919 Weimar constitution (Art. 137, Paragraph 1) and is characterised by the principle of the separation of church and state. At the same time, the state confers certain tasks and rights on the church (e.g. the levying of church taxes). Churches have the status of independent public law bodies. In 1998, the Roman Catholic Church in Germany had 27.2 million members and the Protestant Church had 27.1 million members (33.0 percent of the population each). The Free churches and the Greek Orthodox Church as well as the Jewish communities are also represented among others.

The large number of foreign workers and their families who have made their home in the Federal Republic account for some 3 million Muslims, the largest group of which are of Turkish nationality. According to the Basic Law, religious instruction is part of the curriculum

in public-sector schools, except non-denominational schools. As stipulated by the Basic Law, religious instruction is given in accordance with the doctrine of the religious community concerned (Art. 7, Paragraph 3). The stipulations contained in the Basic Law on religious instruction as a standard subject are not, however, applied in Bremen and Berlin since these Länder had already laid down different regulations under Land law on 1 January 1949, in other words prior to the promulgation of the Basic Law. Brandenburg also makes use of this legal provision, whilst conceding to the churches and religious communities the right to teach pupils according to their denomination on school premises. The Basic Law stipulates that parents have the right to decide whether children receive religious instruction (Art. 7, Paragraph 2). According to the Law on the Religious Education of Children (Gesetz über die religiöse Kindererziehung—R13), once a child has reached the age of 12, the decision made by the parents must have the child's consent. From the age of 14, each child is free to decide whether to attend religious instruction, unless Land legislation makes other provision. In most of the Länder, pupils who do not participate in religious education are instead taught ethics as replacement or alternative subject. Further details are given in the reports from 1992 and 1998 of the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder on Protestant religious education, Catholic religious education and ethics education.

Muslim religion classes

According to the most recently published government report on the situation of foreigners in Germany, at least four different modes of Muslim religion classes can be identified:[4]

- The case of the state North Rhine-Westphalia, where education in basic elements of Islam have been taught at the primary school level since 1986, originally as part of the additional afternoon lesson in the mother tongue of children with immigrant backgrounds. Currently, as some kind of educational experiment confined to a number of model-schools only, Muslim religion classes are offered as regular subject with German as medium of instruction at the level of primary and secondary (I) schools.

[4] Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen über die Lage der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2002), p. 254.

- In Berlin the Islamic Federation had won the case against the state government of Berlin in 2001 and has been entitled to offer Muslim religion classes at two primary schools in Berlin.
- The Federation of Alevit Communities (Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Deutschland e.V.), with their regional member communities in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin, have submitted their applications for supplying Muslim religion education. In Berlin the case has been granted, other German state governments still have to decide.
- A special form of religion classes has been provided in the state of Hamburg where different religious communities (Christian churches, Buddhist communities as well as Islamic communities) participate in providing "religion classes for all".

Besides these regional attempts to cope with a growing demand for Muslim education as part of the regular instruction at state-run schools, different Islamic organisations compete for different models of instruction, favoring classes with Turkish as the language of instruction and Islamic teachers as the exclusive providers of religious education.

By far the majority of Islamic religious communities request some kind of denominational Islam (Muslim) religion classes in accordance with Article 7, para. 3 of the Basic Law, which "sets out that religious education in state schools (with the exception of non-denomonational schools) is to be a regular school subject to be taught in compliance with the principles of the respective religious communities, notwithstanding the right of supervision held by the state".[5] The Turkish Federation in Berlin-Brandenburg demands that religious education is not dependent on a particular Islamic association's interpretation of Islam. According to a survey among Turkish immigrants in North Rhine-Westphalia a majority of 73 percent favour Muslim religion classes in Turkish, and 45 percent support the participation of Turkish state authorities. Only a minority support the exclusive responsibility of German school authorities or Islamic organisations for the provision of Muslim religious classes.

At the level of Federal and State governments consensus has been reached on the necessity to introduce Muslim religion classes using

[5] Independent Commission on Migration to Germany (2001), p. 231.

German as the language of instruction. These curricula should be developed in cooperation with Muslim representatives and follow the requirements as outlined in the Basic Law. A major prerequisite—and currently the most pressing problem—for a successful introduction of this denominational education is the availability of professionally trained teaching personnel. Teachers for Muslim religious classes should be trained at the university level although no such programs have yet been developed as part of any teacher training program.

Official languages and minority languages

German is stipulated by law as the official language of administration and of the judiciary. There are special provisions in Brandenburg and Sachsen for the use of the Sorbian (Wendish) language. Education differs from administration and justice in that there are no legislative provisions on the language of instruction. German is the normal language of instruction and training at general education and vocational schools as well as institutions of higher education.

The exceptions at school include certain private schools, all bilingual schools and classes as well as instruction and extra classes in the mother tongue for non-German pupils. In 1998, Germany joined the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages of the Council of Europe and applies this agreement to those speaking Danish, Fresian, Sorbian, Romany and Low German. The children of the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein can attend private schools (Ersatzschulen) instead of the general education schools of the public sector, as long as the educational objectives of these schools essentially correspond to those of the school types provided for in the Schleswig-Holstein education act (R105). Lessons in these schools are taught in Danish. As a rule, German is a compulsory subject as of grade two. Parents may choose whether their children should attend schools catering for the Danish minority. They merely have to inform the local primary school (Grundschule) that their child has been accepted at a school which caters for the Danish minority, and thus absolve him/her from the need to attend the public-sector school.

The Case of Berlin

The total number of the non-German population increased from 248.656 in 1985 to 436.182 in 2001. About 45 percent of the Berlin population belongs to religious communities, among them 27 percent are protestants, 10 percent Catholics, 6 percent are Muslims of different orientation and 0,3 percent belong to the Jewish Community. About 2 percent belong to other religious communities of which official statistics count about 100. Depending on how they are classified, the number of these communities may be between 100 and 200. Islam in Berlin represents the third major religious community, as it happens to be in Germany generally. The total number of Muslims in Germany is about 3 million, of whom 80 percent are immigrants from Turkey, mostly Sunnīs. The number of Alevites is about 500.000 for Germany, about 60.000 in Berlin. There are more than 70 Islamic mosques and prayer houses in Berlin.

Options for Migrants' Education in Berlin

Background: Deficit Language Abilities

Following a pilot project in the Berlin district of Wedding in 1998/99 (covering 20 primary schools with 1594 students in grade one), which has the highest proportion of foreign immigrants and of unemployment, the Berlin government decided to assess the level of language competence (communicative competence) of newly recruited students in grade one of primary schools for the school term 2002/2003 (Senatsverwaltung, 2001). The assessment is designed to provide information on language deficits among students of German and non-German language origin. As a first step the four districts with the highest percentage of students of non-German language origin were selected for a trial assessment. In spring 2003 this will be extended to 12 districts. Altogether 145 schools with 9874 students (51 percent German students, 49 percent students of non-German language origin) were tested six months ahead of the entry to primary school education in fall 2002/2003. The results of the assessment were devastating and lead to a massive public discussion of the current mode of education for migrants' children and youths.

The emerging picture was as follows: On average students achieved 66 out of a 100 points scale, German students did better with 78 points, students of non-German language origin fell behind with 53 points only. Students who had attended pre-primary classes or preschool institutions did better than those who had not attended any preschool institutions. The proportion of students with intensive need for supplementary education/training was 36 percent, in contrast, 33 percent had no such demand and 31 percent simply had demand for supplementary education/training. Among those with intensive (severe) need for supplementary training the number of students of non-German language origin was nearly five times greater than the number of German students. In practice, the more severe the need for additional training, the higher the percentage of students of non-German language origin. Not surprisingly, those districts which "won the race", were those where the proportion of foreign immigrants (students of non-German origin) was low. In Wedding, the district with the highest proportion of students of non-German language origin, the learning achievement was the lowest among all districts. Regardless of the fact that educationists have criticized the underlying methodology of the language assessment (Gogolin, Neumann & Roth 2001), the picture emerging from the data is frightening and should be considered as a starting point for action.

Supplementary (Remedial) Education (Förderunterricht)

The most influential shortcoming of education for minorities with regards to their life chances is the dramatically reduced language proficiency, especially on the level of pre-primary and primary education. In order to cope with this problem a number of options for supplementary education are available (Nové, 2000):

1. Students with no or a highly restricted command of the German language may attend intensive German language courses which are run for eight hours per week, mostly parallel to regular classes at primary school level. Learning groups should not exceed 12 students. Regardless of the student's learning success this class may be attend for up to three years.
2. Students with considerable deficits in the German language and who have severe problems in following instruction in the class are entitled to receive remedial teaching, the so-called "German as second language" training. It will be provided for five hours per

week, and learning groups should not exceed 10 students. This language course may last for two years (in exceptional cases for three years), depending on the learner's success.

3. If more than 25 percent of students in regular primary classes are not able to follow German as the language of instruction, special remedial classes should be established in order to qualify students for participation in regular classes within two years. In addition to these promotional measures, the school will take the language deficits of students into account for grading. Many schools also provide after-school activities, either independently organised or in cooperation with other social organisations.

A research report on "Verlässliche Halbtagsgrundschule" (Ramseger et al., 2001), which was part of a larger project "Primary School Reform 2000" run by the Berlin school authorities, pointed out that the provision of qualified personnel for the organisation of supplementary education for students of non-German language origin was far from what was necessary. Specially delegated teaching personnel were very often misused in spite of severe manpower shortage at primary schools. This in turn lead to severe undersupply of teaching hours in the afore mentioned three versions of supplementary language training. This situation seemed to be most dramatic in districts with a high percentage of foreign immigrants, like Kreuzberg, Wedding, Neukölln and Tiergarten where in some classes up to 90 percent of students were of non-German language origin.

But criticism has also been raised with regard to the concept of remedial training and remedial classes, in both cases students are separated from their German class-mates, thus isolated in a language environment, which prevents a student from opting to communicate with native speakers of the same age. In addition, while out-of-class communication in multi-ethnic classes is dominated by the use of German as the main language for communication, more homogeneous classes of students of non-German language origin tend to avoid German as the main form of communication (Ramseger et al., 2001, p. 29). Finally, most successful examples of supplementary provision of training seems to be of that kind where language training is interrelated with a variety of additional measures, covering school-based after-class activities as well as out-of-school activities and coaching in cooperation with different actors in society.

European School (Europaschule)

The European School (Europaschule) is a fine example of schooling in a multilingual environment (Göhlich 1998; Sukopp 1996). In terms of administration these schools comprise classes attached to regular schools, starting with preschool classes for five-year olds on the pre-primary level. Teaching is bi-lingual and all kinds of formal graduation certificates can be obtained. The main characteristic of this type of schooling is the composition of the student body: Classes are formed on the basis of equal representation of students with German as their mother tongue and those with one out of the following nine foreign languages English, French, Russian, Spanish, Italian, Greece, Turkish, Portuguese and Polish. These languages form a pool of so-called "partner languages" (Partnersprachen). Teaching—except foreign language training—is carried out by native speakers, special personnel are in charge of teaching in the non-German mother tongue. Until Grade 8 teaching in the subjects "mother tongue" and "partner language" are organized on the basis of separated language groups receiving the same amount of instruction. Beginning with grade 5 all students have to attend English language classes as their foreign language training, students with English as partner language attend French classes.

Islamic Education in Berlin: the Unsolved Problem

In Berlin the provision of religious education for students from Muslim families is still an unsolved problem, as there is actually hardly any choice for parents. As it is the case in most German states, elements of Islamic education predominantly are provided in the form of supplementary language instruction. As part of these language-based classes education in ethics and moral values have also become core elements. At present Islamic education is favoured as a separate course for primary/secondary schooling in a limited number of German States, among them being Berlin. The underlying question which has been brought to court is whether teaching of Islamic education may be left to Islamic organisations, thus leading to teaching at school without direct state control, or has to be taught by professionally trained teachers with a regular certificate of state controlled education at the university level. Reference has been made

to the most recent decision of court that Islamic religious organisations are legally entitled to provide religious instruction in accordance with the Basic Law (see above). It has only since the beginning of the new school year of 2002/2003 that Islamic religious classes have been opened at selected schools.[6] There is ongoing debate on the kind of professional background that is to be required for teachers and universities engaged in teacher training have been asked to develop new courses for preparing teaching personnel. First results are not likely to become visible before 2003/2004.

According to interview data generated as part of a Masters thesis in progress I have the impression that teachers at primary and secondary level schooling face special difficulties in coping with student behavior and different orientations that are either related to cultural differences and/or social class background. Most frequently cited problems have been:

- Aggressive behavior among Muslim boys, especially in open discussion with female teachers, and gender-specific dominance in male-female communication;
- the correct interpretation of the concept of seref and namus (honour and dignity);
- the confrontation between Islamic values and non-Islamic value systems, especially after the September 11, 2001 attack, also the different approaches of Islamic and non-Islamic law;
- the reluctance among Muslim parents to accept responsibilities for misbehavior and learning failure of their children and to avoid direct communication with teachers and school authorities;
- the assumed clash of Human Rights—as interpreted by the majority of western states—with core values in Islam (actually, the question is: which Islam?);

[6] The introduction of these classes is in line with the Recommendation of the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany to "integrate Muslim religion classes taught in the German language into the curricula of German schools in accordance with Article 7, para. 3 of the Basic Law in order to provide an alternative to the lessons offered by private Ḳur'ānic schools; to train teachers in preparation for Muslim religion classes in Germany and to organise Muslim religion classes at German schools in such a way that they help young muslims develop their own identity."

– the role of dress codes for women (wearing a scalf) in Islamic societies and the western interpretation in the light of women rights,
– the low attendance rate among migrant students in general.

These findings have to be confirmed at a later stage of the thesis but, they certainly point into the direction for further attention and discussion of possible reforms in teacher training.

Conclusion

The introduction of Islamic education as a new element of the school curriculum in state run schools is certainly reflecting a new understanding of "integration" in public. More German states are on the move to granting individual schools at primary level the right to introduce Islamic education. Overall the percentage of Muslim students who take part in these classes is probably in the range of 10–15 percent. Especially after the events of September 2001 the informed public is watching critically who is delivering teaching and what is the content. Currently, the most pressing problem is the provision of a qualified teaching force. The actual participation of Islamic organisations is hardly accepted and state governments are in a hurry to establish university based training for teachers. This will take some time, in the meantime it will be the Islamic organisations to provide the Islamic expertise at the school level.

In a broader perspective—and this may be part of educational globalization—the education of Muslim minorities has become an issue for state and society. The role of Islam as a religion of equal right to Christian religions is now under debate, and this leads to the more general discussion about the role of religion in education and schooling. Regardless of the outcome of this discussion we do find more flexibility and openness in handling these issues than ever.

With regard to competence building new developments have been cited here in the aftermath of the PISA "schock" in Germany. Most likely a variety of educational programmes will be developed to overcome language-based difficulties in competence building among migrants' children and youth. This will also be on the agenda as soon as the Immigration Act finally comes into effect. Still, the under-

lying problem of "identity building" among Muslim minorities will not be solved in the near future. At least there is a growing awareness about these issues.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

EDUCATION AND MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Karel Rýdl and Marika Uiberlayová

Introduction

This chapter describes the situation of the Muslim and some other minorities and the possibilities for education and teaching in the Czech Republic (CR). Traditional linguistic minorities such as Polish and German speaking minorities have since long-established rights to their educational arrangements, while the same does not apply in practice to the large Romany minority and still less to the comparatively recently immigrated Muslims. In its efforts to become involved in the globalization processes, the CR has had to accept a large number of laws and conventions which would improve the situation of the Muslims if they were realized. The first section presents the general information and political, historical and cultural background that situate minorities in their present day context. The second and third sections describe the problems Muslims encounter when demanding their education solutions.

Background

The minority experience in Czechoslovakia before and after 1993, when Czechoslovakia became the Czech republic (and the Slovac Republic) has very different historical backgrounds. The communist government came to power in 1948. With regard to immigration, the first wave included people from Vietnam, Kampuchea, Cuba, Ethiopea, mostly—students and workers. With the 1968 invasion by the troops from the Warszaw pact, there was a wave of emigration of Czechs to countries in Western Europe. A second wave of immigration came after the collapse of the Soviet system in 1990. Immigrant groups included Czechs living in Russia, and people from Ukraine,

Greece and Arab countries. Then, more and more people have come from the Balkans, Afghanistan (war immigrants), Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (economic immigrants). After the political division of Czechoslovakia into two new republics (Czech and Slovak) more people came from Slovakia (Romany) into the CR to pursue economic opportunities and the Slovak people are also at present members of a national minority in the CR. The CR made efforts to create better conditions for the life of ethnic, national and religions (cultural) minorities.

The second half of the 20th century brought the UN's attempts at institutionalising the care of asylum seekers. In 1951, the Geneva Convention (The UN Convention for the Conditions of Refugees) consolidated the status of refugees for the whole world and established a minimum standard for handling refugees. The CR accepted and ratified the Convention in 1991, but it took until 1993 before it was made public in the Law Digest. The delay was due to the division of the state, and the international recognition of the two new states: the Czech and Slovak Republics. The CR had been preparing its own refugee law for a number of years. Alongside the establishment of different international institutions, the problems of refugees became the concern of a range of non-governmental organisations.

Despite the new conditions in Europe, Czech legislators struggle against a lack of interest at various levels in the country—in systematic adaptation to the international changes. However, two new laws, the one concerning immigrants (1992) and the other one concerning asylum seekers (1990) were put into effect. The new law concerning residence status of immigrants in the CR, in fact, complicated rather than eased the situation of immigrants already living and working in the CR. A welcome addition, however, was the institutionalization of temporary asylum, which allows a visa for a period of one year.

The Situation of Immigrants

Polish and German speaking minorities have a long history in the CR. Until 1989 the state recognised only organizational activities of these two minorities: the Polish Cultural League from 1948 and the Cultural Association of Citizens of German nationality from 1968.

If we do not take into account the waves of refugees from the former East Germany, who tried to reach West Germany through

Prague, the CR experienced, for the first time, a large number of refugees following the revolution in autumn 1989. Until that time the CR had been a strictly closed country, creating more of its own refugees (two waves: after 1948 and after 1969) than it received. By the year 1990 the then Czechoslovakia had once again become an asylum, transit country, particularly for migrants from countries of the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, India and Pakistan, and since 1993, Slovakia. In 1990 the first refugee camps for political asylum seekers were set up. For refugees, integrated accommodation centers were established, and humanitarian centres were established for people with temporary asylum. Between 1990 and 1998 refugee camps received almost 20,000 applicants, of which approximately one tenth gained refugee status, most of them were from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and Romania. Between 1990 and 2001 the national composition of refugees changed radically. Of 1,228 individuals, one third were from India and Ukraine, and many were from Moldavia, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Armenia, and Sri Lanka. However, only eight persons were granted asylum. Also, for most of these asylum seekers, the CR is merely a transit country on the way to the EU.

Immigration is an unexpected phenomenon for the Czech population (a certain closedness and xenophobic mood have been inherited from the former political regime), and is accepted as a necessity in the political and economic convergence with "open" Western Europe. Gradually, European legal standards are being accepted.

Ethnic Minorities in the CR

The current national and ethnic composition of the population of the CR is the result of long-term development characterised by a number of politically and economically motivated migration waves. Politically motivated refugees appeared in Czechoslovakia in the beginning of the 1960s from Greece, and later on also from African countries. An additional wave of migration started after 1990 due to the Balkan conflict and the collapse of former Soviet Republics but also because of the problems in the Middle East. Economically motivated migration of young people from Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Libya and other befriended countries was generally supported by the state in the 1970s and 1980s. A large number of these people

studied in the CR and found work. After 1990 their relatives and friends came to join them, a fact that has resulted in relatively large national minorities living throughout the whole republic. In the years 1993–1995 (after the division of former Czechoslavakia into two republics) the CR experienced a strong migration wave of Slovaks searching for better social conditions in the CR.

In 2002, the largest ethnic and national minorities living in the CR were, in terms of their estimated numbers: Slovaks (320,000), Poles (59,000), Germans (48,000), Romany (33,000 registered in 1991, though, in reality, 200,000 live in the CR), Hungarians (20,000), Ukrainians (9,000), and Russians (5,000). All minorities make up about six percent of the population. These numbers do not include the estimated 100,000 immigrants who stay illegally in the country.

Principle changes in the lives of minorities took place after the acceptance of the new constitution in 1991. Protection of the rights of (some) minorities now includes: education in mother tongue (there are Polish, Romany and Slovak nationality schools with state grants); cultural activities and development of national culture with state grants; and propagation and acceptance of information in the mother tongue (radio, television, books and publications).

In 1994 the Refugees Counselling Centre of the Czech Helsinki Committee was established to create better communications with refugees. This NGO sends its voluntary workers regularly to camps to organise education in the Czech language, cultural and social programmes, and in democracy, human rights, interpersonal relations, etc. In 2000, in connection with the application for membership in the EU, the CR began an extensive campaign in order to create consensus particularly on three principle EU documents: the Schengen Agreement (1990) on the Gradual Removal of Borders in the EU, the Dublin Agreement of the Council of Europe (1990) and the Harmonization of Asylum Policy. For the CR, the so-called associated decisions are important as an expression of the ambition to live up to the EU requirements. These requirements imply that the Czech legislation adopts decisions made by EU bodies (Cruz, 1993; Drbohlav, 1999).

In its evaluation announcement in 1999, the European Commission stated that the situation of ethnic minorities in the CR is satisfactory with the exception of the Romany, who evidently experience discrimination (Ceská republika, 1999).

Education for Children of Refugees and Other Minorities

Generally, free education including teaching in the Czech language for immigrants is guaranteed for different groups, among them the groups relevant in this chapter.[1] Most categories of these children are provided with free education at compulsory levels. Children of immigrants with permission for permanent stay and children of immigrants who were granted refugee status finish obligatory school attendance at secondary school under the same conditions as the children of Czech citizens. A directive from 1995 makes it compulsory for school councils to establish direct contact with sites in their regions having immigrant children attending compulsory education.[2] Since January 2000, the Law on the Residence of Immigrants (no. 326/1999 Coll.) and the Law of Asylum (no. 325/1999 Coll.) have been in force in the CR. A directive of the Ministry of Education (MOE) on education of immigrants in Czech schools presents new regulations that are currently being prepared.

Working with children of refugees awaiting asylum in camps constitutes a significant problem. This educational activity is organized voluntarily by the Advisory for Refugees in Prague, whose teachers teach Czech in the camps, prepare children for school attendance, conduct courses of citizenship education, tolerance, hygiene, etc. They organize outings, and acquaint the children with Czech customs in a real setting. To ensure the finance of these activities, the Advisory group holds various charity events, concerts, bazaars and so on.

The educational conditions of children of refugees and other immigrants are guaranteed with the following means. The Education Act of 1984 states: "Pupils belonging to national minorities, to the extent of adequate interest in their nationality development, are ensured the right to education in their mother tongue."[3] In June 1993 the

[1] Children of immigrants who have been granted permanent residence permission; children of immigrants who have been granted long-term residence permission; children of immigrants who have been granted temporary asylum; children of immigrants who apply for refugee status; children of immigrants who are granted refugee status; and children of immigrants who have permission for permanent stay in the immigrant camps.

[2] Citizens of the Slovak Republic have the right to use Slovak language apart from the lessons of Czech language and literature.

[3] Education Act (no. 29/1984 Coll.), on the System of Primary, Secondary and Higher Educational Establishments in the wording of Novella no. 138/1995 Coll., ' 3.

MOE requested local school councils with suitable conditions, to organise so-called preparatory classes for children with socio-culturally challenging backgrounds (Romany children, for instance). The MOE introduced—on experimental basis—from the autumn 1997 to the end of June 2000 preparatory classes for disprivileged children (Freiová, 2000). After an evaluation of the results among Romany children, it was suggested that the organization of these preparatory classes be continued. Such classes can be organized by public and private bodies in primary schools, special schools and exceptional nursery schools under the following conditions: the relevant school councils must approve the introduction of such classes, and there are children who have deferred school attendance due to lack of information.

The Educational Perspectives of Minorities

The Roman Minority

The Soviet imposed education system (similar to that of other Soviet-dominated countries) was abolished in the beginning of the 1990s. The Romany are the largest territorially unattached minority in Europe and number almost seven million. They may serve as a point of comparison when the educational situation for the Muslim immigrants is discussed. Since 1991, they are defined as a national minority in the CR, constituting two to three percent of the population. Due to their high birth rate, and an increasing illegal Romany immigration from Slovakia (many Romany immigrants live as "just visiting" people), the proportion of young people among the Romany is incrreasing. Before 1990, the communist policy-makers saw the Romany as a socio-cultural backward population, and made attempts to raise its educational level. The return of democracy in 1989 led, first of all, to an acceptance of the Romany nationality, the right to their own language and support for a specified national culture. There is no doubt, however, that in practice the situation of the Romany ethnic group is bad and deteriorating. The level of education among the Romany population is extraordinary low, although younger generations among them have participated more than older generations in primary education. Romany children, in comparison to other children, fail more often and are classified with second and third degree of behavioural difficulties and more greater drop out

before having completed primary education (Sotolová, 2000). Therefore, CR is often the subject of criticism on the European forum. The Romany suffer from poverty, unemployment, marginalization—just to mention a few problems (Rican, 1997).

It is an obligation of the state to guarantee Romany (as well as non-Romany) children the rights stipulated in the international Convention on the Rights of Children. The Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms ensures citizens forming a national or ethnic minority the right to participate in the solution of matters concerning themselves. The coordinating and advisory organ of MOE in the matters of national education is a special commission, in which Polish, Slovak and Romany nationalities are represented.

Muslim Immigrants and Their Education

Alongside the change in political orientation in the CR at the close of the 1980s and with the gradual creation of a pluralistic democratic society, attempts have been made by oppressed and unrecognised church and religious groups to assert themselves in areas of public life and to attain state registration to allow them to expand their public life, education and cultural institutions, and make them recognized public organs. One such minority are the Muslims in the CR.

The Muslim population has immigrated to the CR in a number of waves generally because of greater opportunities in the CR than in their home countries. The Communist regime allowed, within the framework of cooperation with countries, university education for chosen people of Asian and African countries, whose regimes suited the Soviet Block. Another group of Muslims in the CR are businessmen, who after 1990 gained permission to work in the country and from that, the possibility of long-term residence. The last group of Muslims are mostly immigrants from the conflict areas of the Middle East and the Balkans. The government estimates that Muslims with citizenship other than Czech number 10,000 individuals. A numerically small though influential group among the Muslims living in the CR are Czechs who have converted to Islam.

After 1990, one problem in the Czech educational system, until then only marginal, began to gain importance—the problem of integrating immigrant children into Czech schools. Although the number of immigrants in the CR has been increasing and is likely to increase in future as well, the issue of the education for their children has

received little attention (Drbohlav, 1999). It is only in the last two years that the education of immigrant children has become a prioritized area in connection with the implementation of a new strategy for education policy, formulated in the White Paper of the Czech Ministry of Education (published in English in 2001) (MOE, 2001).

Even ten years after the Velvet Revolution, Czech society, mainly the older generations, is very closed and reacts against the acceptance of any type of political, cultural, religious or social system, other than the Czech. This taciturnity and certain mistrust among people particularly from the Arab countries have lead to a significant isolation of Muslims in the CR. People from Muslim countries are suspected to be (potential) terrorists and there is a fear of their activities and their attempts to establish themselves in the same way as other social and religious groups.

If we do not take into account indigenous Czechs who adhere to Islam, Muslim-oriented immigrants can be classified into two basic groups:

a) Legal residents who have been granted an official residence permit for family reasons, employment or study; and
b) illegal residents coming to the country through unofficial channels, with no residence permits, and often heading for other countries (Germany, France, Scandinavia).

As far as the first group is concerned, there is some information available that allows an assessment of their children's education. As for the second group, however, we rely only on rough estimates because official information is unavailable, and all data is hypothetical and speculative. We may, however, assume that most members of this illegally settled group live in the country without their children, and are thus not relevant for the issues of child education.

As to the legally settled group of Muslim residents in the CR, it is necessary to distinguish between two categories of immigrants according to the differing conditions for the obtainment of a permanent residence permit, and get a job and acquire a right to the benefit of the Czech educational system:

1. Immigrants with a permanent residence permit based on keeping a common household with a Czech partner, a person's own entrepreneurship, or a request from an international company for a

work permit for immigrant experts. These people are guaranteed absolutely free movement and are entitled to all the benefits of the Czech social and educational systems.
2. Immigrants holding a temporary residence permit for humanitarian reasons. This concerns mainly Muslim refugees from the Balkans or asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, or African countries. Their movement is restricted to the area of their refugee camps. If camp facilities do not include a school, refugee children attend a local school (Pristehovalectví, 2000).

Compared to the situation in other European countries, a significant Muslim presence is a recent phenomenon in the CR. Collective Muslim activities have to take place through public associations or publicly beneficial charities that are registered with the Ministry of Interior. In this way, a number of Muslim groups are legally active in the CR. The Muslim umbrella organisation in the CR, "The Centre of the Muslim Religious Community" (Al-Ittihad Al-Islami), which is based in Trebíc, where the magazine "The Voice of the Muslim Religious Community" is published by Czechs who have converted to Islam. Their relations with the authorities are very diplomatic and conciliatory. Other organisations have created a certain compromise in the their missionary work and their demands towards the Czech state. Among them we find "The Association of Muslim Students", which is run mainly by Arab students and young businessmen, and the "Islamic Fund" which runs mosque activities in Prague and Brno. Mosque activities take place in ordinary buildings which have not been changed for this purpose and for which no approval has been given to change. In 2000, the "Muslim Union" was set up for a better mediation position with the state authorities, though its people are the same as in the Centre of the Muslim Religious Community and Islam Fund. Alongside these organisations there exists the official Turkish Mosque in Prague, which plays the role of an Islamic cultural centre for the CR.

However, it may be argued that migration itself can have a negative impact on the further education and upbringing of children. The background of a family which follows traditional cultural and educational patterns and roles has a great impact and already acquired knowledge, values and standards can become a barrier, if they clash with the values and standards promoted by the Czech schools. The monitoring of a number of Muslim families in the regions where

most of these families are concentrated, revealed that "children who began to attend Czech schools gradually developed their own new world, thus becoming alienated from their parents, a fact that caused tension, and many families wanted to deal with this situation by returning to their country of origin" (Vizinová, and Preiss, 1999, p. 158). Many Czech schools have already seen a spontaneous emergence of a multicultural environment (Rýdl, 1998).

The Czech Ministry of Education has, thus far, registered 21 church and religious associations, which may thus legally develop their cultural, instructional and educational activities. However, the Ministry of Education has thus far not registered any application for setting up a Muslim school which could fulfil the obligatory school attendance. Legislation in force up to now has been appropriate, neither for educational demands as a whole in the CR, nor for the immigrant pressure for an open society (multicultural tolerance). A draft proposal was presented to the parliament early in 2002 which would allow official recognition and registration for the majority of religious groups. According to the prevailing law, a religious community can be registered only if it has 10,000 members or more. In the proposal, this number has been lowered to 300 members. On the other hand, it has to wait ten years for the possibility to establish schools within the education system. Muslims and other, as yet, unregistered religious groups (such as Hindus or Buddhists) do not agree with this proposal, because it does not give them the possibilities to develop educational activities and compete with state schools. The law mentioned is still being discussed in the national parliament.

According to current legislation regarding religious education in state schools, such confessional activity with students is allowed. If at least one parent of a student shows interest (the new proposal suggests the interest of at least ten parents), the head-teacher should turn to representatives of registered churches with a request for religious education. Such representatives may be allowed access to the schools only and present their religion and the cost has to be covered by the school budget. However, the church must not be active in the school outside the normal religious education lessons. In the case of an unregistered religion the head-teacher is not liable to react at all. However, the authors of this article know cases in which one or two representatives of an unregistered Islamic group came to a school invited by parents, children or teachers to present the Islamic culture.

Four schools and their dealings with immigrant children have been

specially studied for this article. These are schools either focussing on teaching Czech to immigrants or providing education to children from a nearby asylum camp, or schools which are obliged to take immigrant children with regard to their place of residence. In view of the fact that no Muslim organisation in the CR has official accreditation (recognition) from the Ministry of Culture, under which religious matters fall, the Muslims cannot establish or develop their own schools. Instead, the educational activities of the Muslims are developed in two directions:

1. Their own educational activities at the mosques. Here there are catechised groups of Muslim children, who are taught about Islam and Arabic on Sundays or at afternoon education meetings. In addition, mosques offer other courses in Arabic and Islam for anyone interested. Available sources suggest that 12–15 children regularly take part in catechism courses in Brno and around 25 in Prague. Typically, a few hundred interested people take part in the weekend meetings in the mosques. Some tens of students and other interested people attend courses in Arabic, though their linguistic competence is not yet recognised by the state.
2. Publication and tutoring activities at mosques. The Islam Fund in Prague and Brno issues a range of printed matter and promotional brochures on individual problems of community life from the Islamic point of view.

Children of Muslim parents with permanent residence in the CR are obliged to attend Czech schools, and it is assumed that they already speak Czech when they enroll. Children of officials of diplomatic missions from Muslim countries are schooled either in Arabic (e.g. the Egyptian Embassy) or in English. According to actual interviews with representatives of Muslim groups in the CR, people's interest in Islam is increasing, but at the same time counter-attacks are growing in intensity, arising from ignorance and prejudices. On the other hand, Muslim protests are directed against the way historical events are described in textbooks for history, civics and philosophy—the world and its development are presented mainly from the Christian and Czech perspective.

On the basis of interviews with Czech school teachers and headmasters and observations in schools with Muslim children, the following picture emerges:

1) Schools have not encountered any serious problems among children as far as clashes between different cultures are concerned. Muslim children want to differ as little as possible and quickly interact with the majority population. However, the atmosphere of an unfriendly approach to Muslim children (mainly girls) is created by some teachers and classmates from higher grades.
2) It is very rare that teachers have to solve cases of children's psychological problems arising from migration, apart from those children living with their parents temporarily in asylum camps.
3) Children from Muslim families live in social and economic conditions comparable to those of Czech children.
4) Muslim children demonstrate the same average rate of success or failure as children of the majority population.
5) Families with prospects for a long-term or permanent residence are highly interested in the education of their children in Czech schools.
6) As a result of current practice, teachers little realize the significance of the issue of multicultural education of immigrant children, mainly Muslims.
7) Teachers usually use the same methodological practice in their relations with Muslim children as in their relations with Czech children. They are willing to tolerate a language handicap for a certain time but not the cultural differences.
8) Teachers are not really deeply interested in further multicultural education. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the range of courses offered to teachers is rather limited and lacks a specific focus.

Children from Muslim families are forced to observe the traditions of their families and traditions of the school at the same time. Therefore, they frequently feel unsure when facing new situations in life to which they respond in their specific way, which is often misunderstood by parents as well as teachers.

When it comes to multicultural education, the didactic methods and forms—and especially the necessary specific information about the way of life, and cultural and social background of immigrants living in the Czech Republic, etc.—are weak points of the Czech educational system. A support system for schools and teachers was launched in 2000 in connection with a change in the education policy.

However, activities in education, even if they have received a favourable response, encounter administrative obstacles from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Culture. The former Ministry applies strict conditions for granting a permanent or a long-term residence permit are being applied. The latter Ministry has made it more difficult for newly recognised religious groups (Muslims being one of them) to establish their own state-recognised schools for the next ten years. Czech Muslim groups, thus organized as civic associations and societies rather than religious groups, have only one opportunity left—Sunday or weekend courses in the Arabic language and culture on the premises of two recognised mosques (Prague, Brno).

Conclusion

The CR was a closed country for a long time and is still a very homogonous country as concerns nationality, which brings significant problems with hidden xenophobia and open racism. Although there have been demonstrations of racist violence, over the last ten years, the CR has become an open country, gradually ceasing to be merely a transit country and becoming the country of immigrants' permanent stay.

The world models (Human rights, minority rights, etc.) have been formally accepted, although not always implemented. The education system was restructured in the way suggested in these models, but the Muslim minority has not been given the same opportunity as in some other countries. When it comes to immigration policies, there are political attempts to assimilate rules for the residence of refugees and ethnic minorities at the standard of the neighbouring EU countries (Germany, Austria), as well as a joint migration policy with EU countries, which will come into force from the year 2005. The CR has accepted a range of laws and measures, which significantly change conditions for the residence of immigrants and ethnic minorities to their advantage, even when, from the economic point of view, it exerts a significant stress, which is criticised by a large section of the population.

A big problem is communication between different ministries and departments of the Czech government in concerting the legislative conditions for the residence immigrants, schooling and social policy

with the needs of the ethnic minorities and refugees according to the easing of the legal norms of the EU. Another serious problem for the future will be the possibility of official recognition of a range of religious groups, who want to educate their children in their own schools. At present this possibility has been granted experimentally to the Hare Krishna sect, while the Czech Jewish community which has its own primary school in Prague has made attempts to be recognized. In contrast, the Muslim or Hindu communities have, until now, had to undertake illegal activities in the area of education of their children.

In the CR the problem of Muslims is not yet a challenge as in Germany or France, for example. However, the number of Muslims is rapidly increasing and if Czech society is not open and compromising enough, we can expect a range of very complicated ideological and practical clashes.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE GREEK STATE, THE MUSLIM MINORITIES OF WESTERN THRACE AND EDUCATION: SHIFTS UNDER WAY?

Luciana Benincasa (with Olga Karavia and Despina Skouladiki)

Introduction

This chapter[1] deals with the Greek state and the provision of education to the Muslim minorities of Western Thrace. On the basis of a literature review and interviews conducted with Muslim parents in the area, the chapter describes recent developments in the relationships between the state and the minorities and their possible relation to what seems to be a shift in parents' educational preferences in very recent years.

Background

Until recently Greece, compared to other nation states, has been a relatively homogeneous country from an ethnic, linguistic and religious point of view. The largest part of the population (98 percent) is Greek Orthodox. Out of the remaining two percent, 1.3 percent is Muslims (CIA, 1998). Greek citizens who are Muslims live in the farthest north-eastern area of Greece (about 100,000) and on the island of Rhodes (between 2,000 and 2,300 in number) (Chiotakis,

[1] A different paper on the same theme, but from a macro-level perspective, was presented at the 3rd meeting of the Nordic Network of International and Comparative Education (NICE) in Aalborg, Denmark, June 5–6, 1998. The paper was published in the meeting proceedings as follows: The Greek State, the Minorities and Education in an International Context: the Muslims of Western Thrace. In Jesper Hosbond Jensen and Palle Rasmussen, eds., *Educational Policy and the Global Social Order*. Report No. 2 from the Nordic Network of International and Comparative Education. Aalborg, Denmark: Aalborg University, Department of Social Studies and Organization (1999).

1997). Starting with the 1980s, Greece, traditionally a country of emigration, has become a host country for thousands of immigrants and refugees. 'Foreigners'[2] are estimated to be around 500–600,000 corresponding to around five percent of the population. The figure includes the repatriates and the Muslim minorities in Western Thrace (Katsikas & Politou, 1999).

The new demographic patterns are increasingly affecting the composition of the school population. In school year 1995–96, 41,000 foreigners and repatriates were enrolled in primary and secondary education. In school year 1999–2000, 12.3 percent of the school population in primary education consisted of pupils with an ethnocultural background different from that of the mainstream school population. Ten years earlier, the same categories of people constituted just 0.5 percent (Karlatira, 2002).

Western Thrace and the Minorities

Located in northeastern Greece, bordering Turkey, Western Thrace consists of three prefectures: Xanthi, Rodhopi and Evros, whose respective capital towns are Xanthi, Komotini and Alexandroupolis. The population of Western Thrace is mixed. According to the 1991 census, out of the total population of Thrace (338,000) about 240,000 are Christians and about 98,000 are Muslims. The Muslim minorities consist of three groups: about 50 percent of the minority members are of Turkish origin (*tourkoyenis*), 35 percent are Pomaks and 15 percent are Roma gypsies (*Dikeomatika*, 2001; MFA, 1999a). Again, according to provisional figures from the 2001 census, the distribution of the three groups varies across prefectures (Malkidis, 2002).

First incorporated into Greece after Second World War as a result of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), Western Thrace is called 'Western' because the geographical area known as Thrace continues eastwards over the border into Turkey (Stavros, 1995). Among other things, the Treaty called for a compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey: all Muslims of Greece were to resettle in Turkey and all the Orthodox population of Turkey was to resettle in Greece.

[2] 'Foreigners' is a literal translation of the expression used in Greek documents.

The only two exceptions to the exchange were: (a) the Muslims of Thrace and (b) the Orthodox population residing in Istanbul and on the islands of Imvros and Tenedos, who were allowed to stay (Greek Helsinki Monitor n.d.).[3] The populations covered by the Treaty were characterized as a religious minority and were granted the right to organize their life according to their own culture (Hellenic Republic, n.d.). Actually, Islam was the only common feature among groups of people that differed as to geographic distribution, language and 'nationality' (Sella-Mazi, 1997) and/or 'cultural and racial origins' (Divani, 1996, p. 24). With the exception of the ethnic Turks, the other groups within the minority (Pomaks and Roma-gypsies) did not have a reference state outside Greece.

As is often the case with minority populations, the Muslim minorities[4] in Greece are far from the centres of power, wealth and decision-making. However, it seems that distance has not prevented governments from viewing these minority groups as 'pawns in a power game', with little concern for their welfare (Divani, 1996, p. 24). Stavros (1995) refers to the Muslim minorities as a 'strategic' minority that a foreign power tries to use in order to forward particular aims. The group of Turkish origin has been the 'scapegoat of the two states, whose fortunes depend on the state of their antagonistic relations' (Dimitras & Papanikolatos, 1998).

According to a very recent study (Troumbeta, 2001), there is a strong tendency among the Pomaks to abandon Pomak and use Turkish instead and, to a lesser degree, to replace Pomak with Greek. The existence of Turkish-language TV programmes, broadcast by Turkey and especially designed for the Slavic speaking population in Greece, helps explain why many Pomaks have been gradually replacing their language with Turkish. The national element of Pomak identity has not outstripped the religious component,

[3] The Greek Helsinki Monitor was founded in late 1992, following the encouragement of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF). A year later, in December 1993, the latter's General Assembly accredited it as its Greek National Committee with an observer status; in November 1994, the General Assembly elevated Greek Helsinki Monitor to full membership. Current Greek Helsinki Monitor members are also members of Minority Rights Group—Greece, the Greek affiliate of Minority Rights Group International since January 1992. More about the Greek Helsinki Monitor is available at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/profile/index.html

[4] The term used in the Treaty is plural: 'the Muslim *minorities*'.

because, as devout Muslims, the Pomaks always place religion at the centre of their social and private life (Ibid.).

In 1951, the Greek state introduced Turkish-language education for the Pomak children (Greek Helsinki Monitor, n.d.). Apart from this, Greek governments have been indifferent and have done little to integrate the Pomaks or protect their interests. It is true that in more recent years the public administration has been showing increasing interest in the Pomaks, but also due to the economic depression of the area it is not easy to restore the populations' confidence in the state (Divani, 1996). The Greek Helsinki Monitor attributes a quite active role to the Pomaks in their own 'turkification' (Greek Helsinki Monitor, n.d.).[5]

The Minorities Today

During the dictatorship in Greece (1967–1973) and down to the very recent past, the Muslim minorities in Thrace suffered from administrative harassment. It was made difficult for them to buy land or houses, to repair or enlarge their houses and mosques, to obtain car, truck and tractor driving licenses, to open coffee houses, get bank loans and buy agricultural machines (HRW, 1999). It has been argued that the objective was to encourage them to emigrate, since their being under Turkish ideological influence was felt as a problem (*Nea*, 2001).

However, since the mid-1990s there have been many improvements in the living conditions of the minorities. The provisions that limited economic activities were abolished in 1990, which allowed for the entrance of the Muslim minorities into the labour market (Ibid.), whereas at the same time there have been improvements in the attitude of the administration towards the minorities (Stavros, 1995; Tsolak, 1998). The changed conditions allowed minority people to change their consumption patterns and led them to make more investments in the area. There are indications that the renewed interest on the part of the Greek state, evident since the mid-1990s,

[5] The Greek Helsinki Monitor is criticized by Gotovos (2002) on grounds that, with a view to avoid the 'turkification' of the Muslim minority in Thrace, it is contributing to the 'creation' of ethnic groups in the area.

has not always been welcomed by the Pomaks, who tend to see such interest as part of a strategy aimed at dissociating them from the ethnic Turks.

The Minorities and Education

The Muslims of Thrace were officially recognized as a homogenous religious minority that had the right to education in their own languages and the right to religious freedom. Since 1968, bilingual primary schools have existed in all villages where minority members live. Theoretically, minority parents have the possibility to send their children to ordinary schools (Stavros, 1995) but this has often been difficult in practice because of the children's limited mastery of Greek. In mountain areas mainly populated by Pomaks many schools are rather small and one teacher only may be in charge of several grades. Until the mid-1990s, there were neither day nurseries nor kindergartens mainly due to people's lack of trust towards the state (Omilos, 1997).

Bilingual schools have a bilingual curriculum (Kanakidou, 1996) set by a decision of the Minister of Education.[6] As stated in Greek official sources, in primary and secondary schools, classes are taught in Greek and in Turkish by Christian and Muslim teachers respectively (Eurydice Eurybase, 1998). Both Turkish and Greek are taught as subjects to the whole minority and used as medium of instruction (Sella-Mazi, 1997). In primary school the curriculum is equally divided between Greek and Turkish. The Greek share includes the teaching of the Greek language, history, geography, social and political education, and environmental studies. The program in Turkish includes the teaching of Turkish, mathematics, physics, religion, aesthetic education and physical education (Omilos, 1997). The Ḳur'ān is taught in Arabic (*Dikeomatika*, 2001). Recently, music and foreign languages have been introduced, to be taught by teachers who are members of the majority, but this measure, implemented in the Xanthi prefecture, has been hindered in the Rodhopi prefecture. According to research carried out in the Rodhopi area in 1996,

[6] The US State Department (1997) reports that Western Thrace has secular *Turkish-language schools*. The term used in Greek documents is 'bilingual schools'.

minority members are not willing to open their schools to an even greater number of majority teachers (Troumbeta, 2001).

At elementary level, bilingual schools are established by administrative order on the request of a sufficient number of minority parents. They are run by governing committees (*efories*) under state supervision. The members of the committees are selected by the state representative in the prefecture (*nomárchis*) out of a number of people chosen by the parents themselves. Each committee administers a special fund partly provided by the Greek state, but most funds come from the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastic or monastery land as well as contributions required from the parents in the form of fees (Troumbeta, 2001). Minority schools were and are private institutions, but in reality, due to the strong state control, they have come to acquire a kind of mixed private-public status (HRW, 1999).

The Treaty of Lausanne grants the provision of primary education but does not mention secondary education (Troumbeta, 2001, p. 69). Today, though education is mandatory for nine years, the provision of bilingual education is very limited beyond grade six.[7] There are three types of secondary education in minority areas, meant to serve both the Muslim minorities and the Christian majority population.

First, two minority secondary schools (lower and upper- six grades) operate in the prefectures of Xanthi and Rodhopi. Second, there are Greek monolingual lower secondary schools funded by the Greek state that have grown particularly in the remote mountainous area around Xanthi where the Pomaks live. In these schools, only religion is taught in Turkish (Baltsiotis, 1997; MFA, 1999a). Third, in the Rodhopi prefecture there are two theological schools. In Greek ministry sources, they are referred to with a term that is roughly equivalent to 'Muslim seminaries'. Founded in 1949 and 1956 respectively, these schools educate future Muslim priests who wish to become members of the lower Islamic clergy (*hati* or *imām*) (Greek Republic n.d.; Omilos, 1997) or intend to continue their studies either at the Special Teacher Training College in Thessaloniki, meant for Greek

[7] According to the US State Department (1997), 'the Treaty of Lausanne provides that the Muslim minority has the right to Turkish-language education'. However, the Treaty simply refers to the minority's 'own language', which was Turkish only for *one* of the groups within the Muslim group.

Muslims only, or at religious universities in Muslim countries, mainly Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Malkidis, 2000). Since 1998 these two schools have been officially recognized as equivalent to the religious studies upper-secondary schools available to Christian students all over the country (MFA, 1999b).

Since the 1960s the minority members have shown increasing interest in secondary education (Baltsiotis, 1997). Because minority secondary education is not available for all those who would like to attend, since 1996 the existing places have been assigned by lottery. On the other hand, the low level of elementary minority education does not always allow minority children to be admitted to majority lower secondary schools (Gousetis, 1999). According to some, admission examinations and final examinations in Greek in subjects that had been taught in Turkish have discouraged families from enrolling their children (Baltsiotis, 1997). All this has resulted in an increase in the flux of minority students from Pomak families as well as Turkish families to secondary schools in Turkey (Greek Helsinki Monitor, n.d.; US State Department, 2000).

In 1987/88 dropout rates in primary school in the two regions with the highest percentage of minority Muslims were 4.2 percent and 8.9 percent (Xanthi and Rodhopi prefecture respectively), while the national average for Greece was 0.3 (Zambeta, 1994, p. 148). In 1996, 16.4 percent and 29.7 percent of the pupils in each region respectively did not complete the nine-year compulsory education. Dropout rates after primary education are especially high among girls (Omilos, 1997) and among Muslim Roma gypsies, many of which never attend school or attend only occasionally as they start contributing to the family income from an early age. On the other hand, the limited knowledge of Greek, the fees, and the position that each family occupies in the local social stratification system constitute additional obstacles for many families, in spite of the fact that many parents have realized the importance of education for the future of their children (Troumbeta, 2001).

According to some authors, the general direction of politics in minority education has been towards weakening the links of the minority with Turkey (Troumbeta 2001). The right of the minority to have 'its own' education helped to isolate minority education from the central system and hindered the overall integration of the minority in Greek society.

Recent Developments

Considerable sums of money have been spent on the improvement of minority education, e.g. maintenance of school buildings, as well as salary bonuses and favourable pension arrangements for Muslim and Christian teachers willing to reside and teach in isolated villages (Demetropoulos, 1996; *Dikeomatika*, 2001). Since 1995 positive discrimination has been applied for admission of Muslim minority members to Greek universities through a quota system (a minimum of 0.5 percent every year) (Demetropoulos, 1996). This has contributed to a considerable increase in the number of Muslim students who attend public Greek-speaking secondary schools (Greek Republic, 1999/2000). The improvement in the living conditions, too, has largely contributed to a change in the attitude towards education: today minority members consider education the most serious issue of the minority (Baltsiotis, 1997; *Nea*, 2001). More and more young Muslims prefer attending Greek schools because they feel that a good mastery of Greek is crucial to survival in the labour market. Though sources do not agree on the exact figures, there has been an increase in the number of Muslim students attending Greek-speaking secondary schools. According to a Greek government source, from 1996–97 to 1999–2000 there has been a 70 percent rise (Greek Republic 1999–2000). At the same time there is high demand for preschool education, where children are taught Greek (*Nea*, 2001). In 2001 there were 185 kindergartens in Thraki, all of which were founded on request of the inhabitants of minority villages who wish their children to acquire satisfactory mastery of Greek language and education (*Dikeomatika!* 2001).

Though entitled to be treated in their own language, the Pomaks have been treated as Turkish (and not as Pomak) speakers by the authorities.

The Case of the Muslim Minorities in Western Thrace

Nineteen in-depth interviews were conducted with Muslims in the capital towns of the three prefectures of Western Thrace.[8] Four

[8] Some twenty Muslims were interviewed in Western Thrace. The respondents were from Komotini, Alexandroupolis and Xanthi.

themes were covered in the interviews: (a) the type of school parents prefer for their children, (b) relations with the state (c) differences between Muslims and Christians, and (d) national/ethnic identity. The interviews were conducted in Greek by two female Greek citizens from the majority group between summer 2001 and summer 2002.[9]

Parents' Educational Preferences

Most respondents claimed that they prefer the minority schools, at least at the level of elementary education. The reported reasons varied from one person to another. A common answer was that in a minority school their children could learn to speak both Greek and Turkish, thereby maintaining '*their mother tongue*' and '*keeping their roots*'. Given the context, 'mother tongue' must be taken to mean 'Turkish'. Although the parents are not legally obliged to send their children to a minority school, they feel pressure from their own minority group to do so. Another reason was the wish to avoid isolating their children from other minority children. According to one respondent many children are reported to attend the first three years in a minority school, which some call 'mixed schools', so that they can get the basics in Turkish, and complete primary education in a majority school.

One of the interviewees stated that the basic reason for choosing a minority elementary school was his belief that the learning of Turkish would enable his children to study at a Turkish university in case they failed in the Greek entrance exams to the university. However, he added that he would choose a non-minority school today because the new legislation facilitates the enrolment of Muslims at Greek universities. Another interviewee answered that his child chose to attend a minority school, but he was planning to move the child to a non-minority school. He also said that he would choose the latter type of school for his younger daughter.

The interviewees unanimously argued that the children of the minority population should learn to speak Greek, as it is the language of the country they are going to live and work in. A fourteen-year-old

[9] All of the respondents were from lower-middle or middle class background, aged 27 to 55 years. Only one respondent was 14.

girl said that after primary education she and her classmates enrolled at a majority school because they believe that they will have more chances to get a better job in the future. For the same reason other respondents want their children to learn Greek perfectly. Some respondents added that this issue concerns boys only, as normally girls are not allowed to study away from their homes. In Xanthi, in addition to whatever school they attend in the morning, in the afternoon boys and girls attend Ḳur'ānic school, which provides them with religious instruction in the form of learning the Ḳur'ān by heart. This instruction is not compulsory and seems to be limited to very young children—in any case not after primary school age.

When asked about minority education in general, almost all interviewees answered that there are many problems, some of which are related to the method employed for teaching Greek and the insufficient qualifications of the teachers belonging to the minority. Most of the respondents claim that in the minority schools neither of the two languages is taught satisfactorily, and that is the main reason why Muslim pupils face a number of problems when they choose a majority school, with the result that they often have to repeat the grade.

The respondents argued that older generations tended to attend minority schools, while younger generations are more likely to attend another type of school. This seems to point to a shift in the educational choices of the Muslim minority population. One of the interviewees linked the shift in favour of the majority schools with the quota system recently introduced. Until ten or fifteen years ago parents preferred to send their children to study to Turkish universities when they failed to get admission to a Greek university. Nowadays, said a respondent, they have stopped sending their children to Turkey. The interviewees felt that there has been a remarkable change in the educational level of the Muslim children within the last 20 years: nowadays several minority students graduate from upper-secondary school and most of them manage to get admission to university.

Relations with the State

In Komotini most of the interviewees answered that they either had faced or face problems occasionally in their relations to the state, mainly as concerns mortgages for buying a house or taking a business loan. A few believed that both Muslims and Christians face problems in their transactions with the state and bureaucracy due

the structure and organization of the state itself. One ethnic Turk pointed out that the state has not accepted him as a Greek citizen but he is not disappointed because he knows it is a transition period and things are changing for the better.

In Xanthi the Pomak interviewees argued that the relations with the state have improved during the last ten or fifteen years and much less than in the past do they face problems when trying to buy a house or obtain a business loan or even get a job. All of them strongly claimed that they do not face any problems with the state and that in their relationships with the local authorities and with the state they are equal to 'the Greeks', insisting on this and providing plenty of examples from their own experience.

Differences between Muslims and Christians

When it comes to the differences between Christians and Muslims, all the respondents in all three towns mentioned that there are some differences in the way of life that derive exclusively from the differences between the two religions. All said that women have significantly fewer rights than men in the field of social events, as well as in the domains of education and professional careers. A typical answer was '*According to our religion, a woman's place is in the home.*'

However, respondents claimed that things are changing, and women can now express their opinion without any reluctance. Nowadays, many young Muslim women are dressed in the same way as Christian women of their age, especially (but not only) those who are not married yet. Also, many girls get more schooling than before and so they do not get married at such a young age as before. Most respondents claimed that, compared to the older generation, younger people are not very observant now in terms of prayer and religious festivals—something Christians and Muslims seem to have in common. Ultimately, some respondents said, the degree of influence of religion in an individual's life is a personal matter.

National identity

As concerns the national/ethnic identity claimed by the interviewees, most Pomak respondents agreed that their religion constitutes a strong bond with the Turks. They either identified as Turks or managed not

to reply to the question about identity, whereas one Pomak claimed he is "*neither Greek nor Turk*". A teacher at a minority school, who declared "*proud to be a Pomak*", believes that the only connection between Turks and Pomaks is the fact that the Pomaks' everyday vocabulary is being invaded by Turkish words. This he sees as a result of the fact that Pomaks are "obligatorily" taught Turkish in primary school. Finally, all six Roma-gypsies identified as Greeks. A typical statement was "I have Greek citizenship. Therefore, I'm Greek".

Discussion

In the discussion that follows, attempts are made to link the information from the literature and from the interviews. Sometimes information, either within the literature or between the literature and the interviews, is somewhat contradictory. This may be due among other things: (a) to the fact that situation is rapidly changing and the people's living conditions/habits/views are undergoing changes, (b) to rural/urban or more generally geographical differences in perception and behaviour, and (c) to the fact that the interviews were conducted with a very small sample that was not selected in a way that ensures representativeness.

Shift in the Educational Preferences of Minority Parents

Both the literature and the respondents notice a shift in the educational habits of the minority in Thrace, particularly greater school attendance, a stronger preference for majority schools than before, and a shift towards enrolling in universities in Greece (as opposed to enrolling in universities in Turkey). The respondents aspire to university education for their children and describe this attitude as fairly common in their social environment. As pointed out by the respondents, these overall changes are, at least partly, due to the educational policies of the Greek state, particularly to the 1995 law that reserves one place for a Muslim student in each of the university institutions in the country. On the other hand, the specific educational provision takes on concrete meaning in the people's lives because the overall conditions have become more favourable for the Muslim minorities during recent years and they feel encouraged to

envision new economic roles for themselves in Greek society. Parents in all three towns declared they prefer minority schools at primary level. In Komotini and Alexandroupolis one of the reported reasons is social control.

The literature points to a differentiation within the minority on a geographical basis, especially between the prefecture of Xanthi and the prefecture of Rodhopi. The capital of the latter hosts the Turkish consulate; it is current opinion that this institution constitutes a factor of control with which the local people must come to terms in everyday life. Another important factor when trying to understand patterns of behaviour in education is the demographic composition of the three prefectures. In fact the Muslim citizens are unequally distributed across the three prefectures and, within the Muslim minority, the three groups who compose it are present in different percentages in the three prefectures. For example, in the Rodhopi prefecture the group of Turkish origin greatly outnumbers the other two.

The Minorities, the State and the International Bodies

Educational policies in relation to the minorities in Western Thrace have been closely linked to the position the minorities came to have in relation to (a) the Greek state, (b) neighbouring nation-states, (c) the international community, and (d) the characteristics of each subgroup within the minority.

International arrangements have constituted the basis of the regulation of minority education to this day. Minority protection by supranational bodies and agreements may facilitate the survival and maintenance of allegedly different cultural traits of those groups, but at the price of hindering the integration of such groups into the social and economic life of the country they live in. The interview answers suggest that among minority members in Western Thrace there is awareness that economic integration requires Greek formal education. To the extent there is a shift in educational preferences, this may be read as a voluntary abdication from a right granted to minority families on the basis of an international agreement. It seems that, when it comes to what is better for them and their children, minority parents' opinion may be different from the perception enshrined in international agreements signed (many decades earlier) in the name of the protection of minority rights.

The influence of Greek political positions on Pomak people is stronger in Xanthi than in the Rodhopi prefecture. Since the early 1990s there has been a gradual growth of Ḳur'ānic teaching in the Xanthi prefecture. This development has been interpreted as an attempt, on the part of members or groups of the local community, to re-equilibrate the ideological-political situation in the minority group after the great increase in Greek influence in some of its sectors. In contrast, in the Rodhopi prefecture, the informants showed that they did not even know what Ḳur'ānic teaching was (Troumbeta, 2001, p. 128).

As concerns Ḳur'ānic education, the findings from the present study do not allow to draw conclusions on a geographical basis because respondents in Xanthi were explicitly asked about Ḳur'ānic schools, whereas respondents in Komotini and Alexandroupoli (Rodhopi and Evros prefectures respectively) were not. All the same, we can say that in Xanthi Ḳur'ānic teaching usually constitutes part of everyday experience for boys and girls in primary school age.

National/Ethnic Identities

Most respondents describe themselves in terms of a national identity rather than an ethnic identity. Whether they declare themselves Greek or Turks, their attitude is alike inasmuch as they have a nation-state community as reference point.

According to some sources, the educational policies of the Greek state have contributed to the Pomak shift towards self-identification as Turks. Education has been an arena of struggle between Greek and Turkish governments. In fact, there are minority members who claim that the Greek state is using education to control them and keep them far from Turkish influence. Though the Greek state does not officially recognize any other minority within its borders, there are indications that at present the administration is trying to 'recover' the Pomaks singling them out from the Muslim minority.

Though some sources report that the Pomaks resent the renewed interest that the Greek state shows in their group, the interviews do not provide such evidence. It is possible that the particular respondents do not have such feelings, but it is also possible that the interviewers' membership in the majority group inhibited this type of remark.

Conclusion

The framework for the educational options available to the Muslim children in Western Thrace in Greece is established on the basis of international agreements inspired by the principle of protection of minority rights. Concrete applications of international agreements have been conditioned by the relationships between Greece and neighbouring countries, especially Turkey, and by the overall international situation in the area as it has evolved over time. Muslim parents, who are Greek citizens, have had the option to enrol their children (a) in bilingual schools teaching in Greek and Turkish, neither of which is the original language for half the minority members, and (b) in ordinary majority schools—an option that only recently parents have started taking. The Ḳur'ān is taught in Arabic in bilingual schools, whereas some local communities organize non-formal Ḳur'ānic education.

During the past decade, the Greek state has made some efforts to improve the situation of the minorities. In education, besides significant economic intervention in various sectors, a quota system has been introduced that ensures that some places in higher education be reserved for the Muslim minorities. The Muslims interviewed in Western Thrace perceive cultural and economic change going on, which affects their educational strategies. In particular, compared to a decade ago, now minority children are much more likely to attend a majority school. The findings from the interviews correspond to some extent to what other sources and findings show. However, no firm conclusions can be drawn from the interviews due to the nature of the sample, the problems involved in the 'mixed encounters' of the interview situation and the particular sensitivity of the situation in Western Thrace.

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